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PREFACE
The performance o f  Naval Dockyards has been a cause fo r  
serious concern over recent years and the subject o f  much debate and 
in v e s t ig a t io n .  Dockyard output depends p a r t l y  o f  course on the size 
o f  workforce, but to a greater  extent on i t s  e f fec t iveness ,  The l a t t e r  
i t s e l f  is  dependent on a m u l t i p l i c i t y  of i n t e r re la te d  var iab les  among 
which the management s k i l l s  and motiva t ion o f  j u n io r  management are 
considered to featu re  prominent ly.
In the work environment s t im u la t ion  o f  mot iva t ion is  a 
func t ion  o f  o rgan isat iona l  ch a ra c te r is t i c s  and condi t ions of serv ice 
amongst which pay and to a lesser extent promotion are deemed important.  
Recognising tha t  there is no in s ta n t  p re sc r ip t io n  f o r  dockyard i l l s ,  t h i s  
paper examines the important issues o f  rewards, namely pay and promotion 
and the problems posed in s t ru c tu r in g  them to meet the needs of the 
dockyards.
The propos i t ion  which the study develops is  tha t  the 
establishment o f  a c le a r l y  perceived l i n k  between e f f o r t ,  performance and 
reward is  c ruc ia l  fo r  developing a high level o f  motiva t ion and commitment 
amongst Non-Industr ia l  grades. A quest ionnaire was administered w ith  the 
aim of obta in ing as broad a range of in format ion as possible on pay, 
promotion and managerial a u th o r i t y  and also to assess the a t t i t u d e  o f
'wh i te '  c o l l a r  employees to incen t ive  schemes.
However, under present arrangements the management in each 
dockyard enjoys l i t t l e  a u th o r i t y  over numbers, pay, grading, incent ives and
a l lo c a t io n  o f  resources. This paper considers these im p l ica t ions  and the
fa c t  tha t  there is  v i r t u a l l y  no scope fo r  local  management to ad jus t  pay
V I1 1
or promotion systems to  match the ch a ra c te r is t i c s  o f the dockyards, 
and re la tes  the quest ionnaire  f ind ings  to these e x is t in g  arrangements
ALEX C. SCOUGALL
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CHAPTER 1 
SETTING THE SCENE 
In t ro d u c t i  on
The aim o f  the present study is  to examine the curren t  system o f  
pay and promotion operat ing f o r  Professional and Technology O f f ice rs  (P&T) 
grades 2, 3 and 4 in Naval dockyards and i d e n t i f y  how these may be 
redesigned to improve t h e i r  a t t rac t iveness  and hence the performance of 
Non - I n d u s t r i a l s .  Mater ia l  f o r  the study i s  based mainly on a f i e l d  
study conducted amongst these grades at Rosyth Dockyard. I t  had also 
been hoped to conduct a p a ra l le l  study at Chatham Dockyard, but f o r  
reasons mentioned below th is  did not prove fe a s ib le .  A quest ionnaire  
was prepared, tested and administered to a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  selected random 
sample of 385 P & T  grades.
The study was conducted over a period (1980-1982) o f  turbulence 
f o r  the dockyards, but two events in p a r t i c u la r  dominated the scene. 
F i r s t l y  the Dockyard Study repor t  (1980) h igh l igh ted  a d e te r io ra t io n  
in  the performance of Naval Dockyards in support of the F leet and put 
forward a number o f  recommendations designed to remedy the s i t u a t i o n .
The pub l ica t ion  of the Dockyard Study repor t  in  August 1980 promised a new 
deal f o r  the dockyards along with  the Government's concomitant 
commitment to keep a l l  fou r  home dockyards open. However, before the 
re p o r t ' s  recommendations had been properly  absorbed^the second major 
event occurred. As a r e s u l t  of  a defence review i t  was announced in 
June 1981 tha t  Chatham dockyard would close and Portsmouth dockyard 
would cease r e f i t  work. (However in  the l a s t  few weeks a defence white 
paper (1982) The Falklands Campaign, The Lessons, ind ica tes tha t  
Portsmouth naval base w i l l  re ta in  a l im i te d  r e f i t  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  the 
foreseeable fu tu re ) .  The June 1981 announcement had a devastat ing e f fe c t
1
on the morale of a l l  dockyard employees, but t h i s  was replaced q u ick ly  
a t  Rosyth w ith  a r e a l i s a t i o n  tha t  Rosyth's fu tu re  had been e f f e c t i v e l y  
secured.
Another feature o f  the present turbulence concerns the mechanism of 
pay determinat ion since the context o f  the study also embraces the 
considerable d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  w i th  e x is t in g  payment systems, both as 
manifested at dockyard level and as par t  o f  the la rg e r  C iv i l  Service.
Also in the l a s t  few months the pub l ica t ion  o f  the Megaw Inqu i ry  in to  
C iv i l  Service pay (1982) raises im p l ica t ions  f o r  dockyards through some 
of the Report's recommendations on performance-related pay and the idea 
th a t  market forces should in f luence pay levels  and re la t io n sh ip s  f o r  a l l  
c i v i l  servants. The appropriateness o f  Megan's recommendations w i l l  be 
commented on as we proceed with  our examination o f  the issues. Indeed 
the recommendation on performance-related pay has d i r e c t  reference to our 
study of rewards.
The choice o f  the lower P & T  grades as the subjects of the study 
is  f o r  three reasons. F i r s t l y  i t  may be argued th a t  the capacity  o f 
dockyards to r e f i t  warships to an acceptable standard and economically is  
heav i ly  dependent on the s k i l l  and motiva t ion of lower management.
Secondly there is  an emergent awareness among Non In d u s t r ia l s  th a t  the 
degree of a u th o r i t y  and autonomy t r a d i t i o n a l l y  enjoyed by lower management 
in  dockyards is coming under increasing pressure from both trade unions 
and senior management. T h i rd ly  the se lec t ion  of th is  p a r t i c u la r  group 
centres on the fa c t  tha t  there is  a sca rc i t y  of in format ion in the 
l i t e r a t u r e  r e la t in g  d i r e c t l y  to issues of reward and mot iva t ion  fo r  
lower management.
Nature of the Problem
The f i r s t  po in t to  es tab l ish  is the scope, nature and magnitude 
o f  the problem confront ing  Naval Dockyards. The symptoms are obvious, 
namely a f a i l u r e  o f  the dockyards to r e f i t  warships to programme and 
cost due to low p ro d u c t i v i t y  (Dockyard Study Report (1980)).  Although 
p ro d u c t i v i t y  per man is  d i f f i c u l t  to measure in dockyards,(a po in t  we 
sha l l  discuss l a te r , )  there is  no evidence o f  improvement in recent years; 
indeed.according to the Dockyard Study, there is  every in d ica t io n  th a t  i t  
has decl ined.  The pe r t ine n t  question is  what has caused th i s  decl ine in 
p ro du c t iv i ty?  Is i t  simply a r e f l e c t i o n  of what has been happening in 
some sectors o f  B r i t i s h  indus t ry  or are there other fac to rs  pecu l ia r  to 
Naval Dockyards co n t r ibu t in g  to th is  decline? Before we can attempt to 
answer th i s  question we need to have some idea of the fac to rs  which can 
or may inf luence the level o f  product ive output.
The leve l o f product ive output achieved in any organ isat ion is a 
func t ion  of many in te r re la te d  var iab les .  Indeed Handy (1976) mentions 
over s i x t y  d i f f e r e n t  va r ia b les ,  among them, employee m o t iva t ion ,  the 
reward system, the physical environment, group re la t io n s  and the f i t  
between the s t ruc tu re  and the technology of the o rgan isa t ion .  These 
var iab les  are sens i t ive  not only to mutual i n te ra c t io n  between themselves, 
but to a whole host of complex cause and e f fe c t  i n te ra c t io n  with  
dimensions such as pay, promotion, career planning, the way work is  
organised and con t ro l led  and not leas t  the a t t i t u d e  adopted by trade 
un ions.
I t  would be u n r e a l i s t i c  to assume th a t  a s ing le  fa c to r  has been 
responsible f o r  the decl ine in dockyard p ro d u c t i v i t y .  Nevertheless, 
among the var iab les  mentioned are a number of key va r iab les  which are 
deemed to  be major determinants o f  employee behaviour, f o r  example pay, 
career planning and promotion and the way work is  organised. The Dockyard 
Study (1983)in  i t s  diagnosis of the Dockyard's problem h ig h l ig h ts
r e s t r i c t i v e  pract ices by In d u s t r ia l  grades and disenchantment by Non- 
In d u s t r ia l s  as the p r in c ip a l  reason f o r  poor p ro d u c t i v i t y ,  w ith  the pay 
problem co n t r ibu t in g  to both these fa c to rs ,  but in  p a r t i c u la r  i t  has 
a f fec ted the motivat ion of Non-Industr ia l  grades. To th is  end our study 
w i l l  focus on the pay reward and to a lesser extent the promotion issue.
The ob jec t ive  w i l l  be to attempt to analyse the issue of rewards to 
i d e n t i f y  the key var iab les  involved with  respect to pay and promotion 
so th a t  p red ic t ion  as to  probable outcomes to any change to these dimensions 
may be made and f i n a l l y  to i d e n t i f y  those var iab les  amenable to change 
w i th in  def ined cons t ra in ts .
Naval Dockyards
There are c u r re n t ly  fou r  home dockyards, but i t  is  planned to 
cease r e f i t t i n g  warships at Chatham and Portsmouth by 1984. A to ta l  
o f  approximately 32,000 c i v i l  servants are employed in the fou r  dockyards; 
i t  is  estimated th a t  t h i s  number w i l l  probably decrease to 23,000 by 
1984, but th is  f i g u re  may be greater  as a re s u l t  of  the decision to 
re ta in  Portsmouth as a r e f i t  f a c i l i t y .  The manpower s trength  o f  the 
fou r  home dockyards is  shown at Table 1.1 Dockyard Study (1980).
Table 1.1 Dockyard Manpower Strength
Portsmouth Devonport Chatham Rosyth Total
Non In d u s t r ia l 1900 3100 1700 1500 8200
In d u s t r ia l  Craf t 2500 4700 1800 2000 11100
In d u s t r ia l  Non Craf t 2100 3600 1800 1700 9200
Apprent i ce 800 1300 700 700 3500
Total 7400 12700 6000 5900 32000
The workforce consists  o f two d i s t i n c t  groups, Non In d u s t r ia l  (White 
C o l la r )  and In d u s t r ia ls  (Blue C o l la r ) .  The Non In d u s t r ia l  cons is t  o f  s ix
occupational groups, but only one group, technical supervisor,  is  
permit ted to supervise In d u s t r ia l  grades d i r e c t l y ,  the other  f i v e  groups 
carry out s p e c ia l i s t  tasks in the Dockyard. At Rosyth Dockyard there 
are approximately 4,400 In d u s t r ia l  grades and 1,490 Non I n d u s t r i a l .
The Non In d u s t r ia l  group consists o f  the Professional & Technical ( P & T ) ,  
1,190 and the Executive group make up the remainder. The P & T  group 
exc lus ive ly  occupy the f i r s t  3 t i e r s  o f  the e igh t  t i e r  management 
s t ru c tu re  with a l im i te d  number occupying posts in  the fou r th  and f i f t h  
t i e r s .  The top fou r  t i e r s  of management are f i l l e d  predominant ly by 
professional engineers from the Royal Corps'of Naval Constructors (RCNC) 
supplemented by a small number o f  serving naval o f f i c e r s .
The dockyard organ isat ion is  an in teg ra l  par t  of  the Navy Department, 
the Admira l ty Board member responsible f o r  the Dockyards is  the Chief o f  
F leet Support. He discharges his  dut ies through the Chief Executive 
Dockyards (CED) who administers the four home and one remaining overseas 
dockyard, which is  dest ined to  close by 1984, from his headquarters at 
Bath. He has a centra l  s t a f f  o f  approximately 400 Non- Indus t r ia ls .
Unl ike the m a jo r i t y  o f  organisat ions s a t i s fy in g  a need or provid ing a 
serv ice the Royal Dockyards are not in  any formal t rad ing  re la t io n s h ip  
w i th  i t s  customer, the Royal Navy.
The dockyards are a jobbing indus t ry  w ith  an enormously var ied 
workload. The work can vary from the modernisat ion o f  a nuclear submarine 
to the docking o f  a harbour a u x i l i a r y  c r a f t .  The June 1981 Defence 
Review impl ies th a t  a greater  p ropor t ion  of dockyard resources v / i l l  be 
a l loca ted  f o r  nuclear submarine r e f i t t i n g .  In add i t ion  to the planned 
r e f i t t i n g  work undertaken, the dockyard may be ca l led  on a t  any time to 
carry  out emergency re p a i r  work which may necessi ta te  programmed work 
being delayed or set aside. The nature o f  the work demands a high
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degree of management e f f o r t  and a high percentage o f  engineering craftsmen. 
Indeed the r a t i o  of s k i l l e d  to other  i n d u s t r ia ls  excluding apprent ices is
1.2 to 1, according to  the Dockyard Study Report 1980.
Rosyth Dockyard
With a labour fo rce of approximately 6,000 Rosyth dockyard is a 
sizeable undertaking in  terms of an in d u s t r ia l  o rgan isa t ion .  For 
example there are only some 100 ind iv idua l  establ ishments in the UK 
manufactur ing indus t ry  w ith  more than 5,000 employees. The Dockyard 
is co- located in  the Rosyth Naval Base with  a c i v i l i a n  manned Naval 
Stores and Transport o rgan isat ion  employing some 1,200, a naval manned 
F lee t  Maintenance Base which provides garage f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  some twenty 
f i v e  inshore naval vessels,  and a Port A u x i l i a r y  Service organisat ion 
which operates tugs and other  harbour support vessels. Although each 
group enjoy varying degrees of autonomy, the Port Admiral who is  best 
described as the m i l i t a r y  commander of the Naval Base is  the chairman of 
the Port Board and in e f f e c t  performs a co-ord inat ing  func t ion  between the 
fou r  organ isat ions. The dockyard is headed by a General Manager who 
is  p ro fess iona l ly  responsib le to  CED, and he is  also one of the members 
o f  the Port Board. A diagram of the Naval Base management s t ru c tu re  
(Port  Board) is  shown at Figure 1.2.
In terms of numerical number Rosyth is  almost id e n t ica l  to Chatham, 
but i t  is  unique among the four  home dockyards in th a t  i t  was created from 
a 'G reen f ie ld '  s i te  between 1912-15 to provide a dockyard to support 
the Grand F leet .  To enable the dockyard to be manned with  the re q u is i te  
s k i l l s  q u ick ly ,  a large proport ion  o f  i t s  i n i t i a l  s k i l l e d  labour fo rce was 
drawn from the three Southern Royal Dockyards. With the rundown of 
the F leet in the ea r ly  1920s Rosyth Dockyard was closed in 1924 and placed 
in  care and maintenance u n t i l  1938.
In 1968 Rosyth Dockyard undertook the f i r s t  r e f i t  o f  a nuclear 
submarine and since 1970 i t  has been the designated r e f i t t i n g  dockyard 
fo r  the B r i t i s h  S tra teg ic  Deterrent submarines, Po la r is .  Nine major 
nuclear submarines r e f i t s  have been completed since 1968. The fa c t  
th a t  Rosyth has accumulated a s i g n i f i c a n t  re se rvo i r  o f  nuclear submarine 
r e f i t t i n g  s k i l l s  and exper t ise  has, along with  good access to the sea, 
assured i t s  fu tu re .  Rosyth's fu tu re  has been f u r th e r  re-assured
recen t ly  by the decis ion to close Chatham and to cease r e f i t  work at
Portsmouth. This decis ion has obviously given added se cu r i t y  to the 
workforce which could make changes in working pract ices more d i f f i c u l t  to 
achieve. Indeed, the Defence Review (June 1981) may have engendered a 
fe e l in g  of i n d i s p e n s i b i l i t y  among the workforce.
The Local Labour Market and i t s  Rela t ionship  to  the Dockyard
Geographical ly Rosyth dockyard is s i tuated on the North bank o f  
the Forth approximately twelve miles from Edinburgh and four  miles from 
Dunfermline. The predominant indus t ry  in the region u n t i l  twenty years 
ago was coal mining. As the coal mines in the area became exhausted, 
in  the la te  1950s, they were shut down and although a few new mines were 
opened at Kincardine and Seafield coal mining can hardly  be considered 
a major indus try  in the area. The rundown o f  the coal indus t ry  resu lted 
in  only a small i n f l u x  o f  s k i l l e d  and non-ski l i e d  In d u s t r ia l  grades in to  
the Dockyard, but v i r t u a l l y  no Non-Industr ia l  grades.
Nowadays the m a jo r i t y  o f  indus t ry  in the area is  centred on modern
in d u s t r ia l  estates w i th  e le c t ro n ic  indus t r ies  being wel l  represented. There 
is l i t t l e  heavy engineering indus try  in the area apart  from the Redpath 
de Groot Caledonian o i l  r i g  fa b r i c a t io n  yard at Methi l  and a Petro­
chemical p lan t  c u r re n t ly  under construc t ion at Moss Morran some f i v e  miles 
from Rosyth. There had been fears p a r t i c u l a r l y  during the
i n i t i a l  construc t ion  phase of Moss Morran th a t  there would be an 
exodus of s k i l l e d  employees, welders and pipeworkers, from the dockyard, 
but th a t  did not occur.  A small number o f  s k i l l e d  men were a t t rac ted  
to leave, but undoubtedly the more r igorous condi t ions o f  employment 
compared with the dockyard coupled with  a temporary r e c r u i t i n g  ban 
imposed by the C iv i l  Service and emergent uncer ta in ty  in  1980 concerning 
the fu tu re  size and shape of Rosyth dissuaded s i g n i f i c a n t  numbers from 
leaving f o r  higher wage ra tes .  The f a c t  th a t  only a few were a t t rac ted  
by the oppor tun i ty  to earn high pay i l l u s t r a t e s  the value th a t  is  placed 
on job se cu r i t y .  In simple language, people were u n w i l l in g  to leave the 
dockyard f o r  fea r  o f not g e t t in g  back in to  the dockyard i f  they were made 
redundant. I t  is  paradoxical th a t  the temporary C iv i l  Service re c r u i t i n g  
ban has achieved more than f in a n c ia l  inducements in re ta in in g  s p e c ia l i s t s  
s k i l l s  in the dockyard, although undoubtedly anxie ty  concerning job 
se cu r i t y  caused by the current recession was a s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r ibu to ry  
fa c to r .
The fa c t  tha t  there are r e l a t i v e l y  few job oppor tun i t ies  f o r  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  technica l grades in the Rosyth area is  la rg e ly  i r r e le v a n t  
because t r a d i t i o n a l l y  there has been l i t t l e  movement o f personnel 
between the C iv i l  Service and the p r iva te  sector .  Indeed the condit ions 
of Service are designed on the assumption or more p re c ise ly ,  the 
expecta t ion^that c i v i l  servants w i l l  spend t h e i r  e n t i r e  working l i ve s  in 
the Service; Fulton (1968) commented unfavourably on the lack of 
m o b i l i t y  between.the C iv i l  and p r iva te  sectors.  Agreements between Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  Trade Unions and Management re in fo rce  the exclusiveness o f  
the Non In d u s t r ia l  pos i t ion  and make i t  very d i f f i c u l t  f o r  dockyards to  
r e c r u i t  Non-Industr ia l  grades d i r e c t  from indus try  or even ex-members 
o f  the Armed Services. The o r ig in a l  purpose of these agreements was to 
p ro tec t  the promotion oppor tun i t ies  of career or establ ished Non-
I n d u s t r ia l  grades, but a de le te r ious  e f fec t ,  has been the suppression 
o f  any meaningful cross f e r t i l i s a t i o n  between the Publ ic and Pr ivate 
sector .  Some Non-Industr ia l  grades do however, get involved with  
p r iva te  indus t ry  when they are appointed to overseeing du t ies ,  but 
these numbers are small .
Pay Bargaining
In recent years pay negot ia t ions have fol lowed nat ional p rac t ice  
and have been conducted on the basis o f an annual round. Annual pay 
increases were set and negot iated w i th in  the frame-work o f  the system 
recommended by the P r ie s t le y  Commission (1955). This recommended a set 
o f  p r in c ip le s  to govern C iv i l  Service pay and to promote the ove r r id ing  
aim o f  an e f f i c i e n t  and f a i r l y  remunerated C iv i l  Serv ice, o f  these:
"The primary p r in c ip le  fo r  determining the pay o f  c i v i l  servants 
should be f a i r  comparison with the current remuneration of outside 
s ta f f s  employed on broadly comparable work, taking account o f  other 
condi t ions o f  serv ice ;  and tha t  in te rna l  r e l a t i v i t i e s  should be used 
as a supplement to the p r in c ip le  o f  f a i r  comparison - and may have to be 
the f i r s t  considerat ion when outs ide comparisons cannot be made".
To enable the P r ie s t le y  p r in c ip le  to be t rans la ted  in to  p rac t ice  
the Pay Research Uni t  (PRU) was set up in  1956 to provide a f a c t  f i n d in g  
service. A j o i n t  Management Non-Industr ia l  Trade Union group was set up 
to commission surveys from the U n i t ,  to spec ify  the in format ion requ i red,  
and to ensure tha t  the Uni t  was provided with  the resources necessary 
to carry  out i t s  task. Pay research was concentrated in  one ' independent 
body' which produced in format ion f o r  both p a r t ies ,  but was s ta f fed  almost 
e xc lus ive ly  by c i v i l  servants. The system was based on methods o f  pay 
comparison and used comparisons o f  to ta l  remuneration ra the r  than simple 
wage ra tes .  Although the body's f ind ings  had been temporar i ly  suspended' 
on occasion, i t  was not f i n a l l y  abandoned u n t i l  1981.
The PRU's reports  provided the raw data on which the pay of the 
re levant  C iv i l  Service grades would be based. This data as i t  stood 
did not i t s e l f  ind ica te  the level  of sett lement ;  adjustments were made 
to take account o f  the value to the outside employee of such items as 
bonus payments, pension co n t r ib u t io n s ,  free  or subsidised cars and 
subsidised meals. In add i t ion  a special  adjustment was made to 
compensate f o r  i n f l a t i o n  between the time the comparisons were made and 
the operating date o f  the pay sett lement .
The actual scope f o r  nego t ia t ion  was l im i te d ;  small adjustments 
were usua l ly  made in response to considerat ions such as job se cu r i t y  
m o b i l i t y  or other wider considerat ions which e i th e r  side wished to 
advance. Although these fac to rs  created oppor tun i ty  f o r  nego t ia t ion , they  
only marg ina l ly  a f fec ted the level  o f  the f i n a l  pay sett lement .
Although the C iv i l  Service unions have in general remained 
committed to the s t ruc tu re  estab l ished by P r ie s t le y ,  the I n s t i t u t i o n  
o f  Professional C iv i l  Servants (IPGS) f o r  a number o f  years inc reas ing ly  
expressed d is s a t i s f a c t io n  with  the way the system was appl ied to  the 
Professional and Technology Group. The s truc tu red system of pay research 
created problems because d i f f e r e n t  occupat ional groups w i th in  the C iv i l  
Service were, qu i te  n a tu ra l l y ,  compared with  d i f f e r e n t  groups in  
indus t ry  and commerce. The net r e s u l t  was th a t  those groups who were 
compared w ith  engineers and technic ians tended to receive less than 
those groups compared with  adm in is t ra to rs ,  accountants, e tc .  The 
emergence of hor izon ta l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  prompted the IPCS to seek a 
renego t ia t ion  of the Pay Agreement to give more p r i o r i t y  to in te rna l  
r e l a t i v i t i e s  and less to external comparisons. This approach was at 
var iance with  the m a jo r i t y  of C iv i l  Service unions who reaff i rmed t h e i r  
b e l i e f  tha t  the s ta r t i n g  po in t  in any system of pay should be comparison 
w ith  people doing s im i la r  jobs outs ide the Service.
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As we have mentioned, P r ie s t le y  created a number o f  pay problems 
some of which have important connotat ions fo r  dockyard Non-Industr ia l  
grades. A manifes ta t ion  o f  the a p p l ica t ion  o f  pay research ''as th a t  
d i f f e r e n t  occupat ional groups w i th in  the C iv i l  Service were awarded 
d i f f e r e n t  increases of pay, we sha l l  examine some of the problems th a t  
th i s  creates fo r  the dockyards.
The Promotion Dimension
An e f fe c t i v e  promotion system which w i l l  reward good performance is  
an important p re requ is i te  f o r  the sus ten ta t io i  o f  any heal thy organisat ion 
The r i g h t  promotion at the r i g h t  time is  an essent ia l  part  o f  the process 
o f  developing to the f u l l  the ta le n ts  of the i n d iv id u a l .  The promotion 
process is  an in teg ra l  part  o f  career planning and development in  any 
sizeable o rgan isa t ion .
Before proceeding i t  is  necessary to gain some idea of the 
importance which is  attached to  promotion in the C iv i l  Service. The 
Government in  i t s  evidence to Megaw 1982 gives us a useful  po in te r .
"The main form of reward f o r  m er i t  in the C iv i l  Service has been 
promotion to the next grade, as and when vacancies occur and the 
prospect o f promotion has been the main incent ive  f o r  in d iv id u a ls  
to perform wel l  in  t h e i r  curren t  grade,"
The inference which may be drawn from th is  statement is  th a t  
promotion acts as a su b s t i tu te  fo r  incen t ive  payments as a method f o r  
rewarding m er i t  in  the C iv i l  Service, This we bel ieve  provides 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  considering pay and promotion juxtaposed in  the study.
The Government's view on promotion contrasts  w ith  th a t  expounded at 
o f f i c i a l  t r a in in g  courses held l o c a l l y  f o r  authors o f s t a f f  repor ts .  
Teaching on these courses is  inc l in ed  towards the assumption th a t  the 
current system of promotion is  not a reward fo r  past endeavour. A 
ra t io na l  explanat ion f o r  th i s  teaching has been d i f f i c u l t  to es tab l ish
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other than the desi re  to  minimise the competit iveness inherent in any 
promotion system. However, a more log ica l  explanat ion may be th a t  
cu r ren t  Government th ink ing  on t h i s  issue has not percolated down to 
the dockyards.
In the m a jo r i ty  o f  s i tu a t io n s  promotion is  normal ly associated with  
an increase in pay and indeed t h i s  i s  so. Promotion engenders 
expectat ions of add i t iona l  reward to the i n d iv id u a l .  Although these 
rewards may not necessar i ly  be f i n a n c i a l ,  i t  is  l i k e l y  th a t  in  the 
m a jo r i ty  of cases f i n a n c ia l  considerat ions were an important fa c to r  in  
deciding whether or not to seek promotion. S i tua t ions  can a r ise  in the 
dockyard where promotion al though re s u l t in g  in an increase in basic 
sa lary  may re s u l t  in a reduct ion in gross earnings. This po in t  w i l l  be 
examined la t e r .
The Non-Industr ia l  - Salary Earner
There is  a whole range of sequences which d is t ingu ishes  the Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  grade from the In d u s t r ia l  grade. But amongst the more 
important is  the system o f  payment administered to each group. I t  is  
p rac t ice  to r e fe r  to a N on - In d u s t r ia l 's  pay as his sa la ry  and an 
I n d u s t r i a l ' s  as his wage. Lupton et al (1983) s tates th a t  a sa la ry  
earner is t y p i c a l l y  a rou t ine  c l e r i c a l  worker, a technical man, a 
professional man (eg accountant,  chartered engineer) or a manager.
Leaving aside fo r  the moment rou t ine  c le r i c a l  workers who are c loser  
to manual workers in t h i s  respect ,  the other groups of sa la ry  earners 
have expectations o f  advancement, based upon age, s e n io r i t y ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  
experience, performance, to higher leve ls  o f monetary reward. The wage 
earner 's  career expectat ionsare much more l im i t e d .  Lupton fu r th e r  
asserts the 'break'  between the sa la ry  and wage earner is  psychological 
as wel l as s t r u c t u r a l . A po in t  re in forced by the t r a d i t i o n a l  nomenclature
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of  white and blue c o l l a r  workers and such things as the p e r io d i c i t y  o f 
payments . In the C iv i l  Service, f o r  example Non- Industr ia ls  are paid 
monthly w ith  a few minor except ions and In d u s t r ia ls  weekly.
The work done by 'blue c o l l a r '  workers, f o r  the most p a r t ,  tends to 
be easier to measure than work done by managers and professional people. 
However, i t  would not be d i f f i c u l t  to quote examples o f  manual work 
where performance measurement. is d i f f i c u l t ,  f o r  example where jobbing 
a c t i v i t i e s  are involved.
Although there are many psychological as wel l  as s t ruc tua l  sequences 
which d is t in g u ish  Non In d u s t r ia l  from In d u s t r ia l  grades, in dockyards 
PTO IVs and I l l s  are in a ra the r  ambivalent pos i t ion  because they work 
alongside In d u s t r ia l  grades. The g u l f  between Non-Industr ia l  and 
In d u s t r ia l  grades is  maintained by condit ions o f  se rv ice ,  custom and 
prac t ice  and a host of less tang ib le  status re la ted  nuances. I t  is  
important th a t  any new payment system f o r  e i t h e r  group should be designed 
to lessen the d i s t i n c t i o n s  between the tv/o groups. Thus what we are 
advocating is  th a t  the pay system administered to  each group should 
have high congruence.
A Theoret ica l  Framework
In order to give the study coherence and d i re c t io n  i t  is necessary 
to develop a the o re t ica l  frame o f  reference to aid our examination of 
systems o f  reward in  the dockyards. This approach is des irab le  so th a t  
we may gain a c lear  understanding of the de f ic ienc ies  and weaknesses in 
the current systems before we can go on to o u t l in e  a l t e rn a t i v e  ways of 
s t ru c tu r in g  the pay and promotion reward. F i r s t l y  we must es tab l ish  in 
broad terms the dimension in f luenc ing  and a f fec t ing  dockyard product ive 
output.  I t  is  reasonable to assume th a t  the product ive output of any 
organisat ion is  a func t ion  o f  ind iv idu a l  output which is  e f f e c t i v e l y  a
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func t ion  o f  ind iv idu a l  performance. Thus we may convenein t ly  express 
the output o f an organisat ion as Ind iv idua l  output or Ind iv idua l  
performance.
Since performance is  u l t im a te ly  an ind iv idua l  phenomenon (Gumming: 
e t  al 1973) environmental var iab les  inf luence performance p r im a r i l y  
through t h e i r  e f f e c t  on the ind iv idua l  determinants o f  performance 
a b i l i t y  and/or mot iva t ion .  A general model r e f l e c t i n g  these ideas 
is  set out a t Figure 1,3 (-Cummings et al (1973)).
Figure 1.3 Performance Model
Environment In d iv id u a l !
Job Design 
Supervi si on 
Fel low Workers 
Training 
Evolut ion
A b i l i  ty..^
Mot i vat i on»-^^
Performance
Our s ta r t i n g  po in t  f o r  the development of a su i ta b le  th e o re t ica l  
model is th a t  performance is determined p r im a r i ly  by a b i l i t y  and m o t i ­
va t ion .  Environmental fa c to r s ,  inc lud ing a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  organ isat ions, 
may engage in  to improve employee performance, have t h e i r  impact, i f  any, 
on a b i l i t y  and mot iva t ion .  We can d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between a b i l i t y  and 
motiva t ion on the fo l low ing  basis.  A b i l i t y  r e f l e c t s  c a p a b i l i t y ,  a 
r e l a t i v e l y  stable  c h a ra c te r i s t i c  which enables in d iv id u a ls  to  behave in 
some spec i f ied  fash ion. Motiva t ion on the other  hand re f l e c t s  e f f o r t ,  
a dynamic, o ften t ra n s ie n t  c h a ra c te r i s t i c  which determines how 
v igorous ly  c a p a b i l i t i e s  w i l l  be employed in some a c t i v i t y .  We w i l l  
f i r s t l y  examine a b i l i t y  and then m ot iva t ion .
A b i1i ty
Conceptual ly ind iv idua l  a b i l i t y  may be considered to cons is t  of 
two elements, the innate and the accumulation o f  s k i l l s  by t r a i n in g .
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The general level  o f  a b i l i t y  in any organisat ion is  a func t ion  of the 
se lec t ion  process and t r a in in g  programmes. Select ion seeks to ensure 
th a t  s t a f f  rec ru i ted  by an organ isat ion have a spec i f ied  minimum level 
o f  a b i l i t y  consis tent w ith  t h e i r  f i e l d  of occupat ion.
A b i l i t y  leve ls  may be increased by t r a in in g .  I t  is  genera l ly  
accepted th a t  s t a f f  high in a b i l i t y  to  begin w ith  are l i k e l y  to  gain 
more from t ra in in g  than s t a f f  s ta r t i n g  at a lower leve l  of a b i l i t y .
A model showing the var iab les in f luenc ing  and a f fe c t in g  a b i l i t y  is  shown 
at Figure 1,4.
Figure 1.4. Determinants of A b i l i t y
Environment
Factors
Organi sat i  on 
Image
Recrui t i  ng 
Pol i  cy
Empioyment 
Opportuni t i  es
Selec t i  on Formal 
Trai ni ng
Innate 
A b i l i t y
A b i l i t y
 --------
On Job
Tra in ing
Experience
Motiva t ion
The motivat ion dimension un l ike  the a b i l i t y  dimension from our 
performance model is  not amenable to such simple treatment.  Mot iva t ion  
is  a somewhat e lus ive  dimension inf luenced by a complex in te ra c t io n  
o f  var iab les o f  which personal needs, percept ion, expectat ion, a t t r a c t i v e '  
ness of outcomes and rewards fea ture  prominent ly.  F i r s t l y ,  we need to 
gain an understanding o f  how these var iab les  in te ra c t  and in f luence 
mot iva t ion .  A conceptual mot iva t iona l  model has been set out a t 
Figure 1.5. From th is  basic o u t l in e  model we sha l l  move on to discuss 
motiva t ion theor ies and examine in d e ta i l  the in te ra c t io n  between 
rewards, e f f o r t ,  performance and a t t rac t iveness  o f  outcome.
15
Figure 1.5 Out l ine Mot iva t iona l  Model
Motivat ion
Expectations
Motiva t iona l
Force
I
Att rac t iveness
of
Outcome
F i r s t  Order E f fec t  shown thus 
Second Order E f fec t  Shown Thus
1 —-1
E f f o r t
1
t >
Performance
t ........... ......... - ...
Rewards
Relat ing th i s  model to the dockyard scene and the theme o f  our 
study, rewards, we can d i s t i l  the model down to two key dimensions, 
namely the dependent va r iab le  of Performance, and the independent 
va r iab le  of reward. In the m a jo r i t y  o f  organisat ions there w i l l  be a 
feedback loop between output and input  (performance and reward) as is  
shown in Figure 1.5; in other words the f in a n c ia l  reward ava i lab le  to 
employees w i l l . b e  a func t ion  of the organisat ions performance. However, 
t h i s  l i n k  between f in a n c ia l  reward and dockyard performance f o r  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  grades is non e x is te n t .  At the personal leve l  the l i n k  
between ind iv idua l  performance and the other major reward, promotion, is  
some what tenuous, a po in t we shal l  explore l a t e r .  To r e i t e ra t e  th e re fo re ,  
the ob jec t ive  of the study is  to i d e n t i f y  methods o f  strengthening the 
l in k s  between performance and the pay and promotion rewards, so th a t  
dockyard performance may be improved. We sha l l  examine ways of 
strengthening these l in k s  by analysing the fac to rs  hypothesised to 
con t r ibu te  to ind iv idua l  and group performance.
To achieve a greater  understanding of the concept of mot iva t iona l  
fo rce and how i t  a f fe c ts  ind iv idu a l  behaviour we need to  es tab l ish  a more 
precise connection between the dimensions of reward, pe r fo rmance ,e f fo r t .
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a t t rac t iveness  o f  outcome and expectat ion than shown in  Figure 1.5.
To do th is  we must tu rn  fo r  assistance to the f i e l d  of motiva t iona l  
theory.
Motiva t iona l  Theories
A number o f  mot iva t ion  theor ies suggest s c i e n t i f i c  explanat ions of 
why ind iv idu a ls  choose pa r t icu la r !  behaviours to a t ta in  t h e i r  goals. The 
general "Expectancy theory" model of human mot iva t ion provides one way 
of analysing and p red ic t ing  which courses of act ion an ind iv idua l  w i l l  
f o l lo w  when he has the oppor tun i ty  to make personal choices about his 
behaviour. This theory , which was o r i g i n a l l y  formulated by Tolman and 
Lewin in  the 1930's recen t ly  has been u se fu l l y  appl ied by Porter et al 
(1975) to behaviour in  organ isat iona l  se t t ings  by Vroom (1964) and 
Porter (1968). In essence Vroom's model postulates th a t  the mot iva t iona l  
' fo r c e '  to  engage in a behaviour is  a m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  func t ion  o f  (1) the 
expectancies the person holds about what outcomes are l i k e l y  to r e s u l t  
from tha t  behaviour and (2) the a t t rac t iveness  or valence of these 
outcomes.
Motiva t iona l  Force = Expectancy x Valence 
Expectancy Model
A number o f  developments in motiva t iona l  theory have taken place 
since Vroom stated his expectancy theory in 1964. The expectancy model 
we shal l  describe draws on these developments to provide the best 
ava i lab le  model f o r  understanding motiva t ion  in  o rgan isat ions.  This 
model is  based on four  points  th a t  previous research on human mot iva t ion  
suggests are v a l i d :
a. People have preferences among various outcomes tha t  are 
p o te n t i a l l y  ava i lab le  to them.
b. People have expectat ions about the l i k e l ih o o d  tha t  an act ion 
( e f f o r t )  on t h e i r  par t  w i l l  lead to the intended performance.
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c. People have expectat ions about the l i k e l ih o o d  th a t  ce r ta in  
outcomes w i l l  fo l lo w  t h e i r  performance.
d. In any s i t u a t i o n ,  the act ions a person chooses to take are 
determined by the expectancies and the preferences th a t  the person 
has a t  th a t  t ime.
Let us i l l u s t r a t e  our th e o re t ica l  model w ith  an example.
Dealing f i r s t l y  w ith  the p ropos i t ion  at paragraph b, suppose a Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  estimates th a t  there is  a 50% p r o b a b i l i t y  th a t  his workgang 
w i l l  complete the refurb ishment o f a sh ip 's  main engines in  s ix  weeks.
The N on - Ind u s t r ia l 's  est imation o f  the p r o b a b i l i t y  tha t  he w i l l  complete 
th i s  task in s ix  weeks is  simply his  expectancy. This can be labe l led  an 
e f f o r t  - performance (E P) expectancy, where e f f o r t  may be physical
or mental or as is  more usual,  a combination of both. I f  we consider 
t h i s  kind o f  expectancy as varying from 0 to 1 the N o n - In d u s t r ia l ’ s 
expectancy in our example may be represented as 0.5.
Moving on to consider the propos i t ion  in paragraph c which postu lates tha 
people liave expectancies about the l ik e l ih o o d  th a t  ce r ta in  outcomes 
w i l l  fo l lo w  t h e i r  performance. These expectat ions, which can be 
labe l led  Performance - Outcome (P ” ”> 0) expectancies, are sub jec t ive  
p r o b a b i l i t y  estimates and can vary from 0 to 1 in  the same manner as the 
E —î»- P expectancies. Returning to our example, the Non-Industr ia l  may 
bel ieve  tha t  there is  a 50% p r o b a b i l i t y  tha t  he w i l l  be selected to  f i l l  
a more pres t ig ious  post which he des i res ,  i f  he completes the job w i t h in  
s ix  weeks. In add i t ion  he may see a number of other outcomes associated 
w i th  completing the job w i th in  s ix  weeks, a more favourable s t a f f  repor t  
and, indeed he may see s t i l l  other outcomes associated with  t r y i n g ,  but 
f a i l i n g  to complete the work to programme.
The f i n a l  po in t concerns the a t t rac t iveness  o f  the outcomes which the 
ind iv idua l  bel ieves to be a va i la b le .  The a t t rac t iveness  or valency (V)
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o f  any outcome can be thought o f  varying from a very desired +1 to 
a very undesired -1. I t  is  postulated th a t  there are tv/o reasons 
why outcomes associated with  performance may be va len t  
1. They d i r e c t l y  s a t i s f y  a person's needs 
or 2. They lead to an outcome or outcomes tha t  s a t i s f y  a 
p a r t i c u la r  need or sets o f  needs.
So fa r  we have not examined how the various expectancy fac to rs  
combine to determine mot iva t ion .  Most expectancy theor ies 
Lawler (1973) have operated on the assumption th a t  the higher the 
E-^P expectancy and the more c lose ly  performance is  seen to be re la ted  
to p o s i t i v e l y  va len t  outcomes, the greater  w i l l  be the mot iva t ion .
Based on past research Lawler asserts th a t  t h i s  assumption seems 
genera l ly  v a l id .  Motivat ion does seem to be greatest when E->P 
is  high f o r  successful  performance and low fo r  unsuccessful performance 
and when P-^0 is  high fo r  p o s i t i ve  outcomes and low f o r  negat ive 
outcomes. In the case o f  our model t h i s  approach would invo lve 
m u l t ip ly in g  a l l  P"->0 expectancies by the valence o f  the outcomes 
and then adding the product. This sum would then be m u l t ip l ie d  by 
the E“">P expectancy f o r  successful  performance. In terms of a 
formula such as Vroom's t h i s  gives 
(E-?>P) X ( ( (P ->0) (V ))
For our N on - Indus t r ia l ,  t h i s  means tha t  his E-?'P expectancy f o r  
doing the job w i th in  s ix  weeks; his P-v-0 expectancies f o r  doing the 
job w i th in  s ix  weeks and the perceived a t t rac t iveness  o f  the outcomes 
combine to  determine his  motiva t ion to do the job w i th in  s ix  
weeks.
Having examined in  d e ta i l  the fac to rs  which in f luence and 
determine the st rength o f  mot iva t iona l  force we w i l l  set out a more 
comprehensive mot iva t iona l  model compared w i th  the model set out in
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Figure 1.5 and inco rpo ra t ing  the a b i l i t y  dimension examined e a r l i e r  
and set out in Figure 1.3 •
Figure 1.6 The Model o f  Mot iva t ion
Observed and 
Personal 
Experience in 
Stimulus 
Si tu a t i  on
Equity o f  
Outcome
A b i l i  t y  
(See Fig 1.3)
V V
E->P
/V
0)(V) E f f o r t
V
A
Performance Rev/a rd
Se l f Degrees to which Problem
Esteem Outcome is  perceived] Solving
to s a t i s f y  needs Approach
-------- — —- -----'—------ - -- -------7S'----- -
Figure 1.6 i l  l u s t r â te s ,  the mot iva t ion  model tn a t  v/e shal l  use to 
inves t iga te  and examine how systems o f  reward, p r i n c i p a l l y  pay and 
promotion, may be s t ruc tu red  to  improve dockyard performance. Before 
leaving the model, i t  should be observed tha t  the s e l f  esteem dimension i n t e r  
acts with the E—>P expectancy, i t  is  considered to in f luence the amount o f 
e f f o r t  expended. The equ i ty  or perceived fa i rness  of outcome dimension is  
conceptual ised as modifying the (P'*^0)(V) r e la t io n s h ip .  In other words i t  
compares the actual wi th the expected reward f o r  a given level o f performance 
Before f i n a l l y  concludinc th is  sect ion on our motivat ion model a 
b r i e f  comment on the shortcominos and de f ic ienc ies  of t h e .expectancy
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model in general i s  meri ted. An evaluat ion o f  expectancy theory by 
Henemen et al (1972) ind ica tes th a t  a number of aspects o f  the theory 
have not been va l ida ted .  He p a r t i c u l a r l y  mentions th a t  the in te ra c t io n  
among independent var iab les  are e x p l i c i t l y  hypothezised to account f o r  
s i g n i f i c a n t  va r ia t io n s  in  performance, but these po ten t ia l  th e o re t ica l  
improvements have not been re f le c te d  in  research. The im p l ica t ion  
f o r  the study is  tha t  the model w i l l  need to be appl ied j u d i c io u s l y  in 
order to avoid making erroneous in te rp re ta t io n s  and drawing in co r re c t  
conclusions r e la t in g  to the circumstances in the dockyard. Indeed 
va l id a t io n  o f  our model can only e f f e c t i v e l y  be made by a l t e r in g  the 
var iab les  th a t  we bel ieve w i l l  lead to an improvement in organ isat ion perform­
ance and then monitor the s i t u a t i o n .  However, complex cause and 
e f f e c t  in te rac t io n s  mean th a t  in r e a l i t y  we would be u n l i k e ly  to 
i d e n t i f y  or associate s p e c i f i c  dimensions with  s p e c i f i c  outcomes.
Despite these reserva t ions,  i t  is  deemed tha t  the theory is more than 
adequate to f a c i l i t a t e  a comprehensive in ve s t ig a t io n  in to  our study o f  
rewards f o r  Non- Industr ia ls  in dockyards.
Pay Theory and Systems A B r ie f  Overview
To complement our th e o re t ica l  model o f  motivat ion we need to gain 
some idea of the in f luence th a t  pay as a reward has on m ot iva t ion .
Although i n t u i t i o n  places pay a t  the top of a league o f  rewards f o r  the 
average person i t  would be useful to understand how people develop such 
a strong a f f i n i t y  f o r  pay. For t h i s  exposi t ion we w i l l  draw on 
Lawler 's (1971) d i s t i n c t i v e  model of the importance of pay. Lawler 
takes as his s ta r t i n g  po in t  Vroom' s (1964) assert ion th a t  money has value 
when i t  is  associated with  other  valued outcomes. Vroom makes no attempt 
to explain why th is  occurs and r e a l l y  side steps the issue by s ta t in g  
tha t  i t  is  not amenable to e x p l i c i t  statement a t  t h i s  t ime. However,
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t h i s  approach does enable fo recas t  about outcomes to be made. I f ,  
however, we th ink  in  terms o f  human needs then we may be able to 
p re d ic t  what outcomes are l i k e l y  to be valued. I t  i s  suggested 
th a t  a theory which sta tes th a t  ce r ta in  needs are important to 
ind iv id u a ls  and th a t  c e r ta in fa c to rs  a f f e c t  the importance of these 
needs can make some s i g n i f i c a n t  p red ic t ion  about when pay w i l l  be 
important and about the a f fe c ts  o f  ce r ta in  system o f  rewards (pay) 
th a t  cannot be made by Vroom's theory. Lawler argues th a t  f o r  a 
model of the importance o f  pay to incorporate a necessary element o f 
predic t iveness i t  must be based on ind iv idu a l  needs.
Importance of Pay - Lawler 's  Model
The core o f  Lawler 's  (1971) model on the importance o f  pay is  the 
f a c t  th a t  a given amount o f  pay derives i t s  importance from i t s  perceived 
assoc ia t ion w ith  the s ix  types o f  needs postu lated by Maslow (1954). 
Conceptually the value o f  pay is  generated by m u l t ip l y in g  each 
'need' by the importance of th a t  need and summing the r e s u l t s .  An 
important po in t  to note is  th a t  the theory does not spec i fy  what the 
r e la t i v e  in s t ru m e n ta l i t y  o f  pay is  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  needs and cons is ten t  
w i th  Maslow's theory there may be a progressive dec l ine in  the 
way pay is  valued beyond a ce r ta in  minimum amount. Pay in  other 
words i s  not p a r t i c u l a r l y  instrumental  in s a t i s f y in g  socia l  and s e l f  
a c tu a l i z a t io n  needs, th a t  is  the higher order needs. However, the 
evidence suggests tha t  the model adequately accommodates esteem and 
psychological needs. This is  an important cons idera t ion from the 
po in t  o f  view o f  the study as a fa c to r  which has assumed importance 
to  ce r ta in  P & T grades is  the unfavourable hor izon ta l  pay d i f f e r e n t i a l  
which has opened between them and t h e i r  execut ive peers.
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The in ference from the model is  th a t  pay is  l i k e l y  to be an 
e f f e c t i v e  mot iva to r  when an i n d iv id u a l  has a strong des ire  to s a t i s f y  
sa fe ty  s e cu r i t y  and esteem needs. The next p o in t  to address i s  how 
theor ies  on pay are re la ted  to  pay systems. An o v e r s im p l i f i c a t i o n  o f  
the problem would be to  i d e n t i f y  a person's needs and s t ru c tu re  a 
pay system accord ing ly .
In p ra c t ic e ,  payment systems f a l l  in to  two broad groups
a. Payment by Results
b. Payment by Time
Payment by Results
The simple philosophy which underpins t h i s  system is  th a t  a 
simple r e la t io n s h ip  can be estab l ished between e f f o r t  and reward 
Webb (1982). The system presumes th a t  i f  money can be used to  induce 
e f f o r t ,  then more money w i l l  r e s u l t  in more e f f o r t .  The l i n k  between 
performance and reward is  s t rong ,  prov id ing th a t  the des ire  f o r  money 
is  s trong. This system o f  pay is  ideal f o r  a management th a t  be l ieves
th a t  mot iva t ion  to exe r t  maximum in d iv id u a l  e f f o r t  and achieve maximum
output is the most important o b je c t ive  f o r  a pay scheme.
Payment by Time
The phi losophy which underpins t h i s  system is  t h a t  there is  a f a i r  
day's work which corresponds to a f a i r  ra te  o f pay. As on ly  the wage 
ra te  is  subject to s p e c i f i c  bargain, although there  may be understanding 
between the pa r t ies  as to  what co n s t i tu te s  a f a i r  day's work, the only 
r e a l i s t i c  assumption is  th a t  the ra te  o f  work i s  what one could expect 
from a r e l a t i v e l y  unmotivated employee who otherwise was working 
consc ien t ious ly .
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Shaw (1982) asserts th a t  payment by time in  a l l  i t s  forms is  
cons is ten t  w ith  the idea th a t  payment systems should be designed to 
encourage co-operat ion between management and employees to  achieve 
the best r e s u l t s .  Nevertheless in  a pure Payment by Time system 
the l i n k  between performance and reward is tenuous.
The purpose o f  t h i s  b r i e f  examination of the th e o re t ica l  aspects 
of pay and a b r i e f  desc r ip t io n  o f  pay systems is  to provide a frame of 
reference to appraise the cu r ren t  dockyard pay system and to  t e s t  
a l t e rn a t i v e  systems o f  pay f o r  Non-Indus t r i a l s .
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CHAPTER 2 
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
In troduc t ion
There are a number o f  d i s t i n c t i v e  methods o f  organising work, exercis ing 
o f a u th o r i t y  and c o n t ro l l i n g  o f  people w i th in  an organ isat ion. Other 
important determinants concern the degrees of fo rm a l isa t ion  required coupled 
w ith  the ro le  prescribed to rules and regu la t ions .  Handy (1976) postulates 
four  d i s t i n c t i v e  types of organisat ional  ideo logies or c u l tu res ;  these are 
power, ro le ,  task and person. We. w i l l  focus on ro le  cu l tu re  fo r  reasons which 
w i l l  become immediately evident.
A ro le  cu l tu re  may be diagrammatical ly depicted as a ser ies o f  v e r t i c a l  
p i l l a r s  on which is  superimposed a t r i a n g le .  The ro le  organisat ion derives 
i t s  strength from i t s  v e r t i c a l  p i l l a r s ,  i t s  funct ions or s p e c ia l i t i e s .  These 
p i l l a r s  are strong in  t h e i r  own r i g h t  provided t h e i r  foundation or environment 
is  s table. Handy in his expose and p r o f i l e  o f  ro le  c u l t u re ,  c i tes  the C iv i l  
Service as an example and fu r th e r  asserts th a t  ro le  cu ltu res o f f e r  secu r i t y
and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  to the i n d i v id u a l .
A predominant feature o f  a ro le  organisat ion is  tha t  there are elaborate 
procedures fo r  ro le s ,  eg job d esc r ip t ions ,  a u th o r i t y  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  ru les fo r  
the sett lement o f disputes. Another c h a ra c te r i s t i c  is  th a t  the ro le  or job 
descr ip t ion  is  often more important than the person who f i l l s  i t .  S ta f f  are
l i k e l y  to be selected fo r  the s a t i s fa c to ry  performance o f  a r o le ,  and the ro le
is  usual ly  convenient ly described to permit  a range o f  ind iv idu a ls  t o % f i l l  i t .
The tasks o f  each department are co-ordinated by the respect ive manager 
o f the department. Co-ordinat ion is  exercised at the top by a small band o f  
senior managers. The c lass ica l  system assumes tha t  th is  should be the only 
personal co-ord inat ion  needed. Decision making moves v e r t i c a l l y  in each p i l l a r  
w i th  a s ing le  cross over po in t a t the top. The organisat ional s t ruc tu re  of 
the Royal Dockyards accords to' the c lass ica l  ro le  cu l tu re  - an assert ion which
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w i l l  be substant iated in the fo l lo w ing  examination and appraisal o f  the 
relevance o f  the current dockyard organ isat iona l  s t ru c tu re  to the task o f  
ship re p a i r .
Dockyard Organisat ional Structu re
The current dockyard organ isat iona l  s t ruc tu re  can be traced to an 
Admira l ty Mater ial  Requirement Committee repor t  1958. This repor t  recommended 
th a t  the departmental o rgan isa t iona l  s t ru c tu re  f i g  2.1 should be abol ished in  
favour o f  a funct iona l  organ isat iona l  s t ruc tu re  f i g  2 .2 .  The manager o f  each 
func t iona l  department is  accountable to a General Manager who in  turn  is  
accountable to the Chief Executive Dockyards (CED), but he also has ce r ta in  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  o f  an adm in is t ra t ive  nature to the Local Port Admiral.  The 
General Manager has f u l l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  the product ive work o f  the dockyard 
and fo r  the contro l  and supervision o f  i t s  personnel. Some o f  the s a l ie n t  
features o f  the current dockyard organ isat iona l  s t ruc tu re  w i l l  be discussed. 
Consistent with the ro le  cu l tu re  model, the task o f  r e f i t t i n g  ships i s  broken 
down in to  a number o f  sp e c ia l isa t io n s .  The main funct ions are product ion, 
planning, s p e c ia l i s t  product ion and support func t ions ,  yard serv ices,  personnel 
management services and f inance. Within each o f  these broad task areas there 
is  a plethora o f  h igh ly  compartmentalised jobs. The dut ies  and a u th o r i t y  
attached to each management post are set out in  de ta i led  job descr ip t ions  o r ,  
in  dockyard parlance, pos i t ion  charte rs . In te rac t ion  w i th in  the work 
organ isat ion fo l lows v e r t i c a l  l i n e s ,  up and down the h ie ra rch ica l  chain.
In a ro le  cu l tu re  system, the decision making process is  sens i t ive  to 
the number of t i e r s  o f management and also the number of managers. The 
greater  the number o f  managers and t i e r s  o f  management there are, the slower 
the decis ion making process is  l i k e l y  to be. The dockyard with  e igh t  t i e r s  
o f  management and an overa l l  r a t i o  o f  1:3 .8  Non In d u s t r ia l  to In d u s t r ia l  is  
not s t ruc tu red to f a c i l i t a t e  rap id  decision making. A breakdown o f  numbers by 
departments i s  shown at f i g  2.3 ,
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Table 2.3
D is t r ib u t io n  o f  Non In d u s t r ia l  and In d u s t r ia l  Grades 
Between Departments - Ju ly  1981
Department Non-Industr ia l  In d u s t r ia l
Product ion 636 2758
Planning 271 33
Yard Services 166 570
Nuclear Power 108 102
Personnel 107 29
Finance 124 2
Management
Service & Qua l i t y  32 8
C iv i l i a n  Secre ta r ia t  24
The i n f l e x i b i l i t y  o f the management system is  re in forced by the dominant 
p os i t ion  accorded to the w r i t t e n  job desc r ip t ion .  The scope o f  each job is  
def ined p rec ise ly ,  the ind iv id u a l  is  informed what he has to  attend to and 
how. This t y le  of management accords w ith  Burns' (1963) desc r ip t ion  o f  a 
mechanist ic system which he asserts is  appropr iate to stable c o n d i t i o n s . I t  
should be emphasised tha t  although there i s  nothing in h e re n t ly  incompatible 
between the organisat ional  s t ruc tu re  o f  the dockyard and the mechanist ic 
s ty le  o f  management pract ised i t  i s ,  however, an issue which meri ts f u r th e r  
in ve s t ig a t io n .  The way an organ isa t ion  is  s truc tu red and the s ty le  o f  
management pract icsed can a f f e c t  the a t t rac t iveness  o f  the in ta ng ib le  rewards 
con t ro l led  by the o rgan isa t ion ,  f o r  example oppor tun i ty  f o r  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
and p a r t i c ip a t i o n  in decis ion making.
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Dealing f i r s t l y  w ith  the organ isat iona l  s t ru c tu re ,  the h igh ly  
compartmentalised system is  not r e a l l y  compatible w ith  the task o f  
ship repa i r  work. The complexity o f  the work demands close in te g ra t io n  
o f  the m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  d i s c ip l in e s  invo lved. Communication up and down 
long management chains g re a t ly  i n h i b i t s  e f f i c ie n c y .  Recognising the 
cons tra in ts  imposed by the raw organ isat iona l  s t ru c tu re ,  p ro jec t  management 
was introduced in  the 1960s to i n j e c t  f l e x i b i l i t y  in to  the system. The 
concept o f  p ro jec t  management is  sound, i t  provides a p la t fo rm which enables 
in te ra c t io n  to take place a t  every h ie ra rch ica l  t i e r  w i th in  the fu n c t i o n a l l y  
s t ruc tu red  system. I t  permits, the co -o rd ina t ion  and contro l  o f  a l l  
a c t i v i t i e s  associated w ith  a sh ip 's  r e f i t .  This is  achieved because the 
establishment o f  the p ro je c t  group permits a series o f  hor izonta l  
communication paths to be set up l i n k in g  the various h ie ra rch ica l  chains.
In other  words a matr ix  system o f  management has been evolved to 
circumvent the cons t ra in ts  inherent in  the func t iona l  system.
The the o re t ica l  benef i ts  which should have accrued from th is  matr ix  
s t ruc tu re  have not been rea l ised  because o f  the combined d e b i l i t a t i n g  
e f fe c ts  o f too many managers and i n f l e x i b i l i t y  sustained by adherence to 
formal job descr ip t ions .  The p ro je c t  system was evolved p r im a r i l y  to cope 
w ith  the unstable condi t ions which are a feature o f  the day to day 
a c t i v i t i e s  o f a sh ip 's  r e f i t .  Unfamil ia r  problems and requirements 
co n t in u a l ly  a r ise  and those which cannot re a d i l y  be broken down are 
d is t r ib u te d  among the func t iona l  managers fo r  so lu t io n .  Although s p e c i f i c  
problems are presented to the various l in e  management teams f o r  s o lu t io n ,  
th i s  is  done w i th in  the general framework o f  the overa l l  p ro jec t  p lan.
The d e f i n i t i v e  and enduring demarcation o f  funct ions m i l i t a t e  against 
the l i n e  co n t in u a l ly  producing e f fe c t i v e  so lu t ions  because vested 
in te re s ts  would probably i n h i b i t  the necessary level  o f  in te ra c t io n  and 
p a r t i c ip a t i o n .  However, does the current p ro jec t  management approach 
f a c i l i t a t e  the re q u is i te  level o f  innovat ive behaviour to make the dockyard 
s ty le  o f  p ro je c t  management e f fe c t ive ?  Sadly the over re l iance  on formal
28
job descr ip t ions coupled w i th  the physical number o f  managers normal ly 
involved in  any decision making sequence g re a t ly  weakens the e f fec t iveness 
o f  the p ro jec t  system.
Because o f  the h igh ly  s truc tu red and mechanistic s ty le  o f  dockyard 
management, lower management is  conscious tha t  i t  i s  not being rewarded 
w ith  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and a u th o r i t y  commensurate with  i t s  pos i t io n .  I t  is  
suggested tha t  as a r e s u l t ,  the commitment o f  lower management to the 
dockyard i s  weakened. To n u l l i f y  some o f  the more adverse e f fe c ts  o f  
the current management system i t  w i l l  be necesary to introduce f l e x i b i l i t y  
in to  the way p ro je c t  management is  p rac t ised ,  in other words i t  must 
encourage each ind iv idu a l  to do his  job with de ta i led  knowledge o f  the 
overa l l  purpose and ob jec t ives .  But how capable is  the dockyard 
organ isat ion  in i t s  cu r ren t  form o f  meeting lower management's asp i ra t ions  
f o r  greater  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ?  The i n t u i t i v e  answer i s ,  i t  is  not,  because 
the organisat ion is  heav i ly  suffused with  rules and regu la t ions  s t ruc tu red  
to enable the C iv i l  Service to administer the func t ions  o f  government. 
However, f o r  a more ob jec t ive  answer to th is  quest ion, i t  is  necessary to 
examine b r i e f l y  the s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  a mechanistic or bureaucrat ic s ty le  o f  
management to an i n d u s t r ia l  undertak ing. Bureaucracy is  simply a system 
o f  management which places great  emphasis on cen t ra l ised  contro l  and 
u n i fo rm i ty .  What th i s  means is  th a t  the organisat ion must promulgate a 
ser ies of bureaucrat ic ru les tha t  should o r d in a r i l y  prevent,  inso fa r  as 
i s  humanly poss ib le , the a p p l i ca t io n  o f  non-uniform standards. 
Unfor tunate ly  th is  usua l ly  means th a t  ru les must be geared to accommodate 
the lowest common denominator. That is  they cannot leave any ru le  
ambiguous, to be decided a t  the d is c re t io n  o f  an ind iv id u a l  manager, since 
tha t  leaves open the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  manager a r r i v i n g  a t  a non-uniform 
in te rp re ta t io n .  Thus the bureaucract ic  rules are not only e x p l i c i t  and 
i n f l e x i b l e ,  but also cons t ra in ing ,  p o s i t i v e l y  discouraging c rea t ive  and 
innovat ive thought and f i n a l l y  they are very impersonal. The net r e s u l t
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i s  tha t  the dockyard o rgan isa t ion ,  w h i l s t  obviously desirous o f  a system 
o f  management to cope with  uncer ta in ty  which i s  a fea tu re  o f  ship repa i r  
and where f l e x i b l e  response and speed may be o f  the essence, have to 
operate w ith  a system o f  management which supresses the very ch a ra c te r is t i c s  
i t  so desperately needs to encourage.
Returning to the question posed e a r l i e r  concerning the o rgan isa t ion 's  
a b i l i t y  to s a t i s f y  lower management's r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  needs, th i s  w i l l  be 
re levant  only i f  lower management ra te  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  an a t t r a c t i v e  
reward. This issue w i l l  be inves t iga ted  by the quest ionnaire and 
commented on in  Chapter 7.
The Professional and Technology Group and I t s  Standing in  the Civ i 1 Service
The existence of the P&T group in i t s  present form was brought about 
as a r e s u l t  o f  implementat ion of the Fulton Report (1968). In 1972 the 
Works Group and some o f  i t s  support ing technica l classes were recons t i tu ted  
as the Professional and Technology group.
Dockyard management is  drawn almost exc lus ive ly  from the p&T group with  
members o f  the Adm in is t ra t ive  group provid ing services such as c l e r i c a l  
support,  al though i t  i s  more usual in  the C iv i l  Service fo r  members o f  the 
Admin is t ra t ive  group to occupy the senior pos it ions in  a department.
Indeed one o f  Fu l ton 's  (1968) main observations was th a t  the Adm in is t ra t ive  
class held the dominant pos i t ions  in  the C iv i l  Service and th a t  th i s  class 
was (1968) e s s e n t ia l l y  based on the phi losophy o f  the amateur, A 
preponderance o f  g e ne ra l is t  and graduates s t i l l  occupy the senior pos it ions  
because the reforms Fulton proposed fo r  changing the top management o f  
the Service have not ye t  been implemented Garre t t  (1980). Thus the 
p reva i l ing  view even amongst ju n io r  P&T grades tha t  the Admin is t ra t ive  
group enjoys a p r iv i leged  pos i t ion  has a degree o f  substance. The f a c t  tha t  
a reward fo r  except ional performance by members o f  S p e c ia l i s t  groups is  
the oppor tun i ty  to t ra n s fe r  to the Adm in is t ra t ive  groun tends to re in fo rce  
th is  percept ion o f  the Admin is t ra t ive  grouo's dominant po s i t io n .
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In summary, the dockyarclsare managed by a group who at the senior  
leve ls  do not enjoy the same oppor tun i t ies  as senior adm in is t ra t ive  grades. 
Although i t  would be u n r e a l i s t i c  to assume tha t  these considerat ions 
in f luence the behaviour o f  j u n io r  P&T grades, the existence o f  hor izon ta l
pay d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between comparable grades in the Admin is t ra t ive  and
P&T groups obviously has an impact on a t t i t u d e .
Before leaving t h i s  sect ion is  is  necessary to c l a r i f y  the 
nomenclature th a t  we sha l l  use to r e fe r  to the subjects of the study. The
term Non-Industr ia l  appl ies to a l l  white c o l l a r  C iv i l  Servants and is 
there fore  the c o l l e c t i v e  term fo r  P&T, Admin is t ra t ive  grades etc .
However, in  t h i s  paper the term Non-Industr ia l  re fe rs  s p e c i f i c a l l y  to 
P&T grades unless we spec ify  to the contrary  or the sense o f  the materia l  
makes i t  obvious to whom we are r e fe r r in g .
S im i la r l y  a d i s t i n c t i o n  needs to be made between the terms Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  and lower management. Our use of the term lower management 
w i l l  be used to describe those members o f  the P&T group employed in l i n e  
management jobs.
Constraints Confronting Local Dockyard Management
The degree o f  autonomy th a t  the senior management enjoy in each 
dockyard is  l im i te d  and is  in  no way comparable to th a t  enjoyed by t h e i r  
counterparts in  p r iva te  and na t iona l ised  in d u s t r ie s .  In t h i s  sect ion we 
shal l  discuss some o f  the major cons tra in ts  although not every ind iv idua l  
cons t ra in t  is  necessar i ly  unique to the dockyards. For convenience we 
w i l l  examine the cons t ra in ts  under the broad headings o f  Rewards,
Career Planning, Organisat ional and S t ruc tu ra l  and the S t ra teg ic  Importance 
o f a c t i v i t i e s  a t Rosyth.
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Rewards. We w i l l  deal f i r s t  w ith  pay and second w i th  promotion.
Pay negot ia t ions are conducted c e n t r a l l y  f o r  the whole C iv i l  Service 
and local fac to rs  in  a p a r t i c u la r  l o c a l i t y  cannot in f luence  the basic 
leve l o f  pay. Local management can however, in f luence  gross earnings 
through t h e i r  po l i c y  on overt ime and s h i f t  working. C urren t ly  each 
dockyard i s  a l loca ted  a sum o f  money f o r  both Non- Industr ia l  and 
In d u s t r ia l  overtime working. By the nature o f  the work in  dockyards 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  overtime earnings w i l l  vary considerably amongst Non- 
I n d u s t r ia l s .
Promotion is  another reward which is  administered c e n t r a l l y ,  but is  
based, in  theory anyway, on the S ta f f  reports  w r i t t e n  in  the dockyards. 
However, as w i l l  be explained in  Chapter 4, there i s  l i t t l e  guarantee th a t  
dockyards w i l l  necessar i ly  get t h e i r  ab les t  men promoted. This can r e s u l t  
in  local management having to place Non- Industr ia ls  in  whom they have 
l i t t l e  confidence, in a more senior post.
Career Planning has been pract ised f o r  many years in  the C iv i l  
Service, indeed the Ful ton (1968) repor t  had c r i t i c i s e d  the frequency w i th  
which members of the Adm in is t ra t ive  group were moved from job to job ,  w ith  
some vague idea o f  g iv ing  them experience. However, t h i s  phenomenon was 
and s t i l l  i s  by no means unique to the Adm in is t ra t ive  group. I t  i s  
recognised th a t  i t  i s  necessary f o r  s t a f f  to change jobs to enable them 
to develop t h e i r  p o ten t ia l  to the f u l l .  However, the emphasis placed on 
career development by the Chief Executive Dockyard's oersonnel management 
sec t ion ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i th  respect to the profess ional sect ion o f  the P&T 
group, does support the view th a t  the needs o f  the dockyards may on 
occasion, be subordinated to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  career development.
The reason normal ly given fo r  the frequent ro ta t i o n  o f  senior s t a f f  
i s  that- i t  enables the men who are dest ined to f i l l  the top posts, in  the 
dockyard o rgan isa t ion ,  an oppor tun i ty  to gain a good general ised knowledge
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o f  the machine th a t  they are u l t im a te ly  to manage and con t ro l .
One e f f e c t  o f  th is  s i t u a t i o n  is  th a t  detai led- knowledge on a whole 
m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  subjects such as s h i f t  pa t te rns ,  overt ime rates and 
most im por tan t ly ,  custom and p ra c t ice ,  tends to res ide with the r e l a t i v e l y  
s t a t i c  lower management group. This creates a s i t u a t i o n  where the mobile 
management group is  heav i ly  dependent on the r e l a t i v e l y  s t a t i c  lower
management f o r  guiding them through a mix o f  custom and p ra c t i ce ,  and
o f f i c i a l  regula t ions so lab y r in th in e  tha t  a p r o f i c i e n t  working knowledge 
is  d i f f i c u l t  to acquire in a short  time scale. Thus, a manager confronted 
with  a new problem has r e a l l y  three choices - he delegates i t  down his 
chain, he passes i t  up, or i f  the problem is  complex and p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f
i t  is  not whol ly  w i th in  his  manager's sphere o f  co n t ro l ,  a committee is
set up to deal w ith  the problem. Burns (1963) states tha t  bureaucract ic  
h ie rarch ies  are most prone to th i s  defect.  Decision making by committee has 
an a t t r a c t io n  fo r  some people, p a r t i c u l a r l y  the anonymity aspect.
Organisat ional and S truc tu ra l  Dimensions. Since the war the size  and 
complexity of dockyard management, s task has grown accompanied by an 
increase in  Non-Industr ia l  numbers. Current ly  (1982) there are approximately 
7,600 Non- Industr ia ls  employed in  dockyards compared w ith  2,500 in  1950.
A redesignat ion of some In d u s t r ia l  posts as n o n - in d u s t r ia l  accounts f o r  
some o f  th i s  increase, but the m a jo r i ty  o f new posts were, to some ex ten t ,  
a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  the more advanced technology found in  modern warships. The 
r a t i o  Non-Industr ia l  to In d u s t r ia l  grades is  c u r re n t ly  1:3.8.
Planning and production funct ions are separate, w ith  the r e s u l t  tha t  
those who plan r e f i t s  are not responsible f o r  t h e i r  execut ion. A consequence 
o f  t h i s  system, i n t e n s i f i e d  by the bureaucrat ic  s ty le  o f  management, i s  tha t  
more e f f i c i e n t  methods o f  carry ing through work packages, developed on the 
job ,  are sometimes slow to be incorporated in  fu tu re  work plans. In other 
words feedback from the workplace to the p lanner 's  o f f i c e  may be slow or 
indeed non-ex is tent.
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The In t roduc t ion  o f  Pro jec t  Management to carry  through r e f i t s  has 
increased the number o f  Non In d u s t r ia l  management grades associated w i th  
ship re p a i r  work. The adopt ion o f  the Pro ject management system has 
been achieved by superimposing the Pro jec t team onto the l i n e  management 
team in  a matr ix  management system. As a r e s u l t  Pro jec t managers f in d  
themselves in  the inv id ious  pos i t ion  o f  having to meet r e f i t  completion 
dates, but not c o n t ro l l i n g  the resources used in the r e f i t .
A fu r th e r  co n s t ra in t  concerns the number o f  leve ls  o f  management, 
which w i l l  be discussed in  more d e ta i l  l a t e r .  From the General Manager 
down to Technical Supervisor there are e igh t  although usua l ly  no more than 
seven are f i l l e d .  The number o f  management leve ls  a t present r e f l e c t s  the 
number o f  grades. Long management chains, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  a bureaucrat ic  
o rgan isa t ion ,  tend to make e f fe c t i v e  communications d i f f i c u l t .  A d d i t io n a l l y ,  
seven or e igh t  leve ls  o f  management tend to re in fo rce  the remoteness of 
senior management which i s  l i k e l y  to be a feature o f  any large o rgan isa t ion .
The dockyard employs a wide range o f  s k i l l s  and each s k i l l  or c r a f t  
i s  represented by a trade union. There ai^e ten c r a f t  and i n d u s t r i a l  
Trade Unions represented a t  Rosyth. The presence o f  a large number o f  
d i f f e r e n t  trade unions engenders a competi t ive c l imate amongst shop 
stewards. A manifestat ion o f  th i s  s i tu a t io n  is  th a t  senior management 
are subjected to cont inual pressure from ind iv idua l  Trade Union shop 
stewards, to increase s p e c ia l i s t  allowance pay, appl icab le  to a p a r t i c u la r  
c r a f t  or ad jus t  work rou t ines to b e ne f i t  a p a r t i c u la r  group. What one 
Trade Union is  seen to get,  the o thers ,  qu i te  n a tu r a l l y ,  want as w e l l .
Thus there i s  a cont inual ra tche t ing  up process suf fus ing  the in d u s t r i a l  
scene. The impetus f o r  t h i s  compet i t ive behaviour stems from the process 
which requires shop stewards to submit themselves f o r  r e -e le c t io n  annual ly .  
Thus a shop steward desirous o f  being re -e lec ted  is  l i k e l y  to take any
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oppor tun i ty  o f fered to improve his chance o f  r e -s e le c t io n .  I t  is  
there fore  paradoxical th a t  the democrat izat ion o f  Trade Unions which is  
believed in  some quarters to be the panacea fo r  i n d u s t r i a l  i l l s ,  should in  
p rac t ice  encourage d iv is iveness and make a negat ive co n t r ibu t io n  to 
performance.
The s t ra te g ic  importance o f  the work ca r r ied  out p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t 
Rosyth Dockyard imposes fu r th e r  cons t ra in ts  on the loca l management. The 
approach to in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  problems is  inf luenced by the importance 
th a t  the Naval S ta f f  a t tach to the completion date o f  key vessels such as 
Po lar is  submarines. Thus in  any in d u s t r i a l  dispute s i t u a t i o n ,  the 
management is  almost i n e v i t a b ly  involved in  a damage l i m i t i n g  exerc ise. 
Disputes are seldom permit ted to develop to a s ta te  where the r e f i t  o f  
important un i ts  is  jeopardised. Consequently many decis ions invo lv ing  
a po ten t ia l  dispute s i t u a t i o n  have to be re fe r red  to headquarters and 
th i s  i n e v i t a b ly  takes t ime when time is  o f  the essence in  a ra p id ly  
changing s i tu a t i o n .  A consequence o f  t h i s  p rac t ice  i s  th a t  the a u th o r i t y  
o f  management in  i t s  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  both Non-Industr ia l  and In d u s t r ia l  
Trade Unions is  diminished by the recogn i t ion  th a t  decisions may u l t im a te ly  
be made by headquarters and the l i n e  taken l o c a l l y  may not necessar i ly  be
endorsed. However, the General Manager Rosyth, Mr FISHER, commenting on
th is  observat ion stated tha t  the e f fe c t  on disputes o f  making reference to 
Headquarters is  o f  less s ign i f i ca nce  than in  former years with  a
consequential  e f f e c t  on the pos i t ion  o f  local management.
The Posi t ion o f  Non-Industr ia l  Trade Unions
The members o f  the P&T group belong to e i th e r  the I n s t i t u t e  o f  
Professional C iv i l  Servants (IPCS) or the Associat ion o f  Government 
Supervisors and Radio Operations (AGSRO). Membership o f  the AGRSO is 
l im i te d  to the f i r s t  t i e r  o f  management in  the P&T group. Membership o f  
the IPCS, however, encompasses lower middle and upper management. At 
local l e v e l ,  IPCS and AGRSO representa t ion is  based on s p e c ia l i s t  groups.
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At Rosyth f o r  example, there are 2 dominant IPCS branches, the 
Technical and Drawing O f f ice  - there is  a t h i r d  branch which represents 
the professional engineers, but numer ica l ly  i t  is  small and i t s  
in f luence is  much less than tha t  o f  the other  2 groups. I t  i s  to the 
professional or RCNC branch th a t  nearly a l l  senior management belong.
The Technical and Drawing O f f ice  branches each have t h e i r  own chairman and 
management s t ru c tu re ,  and representa t ives in each dockyard department.
S ta f f  re la t io n s  in  the C iv i l  Service are organised through the 
c o l l e c t i v e  machinery o f  Whit ley Counci ls. The main s t a f f  associat ions 
are members of the S ta f f  Side o f  the National Whi t ley Council and 
s t a f f  associat ions w ith  members in  a department co n s t i tu te  the S ta f f  Sides 
o f  Department Whit ley Councils.  The O f f i c i a l  Side o f  the Whi t ley Council 
normally comprises a number o f  the senior management in  the department.
The a u th o r i t y  th a t  the loca l Whit ley Counci ls have is  very l im i te d .
There appears to be a reluctance by Managers to become involved in  
quest ions of o rgan isat ion and s ta f f i n g  at Whit ley committees which are 
o ften the subject o f  complex agreements reached c e n t r a l l y .  These 
agreements are the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  the Personnel Department o f  the CED 
department and s ta f f i n g  is  regarding as t h e i r  exclusive province. The 
scope and a u th o r i t y  th a t  a departmental manager has is  l im i te d  and 
consequently he i s  normally unable to take decisions on the m a jo r i t y  of
problems raised by the S ta f f  Side. As a r e s u l t ,  the manager i s  apt to
see himself  as less than f u l l y  responsible  fo r  the e f fec t iveness o f  his 
department. I t  is  perhaps i r o n ic a l  th a t  the machinery ex is ts  in  the 
C iv i l  Service to s a t i s f y  the desires of s t a f f  to have more contro l  over 
t h e i r  work s i t u a t i o n ,  but the bureaucracy cons t ra in ts  the O f f i c i a l  Side 
by i t s  habi tual requirement f o r  greater  cen t ra l ised  co n t ro l .  The desi re  
f o r  greater  autonomy by employees is  a nat ional t rend ,  and i t  i s  
specu la ted , tha t  there may have to be a review o f  the machinery f o r  
conducting s t a f f  r e la t io n s  to accommodate these needs.
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During the period 1979-81 there have been two i n d u s t r i a l  disputes 
invo lv ing  Non-Industr ia l  grades up to Pr inc ipa l  le v e l ,  A consequence 
o f  these disputes has been to br ing in to  prominence the ro le  o f  the Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  t rade Uion (NITU) represen ta t ive .  Previous to these d isputes, 
NITU representa t ives did not have the standing o f  t h e i r  In d u s t r ia l  Trade 
Union peers, but t h e i r  deep involvement in  those disputes forced t h e i r  
presence on senior management who found themselves nego t ia t ing  w ith  
j u n io r  Non-Industr ia l  grades. Thus a new dimension entered the 
dockyard in d u s t r i a l  scene as a r e s u l t  o f  the 1979-81 disputes.
The Dockyard's Organisat ional Climate
To conclude th i s  chapter we sha l l  at tempt to  draw the various 
aspects of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  dimensions together under the embracing concept 
o f  o rgan isat iona l  c l imate  though the concept of organ isa t iona l  c l imate  
is  ra the r  ' fuzzy '  and the l i t e r a t u r e  is  charactertsed by a lack of 
consensus on the subject.  For our purposes we shal l  draw on Campbell e t  
al (1970) who i d e n t i f i e d  fou r  broad dimensions and convenient ly  these are 
fac to rs  th a t  we have already examined.
A model o f o rgan isa t iona l  c l imate has been developed and is  set out at 
f ig u re  2 ,4 .  This model although drawing on Campbell 's work is  our i n t e r ­
p re ta t ion  o f  the dimensions in f luenc ing  organ isat iona l  c l ima te .  We shal l  
deal w ith  four  components of the dockyard’ s cl imate  in  our t r e a t i s e .
Deal ing f i r s t l y  w i th  o rgan isat iona l  s t ruc tu re  we have already 
noted the h igh ly  s t ruc tu red  nature o f  the dockyard's organ isat ion  and 
the dependency on the w r i t te n  job d e sc r ip t io n .  This places ce r ta in  
cons t ra in ts  on ind iv idu a l  freedom of choice regarding behaviour which 
is  re in forced by e x te rn a l .c o n s t ra in ts  imposed on senior dockyard management 
by the Chief Executive Dockyard department.
The type o f  work ca r r ied  out in  the dockyard, jobb ing ,  demands a 
ce r ta in  level of in d iv idu a l  i n i t i a t i v e  and a general innovat ive  approach
37
by l i n e  managers. We have already suggested tha t  the h igh ly  bureaucrat ic  
system o f  management pract iced in the dockyard is  not compatible with  
ship re p a i r  work. A supposi t ion emerging from th is  apparent incompatabi1i t y  
between work and management s ty le  is th a t  a degree o f  dissonance ex is ts  in 
the organisat ion which may a f f e c t  and inf luence employee behaviour.
A second fa c to r  which may a f f e c t  organisat ion cl imate concerns the 
pos i t ion  of the s p e c ia l i s t  group v iz  a v iz  the execut ive group w i th in  the 
overa l l  framework o f  the C iv i l  Service. The v iewpoint o f  P&T grades on 
th is  issue is  d i f f i c u l t  to ascer ta in  indeed the P&T group may perceive t h e i r  
pos i t ion  compared with  the execut ive group more favourably  than the actual 
pos i t ion  suggests, but th i s  is  u n l i k e ly  because o f  the existence o f  a 
hor izonta l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between ce r ta in  P&T and execut ive grades. Thus 
the d i f f e r e n t  treatment these two groups rece ive, emanating from t h e i r  
d i f f e r e n t  pedigrees w i th in  the C iv i l  Service, may create undertones o f  
tension amongst Non-Industr ia l  grades in dockyards,
A t h i r d  fa c to r  re la tes  to rewards and t h e i r  adm in is t ra t ion .  The 
fa c t  tha t  pay rates are determined c e n t r a l l y  tends to avoid c o n f l i c t ,  
a t  the local le v e l ,  between senior  dockyard management and other employees. 
In other  words, cen t ra l ised  pay nego t ia t ion  avoids loca l management, 
becoming the focus o f  disenchantment over pay leve ls .  However, as contro l  
o f  overtime spending has been devolved to each dockyard, th i s  means th a t  
local  management is  not e n t i r e l y  immune from local t rade union pressure on 
the pay issue.
A fou r th  fa c to r  which inf luences the cl imate at Rosyth concerns the 
strong pos i t ion  occupied by the trade unions. The emergence o f  trade 
union assert iveness has been a featu re  o f  i n d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  in th i s  
country over the past ten years. This development has presented management 
w i th  a chal lenge to maintain t h e i r  leg i t im a te  p o s i t io n .  We shal l  
examine th is  issue in depth in Chapter.7.
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In summary we have an organisat ion where c l imate tends to be 
dominated by the management s ty le .  Both the pos i t ion  o f  the s p e c ia l i s t  
group w i th in  the C iv i l  Service and the trenchant a t t i t u d e  o f  the trade 
unions obviously i n t e ra c t  with management s ty le  to produce a cl imate where 
the ind iv idua l  has d i f f i c u l t y  in  perceiving his co n t r ibu t io n  to 
organisat ional e ffec t iveness.  I t  is  also a cl imate where remoteness and a 
lack o f  choice are l i k e l y  to be dominant features.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF PAY
In t ro d u c t i  on
I m p l i c i t  in our examination o f  the pay system administered to c i v i l  
servants in  general and dockyard Non- Industr ia l  grades in  p a r t i c u la r  is  
the assumption th a t  the cur ren t  pay system has ceased to be capable of 
accommodating the present day needs o f  the c i v i l  serv ice . Since the 
adopt ion o f  the P r ie s t le y  p r in c ip le s  in 1955 fo r  c i v i l  servants'  pay 
considerable changes have occurred and the whole s t ruc tu re  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
re la t io n sh ip s  and socia l  in f luences have a l te red .  For example Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  t rade unions have become more asser t ive  w ith  an attendant 
commonality o f  purpose in  response, in p a r t ,  to the greater  expectat ions 
o f  t h e i r  members.
This Chapter examines the main issues r e la t in g  to pay under four  
broad headings
a. C iv i l  Service system o f  pay determinat ion which incorporate
an in t ro du c t io n  to the Megaw repor t .
b. Spec i f ic  pay problems areas in Naval Dockyards.
c. Motiva t iona l  im p l ica t ions  a r is in g  from the pay system as
administered in Naval Dockyards.
d. The e f fec t iveness o f  the curren t  pay system.
The method which was used f o r  pay determinat ion in the C iv i l  
Service between 1955 and 1980 w i l l  be examined because an understanding 
o f  the mechanics o f  th a t  system provides essent ia l  background to an 
apprec ia t ion  o f  the pay issue. In common with most organisat ions the 
dockyard's in te rna l  s t ru c tu re  o f  payment level i s  d i f f i c u l t  to understand 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the area of pay enhancements. Thus i t  is  necessary to 
examine, in d e t a i l ,  the dockyard's pay system so th a t  some Idea o f  how 
the system a f fe c ts  the mot iva t ion o f  Non- Industr ia ls  can be gained. The
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Chapter w i l l  be concluded w ith  an assessment o f  the system's po ten t ia l  
to generate and susta in e f fe c t i v e  performance in dockyards.
The C iv i l  Service System o f  Pay Determination
Since the present s t ruc tu re  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  bargain ing in the C iv i l  
Service was introduced in 1919, pay awards were determined f i r s t  through 
movements in  the cost o f  l i v i n g  index and then according to the 
recommendation of the Tomlin Royal Commission on the C iv i l  Service 
(1929-1931). This consol idated the idea of using comparisons with 
remuneration in other  employment to determine C iv i l  Service pay, on 
the basis o f  long term trends o f  movements in remuneration. D is s a t is fa c t io n  
w ith  the methods o f  se t t in g  C iv i l  Service pay and with  the actual pay 
leve ls  led to the establishment in  1953 o f  the P r ie s t le y  Commission to 
consider 'whether any changes are desfreble in the p r in c ip le s  which 
should govern pay, or in  the rates o f  pay a t  present in force f o r  the main 
ca te g o r ie s '.
The P r ie s t le y  Commission reported in 1955. Their  basic conclusion was 
th a t  the ove r r id ing  aim of a C iv i l  Service pay system must be ' the 
maintenance o f  a C iv i l  Service recognised as e f f i c i e n t  and s ta f fed  by 
members where remuneration and condi t ions of service are thought to be 
f a i r  both by themselves and by the community they se rve ' .
To achieve th is  aim, the P r ie s t le y  Commission recommended the 
adopt ion of one 'pr imary p r i n c i p l e ' ;  th a t  C iv i l  Service pay should be 
based on:
' f a i r  comparison w i th  the curren t  remuneration o f  outside s ta f f s  
employed on broadly comparable work, tak ing account o f  d i f fe rences  in 
other  condi t ions of s e rv ic e ' .
The P r ie s t le y  Commission made de ta i led  comments on the way in which 
the evidence o f  outs ide pay rates should be co l lec ted  through 'pay
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research ’ and how i t  should be used. The Coiniiission's main recommendations 
were put in to  e f f e c t  promptly. A formal agreement was concluded between 
the Government and the Union side in  1956. A Pay Research Uni t  was set 
up in  the same year to begin the d e ta i led  process o f  surveys in to  outs ide 
pay and other condi t ions o f  serv ice.
P r ie s t le y  and Pay Research Unit
The Pay Research U n i t ' s  (PRU). task was to es tab l ish  comparisons 
between ind iv idua l  jobs ins ide  and outs ide the C iv i l  Service and then to 
repo r t  not only the actual rates o f  pay but also a l l  other  re levant  
condit ions o f  serv ice f o r  the analogous jobs outs ide the C iv i l  Service.
I t  should be stressed th a t  i t  was not the func t ion  o f  the PRU to recommend 
pay rates f o r  the C iv i l  Service, The PRU undertook i t s  comparisons 
through two surveys.
a. In te rna l  Surveys - the PRU examined a representa t ive  sample of 
the curren t  work o f  the grades undei" review so th a t  proper comparisons 
could be made.
b. External Surveys - the PRU looked a t  a ser ies o f  ind iv idua l  
jobs in a sample o f  organ isat ions in the pub l ic  and p r iva te  secto rs. 
Each sample was chosen to r e f l e c t  the spread o f  work comparable to 
the occupations o f  the re levant  C iv i l  Service grades throughout the 
country.
The P r ie s t le y  Commission expected tha t  the organ isat ions selected 
f o r  outs ide comparisons would be 'good' employers. However, the 
Commission re jec ted the idea th a t  the Government should be a 'model ’ 
employer, th a t  i s ,  one who sets an example to indus t ry  and commerce, f o r  
example paying the h ighest rates o f  pay. Nevertheless,a p re re q u is i te  o f 
'good' employer was in te rp re ted  f o r  the purposes o f  Pay Research as an 
organ isat ion  employing more than 1000 employees. Indeed about fo u r -
42
f i f t h s  o f  the PRU's surveys in 1980 were in  ente rpr ises with  over 2000 
employees and the remainder were almost e xc lus ive ly  drawn from f i rms 
employing over 1000 s t a f f .
The CBÏ (1981) commented th a t  the experience o f  many businessmen 
is  tha t  there is  a tendency f o r  large f i rms to pay higher ra tes ,  an 
impression supported by the resu l ts  o f  the 1964, 1968 labour costs 
surveys.
Table 3 .1
Analysis o f Labour Costs in Manufacturing Industry  by Size Range
of Firms (Average expenditure f o r  employees £s per y e a r )
Size of Firms (Number o f Employees)
25-249 250-999 1000 Av. o f  a l l
employers
1964
Total  Wages & Salar ies 717.8 756.5 868.9 813.0
Total  Labour Costs 769.0 818,2 953.1 885.5
1968
Total  Wages & Salar ies 899,1 965,2 1,110.8 1,034.5
Total  Labour Costs 973.3 1,056,4 1,220.1 1,132.9
Sources: M in is t r y  o f  Labour Gazette - Dec 1966
Employment and P ro d u c t iv i ty  Gazette - Aug 1970
Table 3.2
Analysis o f Labour Costs in Manufacturing Industry by size of Firm 1973
(Average expenditure per employee £s per year)
Size o f  Firms (Number o f  employees)
1973 50-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 1000 Av, o
Over a l l  
Emplo 
ers
Total  Wages/Salaries 1542.5 1559.3 1631.1 1710.4 1945 1799
Total  Labour Costs 1687.7 1708.5 1801.3 1897.6 2177.6 2001
Source: Department o f  Employment Gazette - Sept 1975
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Although o f f i c i a l  labour cost surveys since 1973 have not provided 
in format ion by size o f  e n te rp r ise ,  i t  i s  the CBI's view th a t  the trend has 
continued. The CBI (1981) argue th a t  size of i t s e l f  may not be the 
predominant reason why large companies have higher leve ls  o f  pay. The 
concern is  tha t  a widening gap between the pay o f  employees in large 
and small f i rms e x is t s ,  and the l i n k in g  o f  the C iv i l  Service to th a t  o f
large companies w i l l  place c i v i l  servants in a more favourable pos i t ion  
compared to people working in  small f i rm s .
Public Sector Pay System Leads and Lags 1970-80
Although e f f o r t  had been taken to minimise the delays in  the system 
they were nonetheless in e v i ta b le .  The external pay sett lements on which 
c i v i l  service pay was based had been reached, up to a year or more 
before the c i v i l  se rv ice 's  sett lement date. Thus c i v i l  service s e t t l e ­
ments were always out o f  phase. When the trend in pay sett lements was 
downwards,civi l  serv ice pay re f le c te d  an e a r l i e r  period in the cyc le ,  
i t s  pay increases appeared higher than those elsewhere, because the 
re levant  comparisons re fe r red  to a period when the going ra te  increase 
was higher.  This s i t u a t i o n  was reversed when the trend in  pay sett lements 
was upwards. Examination o f  Average Weekly Earnings Indices f o r  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  c i v i l  servants and Non Manual Workers in the Private Sector 
i l l u s t r a t e s  th is  po in t .  I t  i s  important to emphasise tha t  these indices 
do not r e f l e c t  high rates o f  overtime working by ind iv idu a l  groups; 
l a t e r  we w i l l  see tha t  overtime earnings at Rosyth are above the nat ional 
average.
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Table 3.3
Average Weekly Earnings and Average Salary Indices f o r  Mon-
In d u s t r ia l  C iv i l Service and Pr ivate Section 1970-80
Publ ic Sector Private Secto
Average Earn i ngs Average Earnii
Men Women Men Women
1970 100 100 100 100
1971 107 106 112 113
1972 122 127 123 125
1973 125 126 137 142
1974 157 169 154 167
1975 185 197 190 221
1976 240 256 224 267
1977 252 273 247 303
1978 276 299 287 339
1979 302 338 325 385
1980 420 449 397 475
Source: Inqu iry in to  C iv i l  Service Pay 1982
Cmnd 8590-1
The C iv i l  Service Trade Unions in evidence to Megay/ (1982) stated 
th a t  the de-synchronisat ion o f  average earning between the Private 
Sector and the C iv i l  Service worked p o te n t i a l l y  against c i v i l  servants; 
when the trend was upwards C iv i l  Service pay stood to be below the going 
ra te ,  when the trend was downwards the Government was re lu c ta n t  to  permit 
a c i v i l  service pay sett lement on the basis o f  the e a r l i e r  higher ra te .
A manifestat ion of large f lu c tu a t io n s  in pay trends p a r t i c u l a r l y  during 
periods o f  high i n f l a t i o n  meant tha t  the system lags were d i f f i c u l t  to 
l i v e  w i th ,  though in the long term there has been reasonable correspondence 
between pay movements in  the C iv i l  Service and the Pr ivate  Sector.
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Pay Negotiat ion Uncer ta in ty  -  Megaw Inqu i ry
The l a t e s t  par t  o f  1980 saw a progressive d e te r io ra t io n  in re la t io n s  
between the C iv i l  Service Unions and the Government. The C iv i l  Service 
Unions claimed in  August 1980 th a t  the Government broke the nat ional pay 
agreement by announcing th a t  cash l i m i t s  would be the major determinant 
f o r  s e t t l i n g  pay rates in  1981. In October 1980 the Government suspended 
the nat ional pay agreement which prevented pub l ica t ion  o f  the PRU's repor t  
f o r  the 1981 pay round. This act ion resulted in a voc iferous attack being 
launched on the Government by the C iv i l  Service Unions. In 1981 pay 
negot ia t ions between the Government and the combined C iv i l  Service Unions 
commenced in February and broke down in  March. Select ive in d u s t r ia l  act ion 
which took the form of s t r i k e  ac t ion by selected key groups s ta r ted  almost 
immediately and continued f o r  a period o f  twenty one weeks.
I t  was against t h i s  background and emergent d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  w i th  the 
P r ie s t le y  system concomitant unease concerning the soundness o f  P r ie s t le y  
a f t e r  25 years o f  operat ing by successive Governments and C iv i l  Service 
Unions, in p a r t i c u la r  th a t  prompted a wide ranging review of c i v i l  servants'  
pay. An independent in q u i r y  was set up in June 1981 to consider and make 
recommendations on the p r in c ip le s  and the system by which the remuneration 
o f  the Non- Industr ia l  C iv i l  Service should be determined. The repor t  o f  
the independent in q u i r y  was publ ished in Ju ly  1982.
A summary o f  the major d i f fe rences  between Megaw and P r ie s t le y  are 
set out in Table 3.4. The real innovat ive  feature o f  Megaw (1982) l i e s  
in  i t s  recommendation f o r  the in t ro du c t io n  o f  Performance-related pay.
We sha l l  b r i e f l y  examine the im p l ica t ions  of t h i s  recommendation along 
w ith  two other  recommendations, Market Forces and Comparabi l i ty which 
have a relevancy to our study.
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The preference f o r  a Performance re la ted  pay system represents 
a s h i f t  o f  emphasis from a payment by Time system to a payment by r e s u l t  
system and would represent,  i f  in troduced, a fundamental s h i f t  in  cur ren t  
pay p rac t ice .  The present system o f  pay is designed to promote employee 
co-operat ion, whereas what has been recommended would increase the general 
level o f  competit iveness amongst s t a f f .  We shal l  explore Performance- 
re la ted  pay, l a t e r  in  the study, to  determine whether a scheme based on 
th i s  p r in c ip le  would be a su i tab le  a l t e rn a t i v e  f o r  Non- Industr ia l  working 
in dockyards.
The Megaw (1982) repor t  i s  also recommending tha t  Market Forces be 
a strong modifying fa c to r  in  se t t in g  pay leve ls .  Prec ise ly  what is  
meant by Market Forces has not been elucidated by Megaw, but i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  
to envisage such a system being appropr ia te  where considerable resources 
have been invested in  t r a in in g  s p e c ia l i s t  and s k i l l e d  s t a f f .  Lowering 
increases in  sa la r ies  f o r  example to the po in t  where s t a f f  s t a r t  to  leave 
impl ies tha t  a high level o f  pay d is s a t i s f a c t io n  would be to le ra te d ,  
but not necessar i ly  the in e v i ta b le  d iminut ion in performance. The ro le  
o f  Market Forces is  s l i g h t l y  d i f f i c u l t  to envisage in view o f  the ra the r  
negat ive pos i t ion  Megaw (1982) has adopted on the issue o f  d e cen t ra l i sa t io n  
o f  pay bargaining.
Althougfi Megaw advocates comparisons fo r  es tab l ish ing  rates o f  pay in 
the C iv i l  Service, i t  is  recommended tha t  they should have a much less 
dec is ive in f luence than in the past. The adopt ion o f  a less r i g i d  approach 
to comparisons with  an accompanying greater  emphasis on in te rna l  
r e l a t i v i t i e s  would provide an oppor tun i ty  to e l im ina te  the d iv i s i v e  
hor izon ta l  r e l a t i v i t i e s  which are c u r r e n t l y  a fea ture  o f  the c i v i l  serv ice pay 
system. We shal l  deal w ith  th i s  issue in depth s h o r t l y .
I t  remains to be seen how the s t ruc tu re  o f  pay w i l l  develop as a 
r e s u l t  of  the Inqu i ry ,  but i t  w i l l  c e r t a in l y  be an important inpu t  in to
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any developments th a t  do take place. However, the name of Megaw is  
l i k e l y  to dominate c i v i l  serv ice pay negot ia t ions f o r  many years to come.
Pay Systems - Naval Dockyards
As b r i e f l y  mentioned in Chapter 1 the actual money payment system is  
an open or pub l ic  system w ith  rates f o r  any job being publ ished. Money 
payments are re la ted  to  grade and length of service in the grade, and in 
common with  most pay systems progression through the various pay bands 
associated with  each grade is  a func t ion  of s e n io r i t y .  This is  a 
system where equiva lent grades in  d i f f e r e n t  occupational groups have 
been placed in bands, al though there may be considerable v a r ia t io n  in  the 
work content o f  jobs in the same grade. For example, a Technical 
Supervisor may be responsib le f o r  a gang of 12 men whereas an equiva lent 
Drawing O f f ice  grade w i l l  probably be constrained to a Drawing O f f ice  desk. 
Thus basic salary is  l inked d i r e c t l y  to grade and does not d isc r im ina te  
between r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  experience, q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  e tc ,  across the various 
occupational groups or indeed s p e c i f i c  posts w i th in  each group, although 
there are except ions, t r i a l s  pay, which w i l l  be discussed l a t e r .  The 
system also accommodates s e n io r i t y  to a l im i te d  degree.
No form o f  payment by d i r e c t  r e s u l t s ,  e i th e r  on an ind iv idua l  or 
group basis ex is ts  f o r  Non- Indus tr ia ls  in dockyards. Performance 
measurement systems e x i s t ,  but these are used to monitor the performance 
of In d u s t r ia l  grades. I t  is  worth r e i t e r a t i n g  th a t  i t  is  against the 
o f f i c i a l  po l icy  o f  the IPCS to have any form of payment by re s u l t s  scheme 
fo r  i t s  members. The IPCS argue th a t  a high basic sa la ry  which is  not 
l inked to performance is  a l l  th a t  i s  requi red to improve the overa l l  
performance of t h e i r  members. There is  a reluctance by the IPCS to 
acknowledge tha t  high basic pay is  no guarantee o f  good performance. I t  
is  postulated tha t  the ‘ c a r ro t  and s t i c k '  approach does not accord w ith  the
image tha t  the IPCS wish to p ro je c t  o f  i t s  members.
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The basic sa la ry  scales f o r  the three grades which are the sub jec t  
o f  the study are shown a t  Table 3.5 . There are usua l ly  f i v e  or s ix  
points  on each scale. A fea tu re  o f  the P&T groups sa la ry  system is  
th a t  very few ind iv id u a ls  enter  a sa la ry  scale at the bottom. This 
i s  because length o f  serv ice in the previous grade determines the po in t  
a t  which an i n d i v id u a l ,  who has been promoted, enters a p a r t i c u la r  
sa la ry  scale. In p rac t ice  ex- techn ic ian  apprent ices on promotion to PTO IV 
are about the only P&T grades who,enter a sa la ry  scale at the bottom.
Table 3.5
Junior  P&T Grade Salary Scales 1980/81
Grade Scale
PTO I I  £7200-8100
PTO I I I  £6100-6900
PTO IV £5500-6300
The use o f  incremental scales in  a pay system has a number o f
a t t r a c t io n s  which should not be dismissed l i g h t l y .  Incremental scales
r e f l e c t  the fa c t  th a t  in d iv id u a ls  take time to become f u l l y  p r o f i c i e n t  
and conversant in a l l  the work of t h e i r  grade and make i t  possib le to 
recognise increasing experience. The use o f  incremental scales also 
provides a degree o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  in se t t ing  s ta r t i n g  pay on recru i tment  
and promotion, a po in t  which we have already mentioned in respect o f  
s t a f f  promoted to a higher grade. Inexperienced or  untrained s t a f f  can be 
paid less on recru i tment than experienced s t a f f .  S ta r t ing  sa la r ies  can 
be set higher up the range or scale fo r  people who are o lder  or who 
have p a r t i c u la r  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  The incent ive  value o f  t h i s  type o f  
payment system is perhaps best described as neu t ra l .
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Table 3.6
Changes in Pay R e la t i v i t i e s  (1975-1981)
1.4.75 1.4.78 1.1.80 7.5.80 7.5.81 %Inc»
£ £ £ £ £
P r inc ip le  & Equiv Level
Admin Pr inc ipa l 7450 8729 11750 1400 15010 101
PPTO 7450 8729 11021 13200 14154 90
PSO 7205 8481 11343 12540 13448 87
SEO & Equiv Level
SEO 5300 7032 8900 10500 11265 112
PTO I 5330 7064 8601 10200 10944 105
SSO 5778 6858 8705 9819 10322 79
TTOA 5947 7083 9400 11100 11907 100
TTOB 5454 6543 8600 10140 10860 99
HEO & Equiv Level
HEO 4700 5718 7250 8555 9184 95
PTO n 4720 5739 6901 8100 8697 84
HSO 4454 5448 6737 7999 8589 92
TTOÏ 5900 5937 7660 9050 9714 98
TTOII 4215 5187 6750 7965 8553 102
EO & Other Grade
EO 3670 4579 5700 6745 7247 97
PTO Î I Î 3925 4869 5820 6900 7413 88
PTO IV 3450 4326 5253 6300 6771 96
SO 3527 4415 5486 6480 6964 97
TTO I I I 3780 4706 6100 7170 7702 103
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SPECIFIC PAY PROBLEM AREAS IN NAVAL DOCKYARDS 
HEO - PTO I I  Horizonta l  R e la t i v i t i e s
Before we examine the. s p e c i f i c  issue o f  the hor izon ta l  pay d i f f e r e n t i a l
between the PTO I I  and HEO, i t  is  important tha t  we are aware o f  the f u l l
extent of changes in  pay r e l a t i v i t i e s  which have occurred between the P&T 
and Adm in is t ra t ive  groups. Set out a t Table 3.6 is  the changes in  pay 
r e l a t i v i t i e s  f o r  the period 1975 to 1981. Without except ion the 
percentage increase of P&T group pay is  less than th a t  f o r  equiva lent 
adm in is t ra t ive  grades. This fa c to r  perhaps more than anything has c r y s t a l l i s e
the general fe e l in g  of disenchantment among P&T grades over pay in to  pe rs is te r
d i s s a t i s f a c t io n .  These d i f f e r e n t i a l s  are a consequence o f  the mechanics o f  
Pay Research because the P&T and Admin is t ra t ive  groups are compared v/ith 
d i f f e r e n t  groups o f  employees in the Publ ic and Pr ivate  Sector f o r  pay 
comparab i l i ty  purposes.
Turning to the s p e c i f i c  case o f  the PTO I I  - HEO pay d i f f e r e n t i a l ,  
i t s  existence simply strengthens the PTO I I ' s  view th a t  they are an unduly 
disadvantaged grade w i th in  a disadvantaged group. I t  is  qu i te  log ica l  
the re fo re ,  f o r  the PTO I I  grade in p a r t i c u la r  and the P&T group in  
general to t ra n s fe r  n o t io n a l l y  t h i s  s i t u a t io n  to outs ide t h e i r  environment 
thus re in fo rc in g  the b e l i e f  th a t  a large unfavourable pay d i f f e r e n t i a l  
ex is ts  between P&T grades in  the dockyards and comparable groups in 
Pr ivate and National ised in d u s t r ie s .  This perception of the pay s i t u a t io n  
by P&T grades i l l u s t r a t e s  the existence of a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the mechanics of the system pay research, which had been used u n t i l  
1980 f o r  determining t h e i r  leve ls  o f  pay. However, as behaviour patterns 
are developed by what is  perceived, i t  is  understandable, the re fo re ,  tha t  
our subjects be l ieve th a t  they have a j u s t i f i a b l e  gr ievance. The 
existence of th is  grievance over pay has important ra m i f ica t io n s  f o r  
managerial mot iva t ion .  This issue w i l l  be fu r th e r  discussed.
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Technical Supervis o r  (PTO IV) - In d u s t r ia l  D i f f e r e n t i a l
A controvers ia l  pay problem ex is ts  between In d u s t r ia l  c r a f t  grades 
and t h e i r  Technical Supervisor (PTO IV) .  This problem may be best 
i l l u s t r a t e d  by data apperta in ing to In d u s t r ia l  c r a f t  grade pay rates fo r  
du ly 1977. (Table 3 .7 ) .  This data which has been agreed by both the IPCS 
and the C iv i l  Service Department was presented to the A r b i t r a t i o n  
Tribunal in 1979 by the IPCS to support t h e i r  case tha t  Non-Industr ia l  
(PTO IV) pay compares unfavourably w ith  In d u s t r ia l  grade ra tes .
Table 3.7.
In d u s t r ia l  C ra f t  Grades - Average Payment
Average Payment A l l  Cra f t
o f  Top Employees
Top 5% £119.05
" 10% 112.51
" 15% 108,48
" 20% 105.50
" 25% 103.27
The A r b i t r a t i o n  Tribunal awarded the PTO IV grade a maximum of  £100.63,
a f ig u re  below the basic weekly earnings of the top 25% of a l l  craftsmen.
Since then the problem has worsened as incent ives payments have grown at
a fa s te r  ra te  than basic pay. This has undoubtedly been heav i ly  inf luenced
by the in t ro du c t io n  of the Dockyard E f f ic ie n cy  Scheme (DES). Some care
should be exercised in  making d i r e c t  comparisons as the In d u s t r ia l
Craftsmen pay includes c r a f t  allowance. Nevertheless there is  some
substance to the IPCS's case, but on the other hand there is a body of
opinion who would argue tha t  i t  is  not unreasonable to expect a young
PTO IV d iagnost ic ian  to  earn less than a 50 year old s k i l l e d  craftsman.
Part of the problem may be found by an examination o f  Table 3.5
which shows a Pay Band width o f  £800 fo r  PTO IV grades. There are s ix
points on the scale which is  expected to accommodate the whole spectrum
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of  PTO IV s e n io r i t y  ranging from f i r s t  promotion to 35 years in  the grade,
A reason f o r  the narrow PTO IV band width is  due to the number o f  t i e r s  o f
management, obviously i f  there are fewer t i e r s  o f management then 
there is  scope to increase the width o f  pay bands.
High Gross Earnings
Basic sa la r ies  o f  Non- Indus tr ia ls  may be enhanced by three types of 
payment;
a. overtime payments
b. S h i f t  Disturbance Allowance (SDA)
c. T r ia ls  Pay.
For convenience we w i l l  examine the e f fe c t  o f overtime payments and 
s h i f t  disturbance allowance f i r s t  and deal w ith  t r i a l s  pay separate ly .  
Overtime and S h i f t  Disturbance Payments
Overtime payments can be earned in one o f  2 ways, e i t h e r  as s t r a ig h t  
overtime worked on a regu la r  or casual basis or as pa r t  of a regu la r  s h i f t  
pattern ie any hours in  excess o f  condit ioned hours. Casual overtime is 
normal ly worked by PTO I l s  whereas overtime accrued by PTO TVs normal ly 
ar ises from s h i f t  working, f o r  PTO I l l s  i t  is a mix ture of both.
Table 3.8
Table Showing D is t r ib u t i o n  of Overtime and S h i f t  Disturbance Payments 
Period Oct 1980 - Feb 1981
£ Per Week PTO IV
NUMBER 
PTO I I I PTO
0-50 240* 130* 20*
50-75 85 45 5
75-100 60 30 3
100-125 14 6 1
125-150 6 2 0
150-175 3 0 0
175-200 2 • 0 0
"'■'Estimated
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Quanti fy ing the overtime s i t u a t i o n  in f in a n c ia l  terms shows th a t  in 
ea r ly  1981 34% o f  PTO TVs, 20% o f  PTO I l s  and 1% o f  PTO I l s  earned more 
than £200 per month from a combination o f  overtime and s h i f t  working.
Table 3.S^  shows the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  overtime and s h i f t  working earnings
by grade. Enhancements f o r  s h i f t  working is  made up of two elements.
a. Overtime payments
b. S h i f t  Disturbance Allowance SDA.
I t  is  estimated th a t  the m a jo r i t y  o f  PTO IVs and PTO I l l s  w i th  the 
except ion of Drawing O f f ice  grades have t h e i r  sa la ry  enhanced 
by varying amounts from th is  source.
Comparing these earnings to data in New Earnings Survey 1981 show 
th a t  s h i f t  and overtime payments account f o r  an average of only 5% of 
Non-Manual gross earnings. I t  is  evident, from a cursory examination of 
the Rosyth s i t u a t i o n ,  overtime and s h i f t  working account f o r  more than 
30% o f  gross sa la ry  f o r  a s i g n i f i c a n t  number o f  P&T group s t a f f .
Managerial po l icy  coupled w ith  an i n d i f f e r e n t  approach to the contro l  
o f  overtime and s h i f t  working budgets contr ibuted to these high enhance­
ments. Let us i l l u s t r a t e  the p o in t .  SDA is  paid a t  two rates^l2% 
and 20%, the higher ra te  when a n igh t  s h i f t  is included in the s h i f t  
pa t te rn .  I t  has been p r a c t i c e ^ i f  a day and backsh i f t  pa ttern is  worked^to 
ad jus t  working hours so tha t  the backsh i f t  ends at 0030,thus q u a l i f y in g  
the whole s h i f t  pattern fo r  the 20% ra te .  This was done as po l i c y  to 
increase the d i f f e r e n t i a l  between the In d u s t r ia l  and h is  Supervisor.  
Overtime has also been progress ive ly  consol idated in to  s h i f t  pa t te rns ,  fo r  
example^supervisors work a h a l f  hour overtime at meal breaks to 
accommodate the mismatch between Non-Industr ia l  and In d u s t r ia l  meal 
breaks. Over the years i t  has become common p rac t ice  f o r  those not 
d i r e c t l y  supervis ing In d u s t r ia l  grades to work overtime at meal breaks.
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S h i f t  change-overs are another area where overtime can be accumulated.
I t  had been custom fo r  supervisors on sh i f twork  and responsib le f o r  
complex jobs to extend t h e i r  s h i f t  hand-over period, by an h a l f  hour 
to one hour. This p rac t ice  spread u n t i l  i t  became the estab l ished norm. 
Although a h a l f  hour overt ime iriay seem t r i v i a l ,  i t  amounts to 
2.5 hours per week which equates to 3.75 pay hours a t  £2.80 per hour 
(198o) which equals £7.50 per week f o r  a PTO IV.
The in t roduc t ion  o f  cash l im i t s  in 1980, resu lted in overtime and 
s h i f t  working pract ices being subjected to s t r i c t  sc ru t in y  so th a t  t i g h t  
headquarter 's budgets could be met. I t  i s  perhaps f a i r  to say th a t  on ly 
a per functory gesture had been made towards the contro l  of  overt ime.
However, since 1980 a more d isc r im ina t ing  approach has been adopted towards 
overtime working w i th in  s h i f t  pa tte rns.  Rules fo r  meal breaks, s h i f t  change- 
overs, and overtime have been r i g i d l y  appl ied. The contro l  o f  overtime 
budgets and working has been elevated from RTO I I  to Pr inc ipa l  grade.
This decis ion resu lted from the fa c t  th a t  PTO I l s  now q u a l i f y  f o r  overtime 
payments in exact ly  the same way as PTO I l l s .  This s i t u a t io n  was 
brought about by the PTO I Is sa la ry  being less than the HEO grade, the 
HEO salary  is used as the bench mark f o r  determining en t i t lemen t  to over­
time etc .
Attempting to contro l  these high gross earnings has created problems 
f o r  senior management. Because P&T group s t a f f  have become accustomed to 
high earnings they have adapted t h e i r  l i f e  s ty le  according ly  and taken on 
commitments cormnnsurate w ith  t h e i r  gross sa la ry .  Quite n a tu ra l l y ,  
the re fo re ,  attempts to eradicate  past bad pract ices which were a func t ion  
o f  lax management, have been stubbornly res is ted  by the Non-Industr ia l  
Trade Unions (MITUs). The NITUs argue tha t  i t  is  u n fa i r  to  expect 
t h e i r  members to accept a dec l ine  in l i v i n g  standards simply because 
Senior Management now choose to enforce rules which have been u n t i l
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re ce n t ly ,  convenient ly  set as ide, a lb e i t  with re se rva t io n s ,
High gross earnings have placed the P&T group in a favourable 
pos i t ion  v i s -a - v i s  the Adm in is t ra t ive  group at Rosyth. There i s  
abso lu te ly  no doubt th a t  the P&T group is  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  b e t te r  o f f  than 
any other occupat ional groups a t  Rosyth, but th is  does l i t t l e  to moderate 
the sense of inequ i ty  created by the d is p a r i t y  between the basic sa la r ies  
o f  the two groups. In a d d i t io n ,  these high rates o f  overtime and s h i f t  
working enhancements have created a d i f f e r e n t i a l  problem w i th in  the P&T 
group. This problem w i l l  be examined to ascerta in i t s  a f f e c t  on the 
a t t rac t iveness  of the promotion reward.
T r ia l s  Pay
A second, but less universal  type o f  enhancement is  t r i a l s  pay. This 
is  an allowance paid to ce r ta in  P&T grades and other s p e c ia l i s t  groups 
employed in  carry ing out t r i a l s  in  submarines, but more s p e c i f i c a l l y  nuclear 
submarines. T r ia ls  pay is  an index- l inked enhancement, which is  paid in 
e i t h e r  h a l f  or s ing le  u n i t s ;  a u n i t  o f  t r i a l s  pay i s  1/355 o f  the appropria te  
basic annual sa la ry .  To q u a l i f y  fo r  a h a l f  u n i t  requi res working on a 
designated t r i a l  f o r  more than one hour in  a s h i f t ,  a whole u n i t  i s  paid fo r  
working more than 4 in a s h i f t .
At Rosyth only about 12% o f  the P&T grades work in  posts which q u a l i f y  
f o r  t r i a l s  pay. Because the payment o f  t r i a l s  allowance is  l inked to s p e c i f i c  
phases o f  the r e f i t ,  the t r i a l s  and r e fu e l l i n g  phase, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
to ca lcu la te  an annual average- value f o r  t r i a l s  pay f o r  i n d iv id u a ls .
However, based on a two-year r e f i t  cycle fo r  the average nuclear r e f i t ,  i t  
probably works out a t between 90 and 100 days add i t iona l  pay per annum; i t  is  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  enhancement f o r  those in rece ip t  o f  i t .
T r ia ls  pay is  paid to reward those conducting t r i a l s  foi" the higher 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  supposedly involved. A comparison between t r i a l s  which 
a t t r a c t  t r i a l s  pay and those which do not,  suggests tha t  there had been
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a ce r ta in  amount of randomness in  the se lec t ion  o f  t r i a l s  f o r  th i s  
monetary allowance.
A feature o f  t r i a l s  pay is  tha t  the greater  the durat ion o f  the t r i a l s  
period the greater  the to ta l  sum paid out in t r i a l s  allowance by the 
organ isat ion. As an incen t ive  system t r i a l s  pay is  ra the r  i n e f f e c t i v e ,  i t  
rewards i n e f f i c i e n c y ,  the longer the t r i a l s  period las ts  the more money 
ind iv id u a ls  obta in . In other  words i t  rewards one th in g ,  i n e f f i c i e n c y ,  
w h i l s t  hoping fo r  something else - e f f i c i e n c y .  A fea tu re  o f  t r i a l s  pay is 
t h a t  i t  has the po ten t ia l  f o r  creat ing in te rna l  group s t r i f e  because i t  
is  paid on an ind iv idua l  basis.  Each group has e labora te , but u n o f f i c i a l  
procedures, f o r  ensuring an equi tab le d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t r i a l s  pay amongst 
group members.
Owing to the way in which, te s t in g  is  s t ru c tu re d ,  no 2 te s t  groups earn 
the same amount o f  t r i a l s  money, the amount can vary by a fa c to r  o f  two or 
three. This d i f f e r e n t i a l  between groups can be fu r t h e r  accentuated by 
managerial e f fec t iveness ,  a wel l  managed and e f f i c i e n t  group could be 
rewarded by a reduct ion of t h e i r  t r i a l s  earning. This aspect of t r i a l s  
pay makes e f fe c t i v e  management o f te s t  groups d i f f i c u l t .
P rac t ica l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  are created by the d i f f e r i n g  amounts o f  
t r i a l s  pay ava i lab le  to each. Ind iv idua ls  in t r i a l s  groups which q u a l i f y  
f o r  a s i g n i f i c a n t  amount o f  t r i a l s  pay are re lu c ta n t  to 'be  moved to a low 
paying group. A t r i a l s  group which f a i l s  to keep up to i t s  te s t in g
schedule is  re lu c ta n t  to have i t s  members increased as th i s  would probably
re s u l t  in  a reduct ion o f  t r i a l s  pay.
T r ia ls  pay not on ly creates problems between t r i a l s  groups, but
also causes problems with  product ion centres as the Non- Indus tr ia ls  
responsible fo r  the i n s t a l l a t i o n  and erect ion o f  systems do not receive 
th i s  allowance. I t  can be shown tha t  some o f  the tasks carr ied  out by 
the production centres requ i re  greater  s k i l l  in some instances than does 
conducting an operat ional  t r i a l  on the same equipment.
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The whole .question o f  t r i a l s  al lowance-is  made more anomalous 
by the fa c t  tha t  In d u s t r ia ls  working alongside Non- Industr ia ls  on 
t r i a l s  do not receive any t r i a l s  allowance. S i tua t ions  e x is t  where a 
Non-Industr ia l  may be c o n t ro l l i n g  a f lush ing  operat ion on an 
i n te r m i t t e n t  basis receives t r i a l s  pay, but the In d u s t r ia l  who is  
manning the f lush ing  r i g  on a continuous basis receives no add i t iona l  pay.
Unl ike enhancements paid f o r  overtime and sh i f twork ing  t r i a l s  pay i s  
a content ious and d iv i s i v e  allowance*, indeed there i s  l i t t l e  apparent 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  the payment o f  the allowance apart  from custom and 
p rac t ice .  Perhaps the biggest indictment o f  t r i a l s  pay is  i t s  po ten t ia l  
f o r  encouraging i n e f f i c ie n c y .
Our research suggests th a t  t r i a l s  pay, as administered in  the dockyards 
is not paid to comparable groups o f  workers in the ship bu i ld ing  or ship 
re p a i r  industry .  So the ind ica t ions  are tha t  t r i a l s  pay as c u r re n t l y  
s t ructured is  unique to the dockyards. Overtime and s h i f t  working payments 
are common place in Industry .  However, the elaborate and complex ru les 
r e la t in g  to overtime premium rates and the d i f fe rence  in  premium rates 
between various- Non-Industr ia l  grades isunusual.  For example, the cross­
over between PTO IV and PTO I I I  gross earnings occurs when more than twelve 
hours overtime is  worked.
Motiva t iona l  Impl ica t ions o f  Pay Problems
In our examination o f  s p e c i f i c  pay problem areas in  the Dockyard
we discussed two areas concerning d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  the PTO I I -  HEO, a
hor izonta l  r e l a t i v i t i e s  problem and the PTO IV / In d u s t r ia l  craftsman, a 
v e r t i c a l  r e l a t i v i t i e s  problem. One way which th i s  might be examined is  
by using the Expectancy approach.
Let us assume th a t  the Non-Industr ia l  makes some ob jec t ive  est imate
of both his e f f o r t  - performance (E-P) p ro b a b i l i t y  and the various 
performance - reward (P-R) p r o b a b i l i t i e s  f o r  the s i t u a t io n  he f inds
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himself  in  Lawler (1971). Once he has carr ied  out t h i s  process, he 
w i l l  be motivated to perform wel l  to the extent th a t  he fee ls  he can 
perform well and to the extent th a t  he fee ls  good performance w i l l  lead 
to p o s i t ive  value outcomes. Assuming th a t  the Non- Industr ia l  is  motivated 
to perform w e l l ,  he w i l l  perform wel l  i f  he has the a b i l i t y ,  the cor rec t  
percept ion of job and the s i tu a t io n a l  fac to rs  are co r rec t .  Once the 
ind iv idua l  has performed wel l  or badly he may or may not receive the rewards 
th a t  he perceived were l i k e l y  to r e s u l t  from good performance. Thus 
i f  th ind iv idua l  performs wel l  and does not receive the rewards t h i s  w i l l  
weaken his P-0 b e l ie fs  and according to the model he w i l l  be less 
motivated next time round. This examination shows th a t  i f  basic sa la ry  
is  considered by the Non-Industr ia l  to be a valued reward, then because 
he bel ieves his basic sa la ry  compares unfavourably w ith  comparable 
groups or is  deemed to be less than tha t  paid to subord inates, in the 
case of PTO IVs, he is  u n l i k e ly  to be motivated to perform w e l l .  Thus 
from a the o re t ica l  aspect,  i t  may be s u b je c t i v e ly  assessed th a t  the 
d is s a t i s f a c t io n  generated by the hor izon ta l  r e l a t i v i t i e s  between 
the PTO I I  and HEO probably f a r  outweighs the cost o f  e l im ina t in g  the 
d i f f e r e n t i a l .  Although s im i la r  arguments could be appl ied to the PTO IV 
In d u s t r ia l  craftsman s i t u a t i o n ,  the issue is  not as c lea r  cu t ,  and anway 
the organisat ion has taken some ac t ion ,  r e la t in g  to overt ime premiums 
to ensure tha t  a p o s i t ive  v e r t i c a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  ex is ts  between the two 
groups with  respect to gross pay.
A fu r th e r  aspect o f  the hor izonta l  r e l a t i v i t i e s  problem c u r re n t ly  
e x is t in g  between the HEO and PTO I I  which meri ts considerat ion is  the 
status dimension. Lawler (1971) states tha t  i t  is  not high pay as such 
which ca r r ies  s ta tu s , but what pay is  taken to represent.  In other  words 
pay is  simply a convenient symbolic way o f  recognising accomplishment in 
our soc ie ty .  The m a jo r i t y  o f PTO I l s  w i l l  r e a d i l y  concede th a t  the
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money d i f fe rence  is  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l ,  but because o f  the openness o f  
the pay system, the pub l ic  d im inut ion o f  status and pres t ige  f a r  
outweighs the f i n a n c ia l  d i f fe re nce .  The impor tant po in t  is  th a t  the 
organ isat ion  is  perceived as assessing t h e i r  value as somewhat less than 
i t  was in  r e la t i v e  terms, compared w ith  1975, when no d i f f e r e n t i a l  
ex is ted between the two grades. Lawler (1971) suggests th a t  by making 
sa la r ies  pub l ic  i t  w i l l  sens i t ise  people much more to small d i f fe rences  
in  sa la r ies  and may cause people to be much more concerned about the 
r e la t i v e  size o f  t h e i r  s a la r ie s ;  the group whose sa la ry  has decreased 
r e l a t i v e l y  may experience a fe e l in g  o f  in e q u i ty .  Adams (1965) argues 
in  his version of equ i ty  theory th a t  s a t i s fa c t i o n  is  determined by a 
person's perceived input  - outcome balance, obviously i f  a PTO I I  fee ls  
he puts more in and gets less ou t ,  than a HEO, he is  u n l i k e ly  to feel 
s a t i s f i e d .
Another aspect o f  the pay system which meri ts  a t te n t i o n ,  in terms 
o f  equ i ty ,  is  t r i a l s  pay. We have already i d e n t i f i e d  the groups who are 
e l i g i b l e  f o r  t h i s  payment and mentioned tha t  In d u s t r ia l  grades working 
w i th  t r i a l s  teams are not paid the allowance and we also noted th a t  
production centre Non- Industr ia ls  do not receive t h i s  payment. This 
coupled w ith  the fa c t  th a t  the se lec t ion  of Test Forms which q u a l i f y  f o r  
the payment appears to have been ra the r  a r b i t r a r y  w ith  l i t t l e  
a t te n t io n  paid to the degree o f  complexity o f those t r i a l s  se lected.
These points which have been mentioned are general knowledge amongst 
the m a jo r i ty  o f  Production Department Non- Industr ia ls  and there is  l i t t l e  
doubt, confirmed by my own observa t ion, tha t  t r i a l s  pay creates intense 
fee l in g s  o f  ine q u i ty  amongst Product ion Department personnel.  There is  
nothing subt le  or elegant about the allowance which would permit  i t  to 
be packaged in  such a manner as to make i t  even remotely pa la tab le  to 
other groups. How has the allowance been permit ted to ex is t?
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There are two main reasons. F i r s t l y  according to local  IPCS 
o f f i c i a l s ,  i t  is  t h e i r  po l icy  to re ta in  al lowances, i e ,  what they have 
got they would wish to keep^ i r respect ive  of i t s  d iv is iveness .  Secondly, 
some o f  the rec ip ien ts  o f  t r i a l s  pay are required to undertake 
s p e c ia l i s t  courses, varying in  length from 2 to 9 weeks. Thus i t  is  
conjectured th a t  there would be a reluctance by dockyard management 
c e n t r a l l y  (CED) to abol ish th i s  allowance and r i s k  a con f ron ta t ion  
w i th  a group where s k i l l s  are not re a d i l y  replaceable in the short  term.
The p ic tu re  which emerges from an examination o f  the mot iva t iona l  
im p l ica t ions  of current pay problems in the Dockyard is  confused. 
Nevertheless there is  evidence to support the view th a t  both the PTO I I  
and PTO IV grades do have a genuine grievance. The existence o f  a 
r e l a t i v i t i e s  problem p a r t i c u l a r l y  between the PTO I I  and HEO is  c e r t a in l y  
not conducive to the maintenance o f  high mot iva t iona l  behaviour 
among PTO I l s .  The net a f f e c t  o f  t r i a l  pay is  probably to confuse 
a less than s a t i s fa c to ry  s i tu a t io n  p a r t i c u l a r l y  as approximately only 
lo7i o f  P&T group Non- Indus tr ia ls  are in  rece ip t  o f  i t  a t  any one t ime.
Current Payment System Effect iveness
To conclude the examination o f  the pay system as administered and 
appl ied to lower management, i t  i s  necessary to address the centra l  
quest ion, how e f fe c t i v e  is  the curren t  payment system in  s t im u la t ing  
organ isat iona l  e f fec t iveness  or more simply put,  does the organ isat ion 
get value f o r  money? The s t r a i g h t  answer would appear to be no, the 
Dockyard Study Report (1980) h igh l igh ted  a problem o f  dec l in ing  
p ro d u c t i v i t y  in Naval Dockyards. Why has t h i s  dec l ine occurred, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in view of the fa c t  t h a t ,  contrary  to popular b e l i e f ,  gross 
earnings a t  Rosyth are r e l a t i v e l y  high as our analysis o f pay enhancements 
has shown? Why f o r  example are these r e l a t i v e l y  high leve ls  o f  gross
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earnings not generat ing leve ls  o f  managerial mot iva t ion  and hence 
organ isa t iona l  e f fec t iveness  comparable to those found in successful  
companies, indeed the type o f  company used by the PRU f o r  determining 
c i v i l  servants pay rates?
I t  is  speculated th a t  one o f  the reasons why these r e l a t i v e l y  high 
leve ls  o f  gross earnings are not generat ing leve ls  o f  p ro d u c t i v i t y  
comparable to p r iva te  ind u s t ry  i s  associated w ith  the f a c t  the pay 
system is  not l inked to dockyard output-. The l i n k  between pay and 
performance fo r  Non- Industr ia l  grades is  extremely tenuous in the 
dockyard. The hypothesis i s ,  th e re fo re ,  th a t  by es tab l ish ing  a l i n k  
between performance and pay, i t  should strengthen managerial mot iva t ion .
The ACAS Advisory Booklet No 2 (1981) makes the po in t  th a t  over recent 
years there has been an increase in the number o f  payment systems which 
l i n k  pay to the output or p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of the organ isa t ion  and indeed 
Megaw (1982) recommends a Performance re la ted  pay system fo r  the c i v i l  
serv ice .
The chal lenge f o r  dockyard management is  to devise a payment 
system which w i l l  es tab l ish  a d e f i n i t e  l i n k  between pay and performance. 
Current ly  there appears to be an over-dependency on overt ime and s h i f t -  
working f o r  pay enhancement, more than 30% of  gross earnings in  many 
instanceSo Managerial mot iva t ion  is  not st imulated because of the very 
tenuous l i n k  th a t  t h i s  type o f  pa^mient estab l ishes between pay and 
organ isat iona l  performance. I t  is  ra the r  nonsensical f o r  In d u s t r ia l  
grades to p a r t i c ip a te  in a d i r e c t  f i n a n c ia l  incen t ive  scheme (DES) w h i l s t  
the bonus element o f  t h e i r  superv iso r 's  sa la ry ,  in  common with  i t s  basic 
element, is  determined by a system o f  pay comparab i l i ty  with  p r iva te  
indus t ry .  I t  is  argued th a t  the f i r s t  step in the process o f  strengthening 
the l i n k  between pay and performance fo r  Non- Indus tr ia ls  i s  the recogn i t ion  
th a t  Non- Indus tr ia ls  working in dockyards require  a d i f f e r e n t  so r t  of
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mot ivat iona l  t reatment to the re s t  o f  the c i v i l  serv ice . In simple 
terms dockyard management must endeavour to re p l i c a te  condi t ions which 
e x is t  in successful  p r iva te  companies.
I t  is evident from th i s  examination o f  the curren t  system o f  payment 
tha t  there is  po ten t ia l  f o r  improving managerial mot iva t ion  by a p a r t i a l  
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of pay enhancements from overtime and sh i f t -w o rk  payments 
to some form of f i n a n c i a l l y  based incen t ive  scheme. The ’Time ra tes '  
o f  payment system is  deemed inappropr ia te  to the p a r t i c u la r  circumstances 
appertaining to the employment o f  Non-Industr ia l  c i v i l  servants in an 
i n d u s t r ia l  o rgan isa t ion .  Although the Time rates system is  e a s i l y  under­
stood by s t a f f ,  is  simple and cheap to  admin is te r ,  th i s  in no way compensates 
fo r  i t s  lack of po ten t ia l  to promote organ isat iona l  e f fec t iveness .
The development o f  a pay system to  meet the needs o f  the dockyard 
w i l l  be explored in Chapter 7. I t  is  concluded from the above analysis 
tha t  the key to improving dockyard output is  the s t ru c tu r in g  o f  a pay 
system which w i l l  es tab l ish  a strong l i n k  between pay and performance.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE SYSTEM OF PROMOTION
In t ro d u c t i  on
According to Lawler (1973) the two most obvious rewards th a t  an 
organisat ion can give are pay and promotion. He goes on to assert  th a t  the 
g iv ing or withho ld ing o f  these rewards and the way th a t  they are administered 
can have a marked in f luence on employee mot iva t ion .  In t h i s  Chapter we shal l  
focus on the promotion reward. More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  the importance of promotion 
in  the C iv i l  Service w i l l  be discussed and the current promotion system examined 
and described in  d e ta i l  in order to gain an apprec ia t ion of the promotion process, 
Lupton e t  al (1983) in  his analysis o f  the motiva t iona l  in f luences of
sa lary  systems asserts th a t  the promise o f  high fu tu re  rewards in  re tu rn  f o r
present e f f o r t  and achievement may be used as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  a p a r t i c u la r
sa lary  le ve l .  These fu tu re  or deferred rewards may take the form o f  prospect
o f  promotion with  accompanying high sa la ry  and s ta tus . We shal l  examine the 
in te ra c t io n  between pay and promotion to determine how overtime earnings and 
perceived oppor tun i t ies  f o r  overt ime working can modify the desire  o f  in d iv id u a ls  
to seek promotion and f i n a l l y ,  speculate how these fac to rs  may in f luence 
Non-Industr ia l  behaviour.
Importance o f  Promotion i n the Ci v i l  Serv ice
In Chapter 1 we i d e n t i f i e d  th a t  promotion was the main form o f  reward f o r  
mer i t  in  the C iv i l  Service. Because there is  no form of m er i t  payment f o r  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  C iv i l  Servants promotion takes on an added s ig n i f i c a n c e .  Thus 
promotion in  the C iv i l  Service is  a p re - re q u is i te  f o r  a pay r i s e ,  other  than the 
annual round, which may become bi-annual in  response to curren t  Government 
th in k in g .  However, th is  explanat ion only p a r t l y  answers the quest ion concerning 
the importance o f  promotion. A useful  s ta r t i n g  po in t  is  to broaden the issue
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and ask the quest ion, why do organisat ions give e x t r i n s i c  rewards such as 
promotion and mer i t  pay? Apart from the obvious reason o f  susta in ing the 
o rgan isa t ion ,  perhaps the s implest and most va l id  answer to the question i s  to 
motivate people to behave in  ways they might not ctherwise behave.
As promotion provides a method f o r  C iv i l  Servants to obta in  add i t iona l  
pay fo r  good performance, i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to judge whether i t  is  the ext ra  pay 
or the status associated w i th  the higher grade which provide the mot iva t ion to 
seek promotion. Organisations have r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  contro l  over the value 
people place on e x t r i n s ic  rewards as th i s  is  la rg e ly  a func t ion  o f  a person's 
needs. Organisat ions can, h o w e v e r , in f luence what employees have to do in  order 
to obta in rewards. There is  a strong tendency fo r  in d iv id u a ls  to react  to the 
o f fe r in g  o f  important rewards by doing what i s  required in  order to a t ta in  
them. Thus how an organ isa t ion  d is t r ib u te s  rewards has a very important 
in f luence  on behaviour o f in d iv id u a ls  more succ inc t ly  put by Porter e t al (1975) 
Organisat ions tend to motivate the kind o f  behaviour they reward. I t  is  also 
argued by Porter th a t  in d iv id u a ls  do not simply want more e x t r i n s i c  rewards; 
ra the r ,  they desire what they fee l is  a f a i r  level o f  reward . Hence depending 
upon how a reward is  perceived by the i n d i v id u a l ,  an o rg an isa t ion 's  reward system 
may or may not motivate the kind of behaviour i t  was designed to mot iva te , and 
the in d iv id u a ls  may or may not be s a t i s f i e d  w ith  the rewards they receive from i t ,  
Whether employees are h igh ly  motivated or not w i l l  depend on how a t t r a c t i v e  the 
rewards are and what employees fee l tha t  they have to do to obta in those rewards 
which are desired. This po in t  has important connotat ions fo r  the P&T group 
in  the wake o f  the decision to close Chatham and run-down Portsmouth dockyards. 
Although the f in a n c ia l  reward associated w ith  promotion may be a t t r a c t i v e  f o r  
th is  need not necessari ly  act as an incen t ive  fo r  i n d iv id u a ls  to seek 
promotion i f ,  fo r  example, promotion oppor tun i t ies  are perceived as being few.
A contrac t ing  indus t ry  i s  l i k e l y  to o f fe r  fewer promotion oppo r tun i t ies  than an 
expanding one. S im i la r l y  too few grades may make promotion prospects poor. This 
po in t  w i l l  be re levant to our discussion concerning the number o f  t i e r s  of
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management in  dockyards.
C iv i l  Service Promotion System
The C iv i l  Service promotion system is  based on an e laborate and de ta i led  
s t a f f  repo r t  which is  rendered annual ly .  Select ion o f  s t a f f  f o r  promotion, 
up to Pr inc ipa l  grade, i s  done by in te rv iew  board. The s t a f f  repo r t  is  the 
veh ic le  which enables s t a f f  to be selected fo r  a promotion in te rv ie w ,  but i t  is  
the candidate's performance in  f r o n t  o f  the se lec t ion  board which determines 
whether or not he i s  se lec ted .  Thus the process has two d i s t i n c t ,  but neverthe­
less re la ted  phases. We sha l l  examine both parts o f  the process, deal ing f i r s t l y  
w i th  the S ta f f  repor t ing  aspect and secondly the method o f  se lec t ing  s t a f f  f o r  
promot ion.
A model o f  the promotion system as i t  appl ies to the dockyards is  set out 
a t  Figure 4.1. The main features o f  the system w i l l  be discussed in  the 
fo l low ing  sec t ion .  An important fea ture  o f  the process is  th a t  i t  has a 
dockyard and headquarters phase.
Figure 4 .1 . Model o f  Current Dockyard Promotion System
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Report ing Sy stem
The method o f  assessing the performance o f  Non- Indus tr ia ls  i s  based on 
a very comprehensive s t a f f  repo r t  which is  w r i t te n  by the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
immediate super io r .  A repor t  is  rendered on each Non- Industr ia l  annual ly.
The w r i t te n  repor t  is  passed by the author to his super io r ,  the Second 
Reporting O f f i c e r ,  f o r  v e t t i n g .  The normal procedure is  f o r  the Second 
Reporting O f f i c e r  to conduct a Job Appraisal Review (JAR) w ith  the sub jec t .
P r io r  to the JAR the Second Reporting O f f i c e r  discusses, w ith  the author o f 
the s t a f f  re p o r t ,  the sub jec t 's  performance over the past year.  Plans f o r  the 
sub jec t 's  career development are appraised and a l te red  as appropr ia te. The 
Second Reporting O f f i c e r  and the author would also discuss any areas o f  the 
sub jec t 's  performance where, with proper guidance improvement could be 
expected.
The JAR is  a s t ruc tu red  in te rv iew  conducted with  the aid o f  a check-of f  sheet 
The core o f  the in te rv iew  is  an in-depth appraisal o f  the content o f  the 
subject- s s t a f f  repor t .  The purpose o f  th is  de ta i led  assessment is  p r i n c i p a l l y  
to provide the subject w ith  feedback on his performance over the past year and 
to  i d e n t i f y  any areas o f  weakness which are deemed to be w i th in  the subject'  s 
c a p a b i l i t y  to improve. Discussions also include work ta rgets  f o r  the f o r t h ­
coming year and whether the subject  would b e ne f i t  from being placed on a 
t r a in in g  course. F in a l l y  the subject is  to ld  whether or not he is  recommended 
fo r  promotion.
The JAR session, which las ts  approximately one hour, is  concluded by the 
Second Reporting O f f i c e r  s e t t in g  out the subject '  s work ta rgets  fo r  the f o r t h ­
coming year along w ith  any recommendation fo r  t r a in in g  and a b r i e f  note 
concerning the sub jec t 's  preferences f o r  fu tu re  jobs. The JAR check sheet is  
signed by the subject who re ta ins  a copy and copies are also forwarded to the 
sub jec t 's  super io r  and the Personnel Department. Check sheets should be 
p e r io d ic a l l y  re ferred to so tha t  progress towards targets  can be monitored.
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The Personnel Department are the custodian fo r  s t a f f  re p o r ts .  Before 
reports  are f i l e d  and copies forwarded to the CEDs department a t  Bath, Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  Trade Union sc ru t inee rs ,  who are appointed l o c a l l y  from w i th in  the 
membership, examine each s t a f f  re p o r t ,  checking amongst other th ings ,  f o r  a 
consistency o f  repor t ing  standard across the dockyard. The s t a f f  repor t  
scru t ineers  are authorised to  discuss the content of s t a f f  repor ts  with  e i t h e r  
the F i r s t  or Second Reporting O f f i ce rs .
The C iv i l  Service s t a f f  repor t ing  systems f u l f i l l s  the fou r  main purposes 
deemed essent ia l  by the l i t e r a t u r e  fo r  an e f fe c t i v e  performance appraisal 
namely, performance feedback, determining promotion p o te n t i a l ,  t r a in in g  and 
development needs and f i n a l l y  considering re ten t ion  or d ischarge. The success 
o f  the appraisal system is  heav i ly  dependent on frankness, confidence and 
d isc r im ina to ry  s t a f f  repor t ing  by super io rs .  However, there is  a f a i r l y  wide­
spread b e l i e f  tha t  s t a f f  reports  lack d isc r im ina t ion  Megaw (1982).
The Select ion Process
The se lec t ion  process which we sha l l  examine is  used fo r  the se lec t ion  of
s t a f f  up to p r in c ip a l  grade, al though the procedure fo r  se lec t ing  PTO IV grades
from w i th in  the In d u s t r ia l  grades is  d i f f e r e n t .  Table 4.2 shows the number of 
s t a f f  by grade at Rosyth, the r a t i o  between the grades is  s im i l a r  a t other 
dockyards. Although the concept o f  a career grade is not e x p l i c i t l y  s ta ted ,  i t  
is genera l ly  acknowledged th a t  the m a jo r i ty  o f  s t a f f  w i l l  a t t a in  the grade o f  PTO 
I I I  and indeed, the general expectat ion among PTO IVs is  th a t  they w i l l  be promoter 
to a t lea s t  PTO I I I  grade.
Table 4.2 P&T Grades Employed at Rosyth in 1981
Grade Number Employed in  Rosyth Dockyard
PPTO 28
PTO 1 33
PTO I I . 138
PTO I I I 380
PTO IV 1 640
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Select ion boards are normal ly convened annual ly ,  but in 1980 no 
se lec t ion  board was convened f o r  PTO I I I  to  PTO I I .  The process s ta r t s  w i th  
headquarters convening se lec t ion  boards and s t i p u la t i n g  the number o f  promotees 
requ i red.  To aid our desc r ip t ion  o f  the process we shal l  take as a s p e c i f i c  
example the PTO I I I  to PTO I I  se lec t ion  process. Suppose 20 PTO I l s  are 
required by CED department, the se lec t ion  board which consists o f  a chairman
plus two would endeavour to se lec t  approximately 60 candidates fo r  in te rv ie w .
The headquarters personnel sect ion would pass the s t a f f  reports  o f  a l l  PTO I l l s  
who had been assessed e i t h e r  as 'Well F i t t e d '  or ' F i t t e d '  f o r  promotion. In 
1981, the se lec t ion  board had to se lec t  60 candidates f o r  in te rv ie w  from a 
f i e l d  o f  approximately 1000 PTO I l l s .  The actual number th a t  the board 
in te rv iew  is  swol len to around 100 by some PTO I l l s  invoking t h e i r  automatic 
r i g h t  to appear before a se lec t ion  board. Five years in a grade earns the Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  the r i g h t  to appear before a se lec t ion  board. I t  i s  genera l ly  acknoW' 
ledged th a t  Non- Industr ia ls  value th is  r i g h t  suggest ing th a t  there is  a ce r ta in  
lack o f  confidence in the S ta f f  Reporting system w ith  respect to promotion.
Each candidate is  interviewed by the se lec t ion  board f o r  about 45 minutes. 
The candidate's performance is  scored by each member o f  the board. Marks are
awarded under tfie fo l low ing  headings set out in  Table 4 .3 .
Table 4.3 Promotion Board Mark A l lo ca t io n
A t t r i bute Maximum Score As o f  Total
Bearing & Presence 15
Technical Knowledge 35
Management Poten t ia l 35
Breadth o f  Knowledge 15
Thus v i r t u a l l y  no a t te n t io n  is  paid to the s t a f f  repo r t  other than i t  
may in f luence the board i f  there were a number o f  candidates with s im i l a r  marks. 
Thus a Non-Industr ia l  who has worked d i l i g e n t l y  and consc ien t ious ly  to m er i t  a 
ser ies o f  'Wel l F i t t e d '  f o r  promotion may f in d  h imse lf  unduly handicapped a t  the
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the in te rv ie w  board i f  he is  unable to a r t i c u la te  l u c i d l y .  Indeed many 
competent ind iv id u a ls  re g u la r ly  f a i l  promotion boards because they are unable 
to create a good impression or do themselves j u s t i c e  in the unnatural  surroundings 
o f  the in te rv iew  room. We would quest ion whether the b r i e f  conversat ion on 
broad top ica l  issues, which is  the content o f most promotion in te rv iew s ,  
adequately t e s t  the managerial a b i l i t i e s  of candidates! ' There i s  no doubt 
th a t  the present system places a l o t  o f  emphasis upon a r t icu la teness  in  a 
stress s i t u a t i o n ,  c e r ta in l y  a managerial a t t r i b u t e ,  but nevertheless on ly one 
among many. There is  an i n d ic a t io n  th a t  the curren t  method f o r  se lec t ing  s t a f f  
f o r  promotion is  not popular amongst P&T grades at Rosyth. This is  an issue which 
the survey w i l l  i n ve s t ig a te .
Another aspect o f  the curren t  promotion process which tends to f u r th e r  
degredate the tenuous l i n k  between performance and the promotion reward concerns 
the lack of d is c r im ina t io n  by super iors when assessing t h e i r  subordinates 
performance. This po in t  is  c le a r l y  i l l u s t r a t e d  in  Table 4.4 which shows the 
average d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s t a f f  in  the s ix  categories o f  performance.
Performance Category Average % o f  Dep t ,
Outstanding )
Very good | - * ”  40 - 75
Good 20 - 50
Fa ir  )
Not Quite Adequate 1“^  ~ - - — ■ - ~— 5 — 10
Unsati s fac to ry 0 - 1
Source - Megaw Report 1982
The S e n io r i ty  Dimension
An aspect o f  the promotion process which meri ts d iscussion is  the ro le  o f  
s e n io r i t y .  .Fulton (1968) was c r i t i c a l  o f  the undue emphasis which seemed to be 
placed on s e n io r i t y  by promotion boards.
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I t  was the view o f  Rayner in  1980 th a t  s e n io r i t y  s t i l l  had a d isp ropor t iona te  
in f luence on determining who was or was not selected fo r  promotion, the 
Buggins turn syndrome s t i l l  had a n iche .  However, the head o f  the C iv i l  Service, 
S i r  Ian Bancrof t ,  p a r t i a l l y  defended a s e n io r i t y  biased system by s ta t in g  th a t  
there must be a perceived career f o r  the able as wel l  as the b r i l l i a n t .  This 
view has substance as a promotion system which rewards loyal and f a i t h f u l  
service may be j u s t  as e f fe c t i v e  a t  motiva t ing ind iv id u a ls  to perform 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  as a promotion system designed to promote a high degree o f  
competit iveness amongst s t a f f .  Promotion which is  perceived as being the 
reward fo r  a sustained period o f  s a t i s fa c to r y  performance may be more bene f ic ia l  
to the organisat ion in the long term than a system which provokes h igh ly  
compet i t ive behaviour.
I t  is  suggested th a t  a promotion system based on s e n io r i t y  is  cons is ten t  
with the C iv i l  Serv ice 's cu l tu re  where s t a b i l i t y  and c o n t in u i t y  are a 
necessary feature .  The knowledge by Non- Industr ia ls  th a t  the promotion reward 
is  re la ted  l i n e a r l y  to s e n io r i t y  may act as a stimulus f o r  sustained e f fe c t i v e  
performance provided there is  a perceived oerformance threshold below which pronot i  
would not be a t ta in a b le .  The s t a f f .performance appraisal system in  C iv i l  
Service incorporates such a feedback mechanism, the annual OAR. At these 
sessions subordinates are given an in d ic a t io n  o f  t h e i r  promotion prospects.
This can only be an i n d ic a t io n  because ind iv idu a l  dockyards do not have any 
d i r e c t  contro l  over which members o f  t h e i r  s t a f f  are promoted.
A s e n io r i t y  biased promotion system also has ce r ta in  appeal where a high 
degree o f  s u b je c t i v i t y  is  associated wit f i  performance measurement because o f  the 
nature of work done in the o rgan isa t ion .  An absolute method fo r  measuring 
performance would be d i f f i c u l t  to set up in an o rgan isa t ion ,  such as the C iv i l  
Service which is  involved in  a high proport ion o f  c l e r i c a l  and a dm in is t ra t ive  
work. In the in d u s t r ia l  environment o f  the dockyard there i s  greater  scope 
fo r  in t roduc ing  an assessment system based on work ta rge ts .  Opportun it ies
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e x is t  in  other  areas o f  the C iv i l  Service to develop a more o b je c t i ve  approach 
to s t a f f  r e p o r t in g .  However, a more o b je c t i ve  repor t ing  system provides no 
guarantee th a t  re l iance  on s e n io r i t y  would necessar i ly  be lessened p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i f  s t a f f  reports  lacked d isc r im in a t io n .  When confronted with  a group o f  
candidates a l l  s i m i l a r l y  assessed, s e n io r i t y  becomes a tang ib le  dimension 
on which to base choice. Thus we consider tha t  i f  promotion was the concern o f  
each dockyard and th a t  candidates f o r  promotion were reasonably f a m i l i a r  to the 
se lec t ion  boards, then s e n io r i t y  would f u r th e r  decl ine in  importance as a va r iab le  
in  the promotion process.
In te ra c t io n  Between Promotion and Pay
The in te ra c t io n  between promotion and pay deserves a t te n t io n  p r i n c i p a l l y  
because o f  the d i f f e r e n t  rates o f  overtime premium between PTO I I I  and PTO IV 
grades. Set out a t  Table 4.5 are the various m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  fac to rs  used to 
transform overtime clock hours to pay hours.
Table ^.5 Grade Versus Overtime Premium Rates
Grade Weekdays Saturday Sunday
PTO I I xl xl x2
PTO I I I xl xl x2
PTO IV xl .5 xl .9 x2.1
Table 4 .6__ PTO I I I  and IV Pay Scales (1980/81 )
PTO I I I  Pay Band £6100 - 6900
PTO IV " " £5500 - 6300
Tables 4,5 and 4.6 c le a r l y  i l l u s t r a t e  the problem o f  cross over o f  gross (a 
po in t  already discussed in  Chapter 3) earnings when both PTO I I I  and IV grades 
work s im i l a r  amounts o f  overtime during weekdays and Saturdays. The PTO IV
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premiums were pi tched at these p a r t i c u la r  leve ls  to ensure a d i f f e r e n t i a l  
between PTO IV grades and In d u s t r ia l  grades. I t  is  not unreasonable to 
assume th a t  a PTO IV accustomed to earnings enhanced by regu la r  overt ime may be 
somewhat re lu c ta n t  to accept promotion i f  the same amount o f  overtime as a PTO I I I
resu lted in  less gross pay or indeed, i f  there was uncer ta in ty  whether a move to a
new post,  on promotion, might r e s u l t  in less oppor tun i ty  f o r  overt ime. As 
in d iv id u a ls  tend to adopt l i f e - s t y l e s  commensurate with t h e i r  earnings, promotion 
is  u n l i k e ly  to be looked on as a valued reward i f  i t  i s  l i k e l y  to e n ta i l  a 
dec l ine in  an accustomed standard o f  l i v i n g .  Because oppo r tun i t ies  f o r  overtime 
in  the dockyard tend to be re la ted  to ce r ta in  areas of work, i t  is  suggested 
th a t  the desire fo r  an in d iv idu a l  to gain promotion may be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
inf luenced by the trade centre and department in which he works. We have already 
emphasised th is  po in t  by focusing on the PTO IV to PTO I I I  promotion, the
argument concerning uncer ta in ty  about a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  overtime appl ies to a
lesser degree fo r  those promoted from PTO I I I  to PTO I I .
The s i tu a t io n  we have discussed may lead to intense d is i l lu s io n m e n t  among 
ce r ta in  ind iv idu a ls  i f  promotion is  considered an a t t r a c t i v e  reward, but owing 
to economic considerat ions promotion has to be avoided. In other  words s e l f  
f u l f i lm e n t  may have to be denied to susta in  an accustomed standard o f  l i v i n g .
Summary
The two main points to emerge are f i r s t l y  tha t  the l i n k  between performance 
and the promotion reward is  tenuous. Secondly f in a n c ia l  considerat ions in some 
circumstances, and depending on area o f  work in  the dockyard may inf luence the 
a t t rac t iveness  o f  the promotion reward. There is  a fu r th e r  issue concerning the 
q u a l i t y  of s t a f f  repor t ing  which not only diminishes the o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  the 
system, but,  more im por tan t ly ,  may deprive the dockyard o f  the services o f  
good managers. A l l  these issues w i l l  be considered in  the fo rmula t ion o f  an 
a l t e rn a t i v e  promotion system ip  Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY OF SURVEY
In t ro d u c t io n
In order to gain an apprec iat ion and understanding of a t t i tu d e s  and
issues pe r t inen t  to the study o f  rewards, i t  was necessary to ask questions
to obta in in format ion. This chapter w i l l  deal w ith  the mechanics o f  
conducting an a t t i t u d i n a l  survey. The o r ig in a l  in te n t io n  had been to 
adminis ter the quest ionnaire a t  Chatham to provide a contro l  group.
Chatham and Rosyth dockyards are heav i ly  involved in a s im i la r  type o f  work, 
nuclear submarine r e f i t t i n g .  However, the announcement in June 1981 of
the decision to close Chatham t o t a l l y  changed the frame o f  reference o f
Chatham’ s Non- Industr ia ls  and thus inva l ida ted  the idea o f  using Chatham 
as a comparator group.
The survey was conducted at Rosyth with  the agreement o f  the General 
Manager and the concurrence o f  the local IPCS chairman whose members were 
to be the subject o f  the study. The core o f  t h i s  chapter concerns the 
design of the quest ionnaire  along w ith  comments on the relevance of 
quest ions to major issues a f fe c t in g  Non- Industr ia ls  a t Rosyth.
A b r i e f  descr ip t ion  o f  the way the ta rg e t  populat ion was cod i f ied  
and respondents selected w i l l  be given. Pr io r  to p r i n t i n g ,  the quest ionnaire 
was tested amongst a small sample o f  Non- Industr ia ls  to e l im ina te ,  as f a r  as
prac t icab le  problems o f  ambiguity and badly s truc tu red quest ions.
The formal quest ionnaire  was supplemented by a number o f  semi- 
s t ruc tu red in te rv iews.  This was done to gain a b e t te r  understanding and 
apprec iat ion o f  the centra l  issues r e la t in g  to pay and promotion. The
interviews were conducted mainly amongst PTO I I  and I I I  grades as wel l  as a
small number o f  senior management.
Although the s t ruc tu red in te rv iew  technique had been considered as an
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a l te rn a t i v e  to the mail survey method to gain in fo rmat ion ,  i t  was re jected 
f o r  three reasons. F i r s t l y  the size o f  the sample popu la t ion, 385 P&T 
grades, would have en ta i led  conducting in  the region o f  800 man hours o f  
s t ruc tu red  and semi-st ructured interv iews in  order to gain a comparable 
amount o f  in fo rmat ion .  Secondly the mail survey method enabled the 
in format ion to be co l lec ted  over a short  period of t ime. This was an 
important considerat ion because during the period th a t  i t  was planned to 
administer the quest ionnaire  events in connection with  the Non- Industr ia l  
c i v i l  servants pay claim fo r  1981/82 were gathering momentum.
T h i rd ly  the mail survey technique afforded the author a degree o f  
anonymity. As the author was a serving o f f i c e r  the face to face in te rv iew  
had the po ten t ia l  f o r  provoking emotive behaviour. However, t h i s  i n i t i a l  
concern was not rea l ised  because o f  the w i l l ingness  o f  the m a jo r i t y  o f 
P&T grades to discuss the issues confront ing  the dockyard.
A t t i t u d in a l  Survey
The p r inc ipa l  reason fo r  conducting the survey was to gain in format ion 
so th a t  the importance of rewards ava i lab le  to P&T grades might be gauged. 
Just as important,  however, in format ion was required to i d e n t i f y  scope 
f o r  change and to provide some idea o f  the d i re c t io n  th a t  t h i s  might take 
in the dockyards.
An important fa c to r  which must be taken in to  account in  the s t ru c tu r in g  
and adminis ter ing o f  a quest ionnaire  is  th a t  i t  might provoke emotive 
behaviour. The degree to which th i s  may a f fe c t  the q u a l i t y  of in format ion 
can only be assessed su b je c t i ve ly .  For example, when the quest ionnaire  
was administered in February 1981, the quest ion of pay was a top ica l  issue 
and obviously th is  fa c to r  the re fo re ,  must temper our i n t e rp r e ta t io n  of 
pay re la ted  questions.
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A fu r th e r  fa c to r  which could a f f e c t  the q u a l i t y  o f  respondents' rep l ies  
concerns the problem of co l lus ion  where a survey is  conducted among a 
r e l a t i v e l y  close k n i t  popula t ion. This was not considered to be a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  problem because o f  the geographical d ispersal o f respondents.
The fa c t  th a t  the fu tu re  o f  the dockyards had been the subject  o f  a repor t  
(Dockyard Study Report 1980) meant th a t  discussion among Non- Indus tr ia ls  
concerning t h e i r  fu tu re  a t  Rosyth was f a i r l y  commonplace and undoubtedly 
the adminis ter ing o f  a quest ionnaire covering these top ica l  subjects 
prompted fu r th e r  discussion at the workplace.
Sett ing Up the Survey
The s ta r t in g  po in t  f o r  the f i e l d  study was to obta in the General 
Manager's permission and the S ta f f  Assoc ia t ion 's  concurrnece in conducting 
a survey among t h e i r  members. Before the quest ionnaire  could be administered 
i t  was agreed th a t  i t  should be vetted by both p a r t ies .  This process 
e l i c i t e d  a l o t  o f  useful  in format ion which was subsequently incorporated 
in  the quest ionnaire . D e f in i t i o n  of the purpose of the study enabled i t s  
ob jec t ives to be sys tem a t ica l ly  redef ined and the relevance of the quest ions 
to  the dockyard s i tu a t io n  improved.
Needless to say, the a t t i t u d e  o f  both S ta f f  Associat ion and senior 
management was cruc ia l  to the success of a desc r ip t ive  type survey. I t  was 
recognised tha t  the study had a degree of s e n s i t i v i t y  associated w ith  i t .
The fa c t  th a t  the S ta f f  Associat ion had taken a p a r t i c u la r  stand on the 
quest ion of incent ives contr ibuted to the view th a t  there might have been a 
ce r ta in  amount of h o s t i l i t y  towards the study. Happi ly ,  however, the study 
received every co-operat ion and encouragement from the senior o f f i c i a l s  o f  
the local  branch o f  the IPCS.
Quest ionnaire Design
The s ta r t in g  po in t  f o r  the design of the quest ionnaire was to i d e n t i f y  
the important var iab les  in the reward equation. The p r in c ip a l  rewards 
are deemed to be pay and promotion, Lawler (1973) stated th a t  as these are
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given in a l l  work organisat ions they form the core o f  any system o f  reward.
He fu r th e r  asserts th a t  w ith  few except ions, statements about t h e i r  e f fe c ts  
on mot iva t ion  and s a t i s fa c t i o n  hold t rue  fo r  other  i n t r i n s i c  rewards.
Complementary to the pay dimension is  the re la ted  fa c to r  o f 
incent ives and cognisant th a t  any e f fe c t i v e  system o f  reward may have to 
incorporate  an incen t ive  component i t  was considered v i t a l  tha t  the 
a t t i t u d e  of the Non- Industr ia l  to the quest ion o f  incent ives be inves t iga ted .
A convenient vehic les f o r  t h i s  purpose was provided in the form o f  the 
Dockyard E f f ic ie n cy  Scheme (DES). This scheme was negot iated between 
management and trade unions represented on the Sh ip-Bu i ld ing  Trades J o in t  
Council to improve Dockyard e f f i c i e n c y  and the remuneration o f  In d u s t r ia l  
employees by the payment o f  appropr ia te s e l f - f i n a n c in g  bonuses. The scheme 
was ex tens ive ly  b r ie fed  to a l l  managerial grades by a team o f  professional 
b r ie fe rs  over a period of 6 weeks. This took place in la te  1980. Thus the 
mechanics o f  the scheme were wel l  understood by a l l  P&T grades and th i s  
provided an exce l len t  oppor tun i ty  to  ascerta in  the a t t i t u d e  o f  Non- Industr ia ls  
to incent ive  schemes in general. The in te n t io n  was to deduce the a t t i t u d e  
o f  Non- Industr ia ls  to incen t ive  schemes by analysing t h e i r  responses to 
quest ions r e la t in g  to the DES.
The second important reward dimension is  promotion. The promotion 
system in the C iv i l  Service is  h igh ly  s t ruc tu red  and s t a f f  tend to hold very 
d e f i n i t e  views on the present system. Owing to the reduct ion in s t a f f  there 
is  a general recogn i t ion  th a t  promotion oppo r tun i t ies  w i l l  decrease and th i s  
w i l l  undoubtedly cause a ce r ta in  amount o f  anx ie ty .  The e f fe c ts  o f 
decreased promotion prospects w i l l  be analysed l a t e r  in the paper.
An important issue which was touched on by the Dockyard Study was the 
problem o f  managerial a u th o r i t y .  The Study i d e n t i f i e d  the problem in f a i r l y  
broad terms and the panacea was deemed to be contained in  the New Deal f o r  
Dockyards set out in the Study. This d imunit ion o f  managerial a u th o r i t y  has
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a s i g n i f i c a n t  d e v i t a l i s i n g  e f f e c t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  on lower management's 
i n i t i a t i v e  and c r e a t i v i t y .  The progressive encroachment o f  trade union 
in f luence on what was once considered the preserve o f  management, normal ly 
in the d isguise o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  has done l i t t l e  to res to re  the morale o f  
the lower echelon of management. Perhaps the most important fa c to r  to 
es tab l ish  from the questions on managerial a u th o r i t y  is  j u n io r  l i n e  
management's percept ion o f  i t s  pos i t ion  in the organ isa t ion .
The l i t e r a t u r e  emphasises the importanceof job s a t i s fa c t i o n  in the 
context  o f  performance, but is  less precise about the cause and e f f e c t  
re la t io n s h ip  between these two dimensions. Accepting th a t  job s a t i s fa c t i o n  
is  the in te g ra t io n  o f  a number o f var iab les  such as pay, r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  
oppor tun i ty  f o r  promotion e tc ,  each dimension may conceptual ly  be regarded 
as having a constant assigned to  i t ,  the value tha t  each constant takes on 
being a measure o f  the importance th a t  each ind iv idua l  assigns to the 
p a r t i c u la r  va r iab le .  A mu l t i  choice quest ion l i s t i n g  a number o f  var iab les  
to determine which are perceived as.being the most s i g n i f i c a n t  in terms 
o f  job s a t i s fa c t io n  was included.
I t  was decided to i n s e r t  a few quest ions to ascer ta in  a number of 
demographic d e ta i l s  o f  the propu la t ion .  The length o f  time th a t  managers 
had been in  the same post and grade were considered p e r t ine n t  to the study. 
The average age o f  the popula t ion fo r  example has a bearing on the type of 
system of reward th a t  would be a t t r a c t i v e  to Non- Indus t r ia ls .
The problem o f  endeavouring to i d e n t i f y  scope f o r  change was p a r t i a l l y  
solved by the t im e ly  p u b l ica t io n  o f  the Dockyard Study in  the Autumn 1980.
The Study made a number o f r e l a t i v e l y  rad ica l  proposals f o r  the fu tu re  o f  
the Dockyards. A number o f these proposals were used to construc t quest ions 
which were os tens ib ly  deisgned to  determine the strength  o f  mood fo r  change. 
Questions based on the Dockyard Study Report also serve to gauge the depth of
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understanding th a t  N on- Indus t r ia ls  have f o r  i t s  proposals. The proposals 
contained in the Dockyard Study were ex tens ive ly  b r ie fed  to a l l  s t a f f  and 
were featured in the Dockyard's own monthly newspaper. L i t t l e  or no 
knowledge o f  the ex istence o f  such a s t ra te g ic  plan, by a s i g n i f i c a n t  
number,of the sample, could s i g n i f y  one o f  two th in gs ,  e i t h e r  the in te rna l  
management communication system is  not e f fe c t i v e  or th a t  the s t a f f  fee l  so 
secure in t h e i r  jobs th a t  i r re s p e c t iv e  o f  what plan emerges there is  
confidence th a t  i t  would not a f f e c t  them.
The addendum contains a b r i e f  synopsis o f  the sub jec t  heading under 
which the questions were grouped.
During the construc t ion  phase of the quest ionnaire advice was sought 
about the problem o f  p re fe re n t ia l  se lec t ion  of those a l te rn a t i v e s  posit ioned 
at the beginning and end o f  the l i s t .  This problem was re levan t  to 
quest ions 9, 30, 31 and 32. The problem was overcome by p r in t in g  4 versions o1 
the quest ionnaire . The opt ions were cycled through the re levant  questions 
in  groups, the size o f  the group being a func t ion  of the to ta l  number of choics 
a va i lab le  in  the quest ion. Equal numbers o f  each vers ion o f  the quest ionnaire  
were administered to each group in  the sample popula t ion.
The completed quest ionnaire  contained 41 questions and occupied 12 
sides o f  A4 paper inc lud ing  the in t ro du c to ry  statement and in s t r u c t i o n s .  
Although the quest ionnaire was designed to be completed in 20 minutes a 
more r e a l i s t i c  t ime was probably 30 minutes. A number o f  respondents 
commented unfavourably on the length of the quest ionna ire .
C od i f i ca t ion  o f  Target Population
The P&T group was categorised according to grade and s p e c ia l i s t  
group, see Table 5.1. A fea ture  of dockyard management is  th a t  only  ex- 
c r a f t  apprentices are permit ted to d i r e c t l y  supervise the c r a f t  trades., but 
no such r e s t r i c t i o n  is  placed on grades above PTO IV, although p rac t ice  
d ic ta tes  th a t  they should be o f  the same d is c ip l in e  as the s t a f f  they are
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managing. There are however, except ions; a number o f  posts in  the 
dockyard are designated func t iona l  and these are open to grades o f  any 
special ism and are s ta f fed  by personnel o f  any s p e c ia l is a t io n .
Entry in to  any o f  the s p e c ia l i s t  managerial groups is  e i t h e r  by 
se lec t ion  or on completion of a techn ic ian apprent iceship. The dockyard 
t r a i n  2 types of apprent ices - c r a f t  and techn ic ian .  The r a t i o  is  about 
f i v e  to one in favour o f  the c r a f t  apprent ices. In 1981 the in take was 
about 120 c r a f t  and 25 techn ic ian .  On completion o f  apprent iceship  the 
c r a f t  apprentices become journeymen and the technic ians are promoted to 
PTO IV and e i t h e r  j o i n  the drawing o f f i c e  or work as d iagnost ic ians .  I t  
is  u n l i k e ly  tha t  an e x - c ra f t  apprent ice would be considered f o r  promotion 
u n t i l  he had about 5 years experience in a production centre , although 
there are obviously except ions. Both e x -c ra f t  and techn ic ian apprent ices 
may be employed as est imators ,  although fo r  the l a t t e r  to be accepted f o r  
t h i s  work is rare.
The Recorder group which works f o r  the f inance manager is  drawn from 
the c r a f t  grades and has i t s  own h ie ra rch ica l  s t ru c tu re  up to PTO I I .
Because o f  the . r e s t r i c t i v e  nature of t h e i r  work i t  was decided not to 
include Recorders in the survey. This decis ion was based on the assumption 
th a t  t h e i r  inc lus ion  might int roduce a degree of bias in to  the re s u l t s .  On 
the other hand i t  was decided to include the d iagnost ic ians because they are 
employed in the l in e  and work alongside c r a f t  trades and technical 
superv iso rs .
Select ion of Respondents
The sample populat ion fo r  the study was selected from Personnel 
department records. These records are updated d a i l y  and are the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
o f  an Executive O f f i c e r .  The names of a l l  P&T grades employed in the 
dockyard are held on a card index system in a lphabet ica l  order by grade.
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specia l ism and department. This method o f  por t ray ing  the d is p o s i t io n  o f  
s t a f f  w i th in  the dockyard enabled a random se lec t ion  o f  respondents to 
be made. The actual mechanics o f  se lec t ing  respondents was achieved by 
sys tem at ica l ly  abs trac t ing  every t h i r d  card and recording the name and 
place of employment shown on the card.
In order to i d e n t i f y  the various respondent groups an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
l e t t e r  was placed on the back o f  each quest ionnaire. Some of the 
respondents went to ex t raord inary  lengths to ensure anonymity, the group 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  l e t t e r  was erased by such methods as cu t t in g  o f f  the bottom 
o f  the page, replac ing the page e tc . However, by analysing question 18 
and cross tabu la t ion  with  questions re la t in g  to overtime i t  was poss ib le ,  
in a l l  except a couple o f  cases, to i d e n t i f y  the respondent 's occupational 
group.
Test ing of Questionnaire
The quest ionnaire  was pretested on a small sample o f  in d iv id u a ls  from 
the same populat ion th a t  the quest ionnaire was to be administered to .  A 
note was made of the names o f  the p re - te s t  sample to ensure tha t  they were 
not included in the f i n a l  sample. The quest ionnaire  was sent to the pre­
te s t  sample accompanied by a l e t t e r  exp la in ing the purpose o f  the quest ionnaire 
and asking the respondents to appraise i t  c r i t i c a l l y ,  h ig h l ig h t in g  any 
quest ions which they considered ambiguous or badly s t ruc tu red .
F i f teen p re - te s t  quest ionnaires were administered and 11 were returned.
I t  was obvious tha t  the m a jo r i t y  o f the p re - te s t  sample had taken great  care 
and made a l o t  o f  e f f o r t  to evaluate the quest ionnaire  c r i t i c a l l y .
Some ambiguit ies were i d e n t i f i e d ,  but moi'e impor tan t ly  i t  enabled the 
imagined frame of reference of the respondents to be adjusted to accommodate 
terminology pecu l ia r  to the Dockyard. The p re - te s t  also served to check 
the information level o f  the respondent, and as a r e s u l t  o f  the informat ion
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gained a question on the subject  o f  c lass to class t ra n s fe r  from the 
technical to professional grade was deleted from the quest ionnaire .
Although not d i r e c t l y  re la ted  to the p re - te s t  procedure, the d r a f t  
quest ionnaire  was passed to the General Manager and Chairman of the Local 
IPGS branch fo r  in format ion and comment. As a r e s u l t  o f  th is  a few 
add i t iona l  questions were incorporated in to  the quest ionnaire .
A d d i t io n a l l y ,  th is  de ta i led  examination resu lted in a fu r th e r  refinement 
of the quest ionnaire and also e l i c i t e d  the fa c t  tha t  both sides were in te res ted  
in the study. The proposed quest ionnaire  was also passed to Professor Bowey 
who had set up a quest ionnaire on incen t ive  schemes a t  Strathclyde 
U n ive rs i t y .  As a r e s u l t  o f  comments received from her a f i v e  po in t  scale 
was adopted fo r  responses.
P r in t in g  and D is t r ib u t io n
The requirement to produce 4 versions made typ ing and subsequent 
p r in t in g  less than s t r a i g h t - fo rw a rd . Four hundred copies o f  the quest ionnaire  
were produced, each version conta in ing one hundred copies.
Address labels  were prepared fo r  the sample popu la t ion ,  the necessary 
in format ion being obtained from the personnel department. The quest ionnaire  
was d is t r ib u te d  through the dockyard in te rna l  mail system, a l l  quest ionnaires 
were d is t r ib u te d  over a period of 24 hours. Table 5.2 gives a breakdown 
of the d i s t r i b u t i o n  to the various groups and shows the number reformed.
Table 5.2 Number o f  Questionnaires D is t r ibu ted  and Returned
Group No D is t r ibu ted No Returned^ S p o i l t
PTO I I 63 47 = 74.6 2
PTO I I I 114 83 = 72.8 6
PTO IV T/S 90 54 = 60.0 10
PTO IV EST 30 24 = 80 ■ 1
PTO IV DIAG 34 15 "  44 3
PTO IV DO 32 22 = 48 3
PTO I I I  DO 21 9 = 43 1
TOTAL 384 254 66.1 25
Total  number returned inc lud ing  s p o i l t  = 280 = 738
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The quest ionnaire  v/as d i s t r ib u te d  on 11/12 February and 216 had been
returned w i t h in  12 days. A fo l low-up  l e t t e r  was d i s t r ib u te d  on 25 February
1981 and th i s  resu lted  in a f u r th e r  38 quest ionnaires being returned by 
1 March. A to ta l  o f  26 quest ionnaires were returned s p o i l t  or blank, 
thus out o f  384 d is t r i b u te d ,  280 were returned.
The release o f  the quest ionnaire  in February meant th a t  very few
people were on hol iday and al though f o r tu i t u o u s ,  i t  con tr ibu ted  to the 
r e l a t i v e l y  high response, 738 (668) f o r  a mail survey. Another fa c to r  
which obviously contr ibuted to  the good response was the f a c t  th a t  the 
content o f  the quest ionnaire  was re levan t  to respondent's cond i t ion  o f  
serv ice and i t  dea l t  w ith  issues which were top ica l  w i th in  the Dockyard.
As mentioned e a r l i e r  an equal number o f  each v a r ia n t  o f the 
quest ionnaire  was d i s t r ib u te d  to  each group. Table 5.3 shows the number of 
completed quest ionnaires returned broken down by group and each v a r ia n t  
o f  the quest ionnaire .
Table 5.3 D is t r ib u t i o n  o f  Completed Questionnaire - Var iants
Group No Grade Questionnai re Vari  ant Total
A B C D
1 PTO I I 12 14 10 11 47
2 PTO I I I 22 21 21 19 83
3 PTO IV TS 15 10 13 16 54
4 PTO IV EST 8 6 5 5 24
5 PTO IV DIAG 1 4 4 6 15
6 PTO IV DO 4 9 5 4 22
7 PTO I I I  DO 2 1 4 2 9
64 65 62 63 254
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Analysis o f  Completed Questionnaires
I t  became progress ive ly  more obvious during the construc t ion  o f  the 
quest ionnaire th a t  a data processing f a c i l i t y  would be essent ia l  to  handle 
and manipulate the data. The s ta r t i n g  po in t  f o r  t h i s  exercise was to 
t ranscr ibe  the responses to each quest ionnaire on to a data processing 
sheet in preparat ion f o r  punching. The process o f  t ra n sc r ib in g  the data 
from the 254 quest ionnaires was. ted ious ,  but i t  served the add i t iona l  
purpose o f  c a r e fu l l y  checking each response and occas iona l ly  assigning 
'D on ' t  know' to  quest ions l e f t  blank.
Use was made o f  S t a t i s t i c a l  Package fo r  the Social Sciences. A 
frequency and j o i n t  frequency programme was used to analyse the sample 
popu la t ion 's  response. Further computer runs were done to analyse the 
responses by grade. On the mu l t i  choice quest ions a cross tabu la t ion  
programme was used to determine i f  the pos i t ion  o f  an a l t e r n a t i v e  on the 
l i s t  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  fa c to r  in  determining i t s  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f se lec t ion .
Examination of m u l t ip le  choice quest ions No 9 and 12 showed th a t  the 
pos i t ion  of opt ions on the l i s t  did not s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  t h e i r  
p ro b a b i l i t y  of se lec t ion .  This f a c t  tends to suggest th a t  respondents 
adopted a d iscerning a t t i t u d e  towards the quest ionnaire and the in ference 
which may be drawn is  th a t  the q u a l i t y  o f  in format ion is  reasonably sound.
In add i t ion  a T te s t  programme was used on each question to determine i f  
there was any s i g n i f i c a n t  s t a t i s t i c a l  d i f fe rence  between the responses o f  the 
three grades.
A Pearson c o r re la t io n  programme was used to es tab l ish  the degree o f  
c o r re la t io n  between ce r ta in  quest ions. The lack o f  high c o r re la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t  
between responses to questions may be j u s t  as s i g n i f i c a n t  as the existence o f  a 
high c o r re la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t ,  What is  imoortant,  however, is  th a t  each s i t u a t i o n  
should be examined from a p ra c t i ca l  po in t  o f  view, and th a t  p re d ic t io n  and 
in te rp re ta t io n  is  based on reasonableness taking f u l l  account o f  a l l  re levan t  
v a r ia b les .
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ADDENDUM
Grouping o f  Questions
Q 1-9 Group o f  questions based on the Dockyard E f f ic ie n c y  Scheme
to ascerta in  the a t t i t u d e  o f  P&T grades.
Q 10-16 Questions r e la t i n g  to pay.
Q 17-26 Questions designed to es tab l ish  the degree o f  s a t i s fa c t i o n  w ith
the present promotion system.
Q 27--31 Questions designed to determine the scope f o r  change w i th in  the 
o rgan isa t ion .  These quest ions are based on the Dockyard Study 
r e p o r t .
Q 32 Mult i  choice quest ion aimed at i d e n t i f y i n g  the important facets
o f  job s a t i s fa c t i o n .
Q 33-37 Questions r e la t in g  to  managerial a u th o r i t y ,  the prime purpose
being to es tab l ish  j u n io r  management's percept ion of i t s  pos i t ion
in the o rgan isa t ion .
Q 38-41 . Questions designed to determine some demographic d e ta i l s  o f 
the subjects.
CHAPTER 6 
PAY
THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
In t ro d u c t i  on
The f i r s t  par t  o f  t h i s  chapter w i l l  examine the substant ive 
issues raised in the quest ionnaire  r e la t in g  to pay. The quest ions 
w i l l  be examined against  the theme o f  pay r e l a t i v i t i e s  and the vexed 
quest ion o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between In d u s t r ia l s  and lower management.
There is  evidence to  suggest the ex istence of a s i g n i f i c a n t  pay 
percept ion problem among Non I n d u s t r i a l s .  A f u r t h e r  f a c to r  which 
meri ts considerat ion is  the relevance o f  the pay package to the 
ind iv idu a l  and the s p e c i f i c  aspect o f  persona l isa t ion  o f  payt the 
importance of the pension w i l l  also be discussed. In cont inuat ion  
o f  the pay percept ion theme, the quest ions r e la t in g  to pay and other  
enhancements and overtime w i l l  be assessed to t r y  and q u a n t i f y  the 
pay percept ion problem. Overtime payments are an important element 
o f  pay enhancement which makes gross pay extremely se n s i t ive  to the 
amount o f overtime worked. The response to over t ime-re la ted  quest ions 
should also enable an assessment to be made o f  lower management's a t t i t u d e  
to overtime.
The second par t  o f  the chapter w i l l  assess the a t t ra c t ive n e ss  o f  an 
incen t ive  scheme to  Non In d u s t r ia l s  w h i l s t  cont inuing to  explore the 
pay r e l a t i v i t i e s  issue. A 'proxy'method was used to determine the Non 
In d u s t r i a l s '  a t t i t u d e  to incen t ive  schemes because o f  the IPCS's 
s e n s i t i v i t y  to the whole quest ion o f  bonus schemes.
I t  proved f o r t u i t i o u s  tha t  the quest ionnaire  was administered 
s h o r t l y  before the in t ro du c t io n  of DES as th i s  meant a l l  îvon In d u s t r ia l s  
had received a formal b r ie f in g  on the e f f i c i e n c y  scheme. The
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respondents were i d e a l l y  placed to  appraise the Dockyard E f f ic ie n c y  
Scheme c r i t i c a l l y .  Their  responses should give some in d ic a t io n  of 
the a t t rac t iveness  of incen t ive  schemes to Non I n d u s t r i a l s .
An important considera t ion in any incent ive  scheme is the c o n f l i c t  
between ind iv idua l  expecta t ion and th a t  of the o rgan isa t ion .  The 
responses to the quest ions should enable an assessment to be made, 
based on the percept ion o f  Non In d u s t r ia l s  as to which group 
expectat ions are most l i k e l y  to be s a t i s f i e d  by DES. I t  is  
acknowledged th a t  the quest ionSre la t ing  to DES were s t ruc tu red  in  
such a way to  i n v i t e  specula t ion and some bias should be expected.
For convenience quest ions are grouped in c lus te rs  f o r  ana lys is .  
Survey re su l t s  apperta in ing to each c lu s te r  w i l l  be shown together 
w ith  the re levant  quest ion at the beginning o f  each sect ion.  For 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  purposes questions w i l l  be numbered with  the chapter 
number and a Roman numeral.
Basic Pay Comparabi l i ty and In d u s t r ia l  
6(1) How do you th ink  th a t  your pay
Pay Needs 
compares with rates in outs i  de
indus t ry  f o r  comparable work?
PTO I I PTO I I I PTO IV
Basic Pay Very favourably 0 0 2
Favourably 6 5 8
About the Same 21 20 17
Unfavourably , G4 64 60
Very unfavourably 8 11 13
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What do you th in k  o f  pay comparab i l i ty  as a method of pay
determinat ion f o r  P&T grades in the Dockyar d?
PTO I I PTO I I I PTO IV
Very des irab le 53 44 42
Desi rable 36 49 37
Don't  Know 2 3 10
Undesirable 9 2 9
Very undesirable 0 2 3
The response to quest ion 6(1) provides an important key to the 
study. There is  unanimity between the three grades who are the subject 
o f the study tha t  t h e i r  basic pay compares e i th e r  unfavourably or very 
unfavourably w ith  comparable groups in  both the p r iva te  and 
na t iona l ised  sector.  This response is  whol ly cons is ten t  w i th  the 
e m p i r i c a l l y  observed view prevalent among Non- Industr ia ls  th a t  they 
are comparatively poorly  paid. Indeed the act ion taken by c i v i l  
servants between March and Ju ly  1981 is  in d ic a t i v e  o f  the f a c t  th a t  
a l l  c i v i l  servants consider t h e i r  pay compares unfavourably w ith  other 
comparable groups. However, t h i s  view is  not supported by Megaw (1982) 
who states tha t  overa l l  the pub l ic  sector has done as wel l  as the 
p r iva te  sector over the period from 1970 to 1980 w ith  l i t t l e  percep t ib le  
r e la t i v e  change in  pay between 1955 (post P r ie s t le y  Report) and 1970.
I t  is  bel ieved tha t  the P&T group bel ieve t h e i r  pay compares 
unfavourably with comparable groups fo r  a number o f  reasons. F i r s t l y  
there is  the hor izonta l  r e l a t i v i t i e s  problem between the PTO I I  and HEO. 
See Table 3.6. This r e l a t i v i t i e s  problem is a func t ion  o f  pay 
research. The execut ive and adm in is t ra t ive  group pay rates are set 
by comparison with pay rates in Banking, Assurance, Headquarters s t a f f
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of  large companies such as She l l ,  IC I ,  Uni lever- BP, whereas comparison 
f o r  the P&T group are made w i th  technica l  s t a f f  in the companies such 
as Babcock Power, Rol ls  Royce, B r i t i s h  Shipbu i lder  and B r i t i s h  Stee l.
I t  is  genera l ly  acknowledge^ but d i f f i c u l t  to  prove conc lus ive ly  
because the New Earning Survey does not cross c l a s s i f y  indus t ry  and 
occupation th a t  rates o f  pay in the engineering sector are lower than 
rates in  the commerce sector  of in d u s t ry ,  indeed the hor izon ta l  
r e l a t i v i t y  between the PTO I I  and HEO is  evidence of t h i s  
supposi t ion.
The second po in t  which is  deemed to a f fe c t  the P&T grouds* a t t i t u d e  
to t h e i r  pay concerns the very small v e r t i c a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  which ex is ts  
between PTO I l l s  and PTO IVs and In d u s t r ia l  grades. The po s i t io n  
shown in Table 3.7 has worsened since the in t ro du c t io n  o f  DES in 
A p r i l  1981. An In d u s t r ia l  grade earning a product ive bonus o f  more 
than 128 is  l i k e l y  to earn more than a PTO IV i f  overtime working is  
ignored.
The t h i r d  po in t  is  re la ted  to  P r ie s t le y  ' s primary p r in c ip le  o f  
f a i r  comparison. Because f a i r  comparison was the primary p r i n c i p le ,  
c i v i l  servants expected th a t ,  w ith  the system operat ing normal ly ,  the 
rates ind icated by the comparisons would form the pay se tt lement .
I t  was u n l i k e ly  th a t  in d iv id u a ls  took account o f  fa c to rs  other than 
comparisons eg pensions, job secu r i t y  when they t r i e d  to  reconc i le  t h e i r  
pay rates w ith  those publ ished in union jou rna ls  f o r  comparable groups 
outs ide the c i v i l  serv ice .
These three po ints have been raised to o f f e r  an exp lanat ion f o r  
the response to quest ion 6 { i )  in view of the fa c t  th a t  ne i the r  Megaw (1982) 
nor New Earning Survey data support the Non I n d u s t r i a l s '  view. The 
response demonstrates two po in ts ,  f i r s t l y  there would appear to be a
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pay percept ion problem at Rosyth and secondly survey quest ions r e la t in g  
to pay tend to prompt emotive behaviour.
The response to quest ion 6 ( i i ]  shows tha t  pay comparab i l i ty  as 
a method of pay determinat ion is  g re a t ly  favoured by the P&T group 
at Rosyth. Because of the overwhelming support shown f o r  pay 
comparabi l i ty  v e r i f i c a t i o n  was sought to es tab l ish  i f  the mechanics of 
Pay Research was understood, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in view of the IPGS' a tt i tude^ 
which w i l l  be examined s h o r t l y .  Discussion with  a se lec t ion  of 
P&T grades revealed th a t  a great deal o f ignorance and myth surrounded 
the subject  of pay comparab i l i ty .  For example, very few respondents 
appreciated tha t  pay comparab i l i ty  meant tha t  d i f f e r e n t  c i v i l  serv ice 
occupational groups were compared with  comparable groups in  indus t ry  
and commerce engaged in s im i l a r  work or th a t  there was a whole ser ies 
of Pay Research Units engaged in  d i f f e r e n t  f i e ld s  of endeavour. A 
number f a i l e d  to appreciate or did not wish to acknowledge th a t  the 
pay increase awarded to  the P&T group was simply a r e f l e c t i o n  of the 
increase awarded to employees in the engineering sector o f indus t ry .
Returning to the c r i t i c i s m  o f  Pay Research by the IPGS, they stated 
in  t h e i r  evidence to Megaw (1982) th a t  based on experience the I n s t i t u i t i o n  
considered tha t  the ap p l ica t io n  of the Pay Research System, as modif ied 
by the C iv i l  Service Department in the period since 1977, su ffered from 
a number of fundamental defects . These are summarised as fo l lo w s :
a. A f te r  1977 the old pay system became inc reas ing ly  
mechanistic and indeed was out o f commission f o r  several years.
b. The mechanist ic a p p l i ca t io n  o f  a s ing le  f i g u re  from the pay 
. research evidence led to the c reat ion  o f  i n to le ra b le  anomalies in
in te rna l  r e l a t i v i t i e s .  These the IPGS asserted are in im ica l  
to e f f i c i e n c y  and contrary  to the approach of the P r ie s t le y  Commission
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c. Pay research in format ion does not provide a p ic tu re  or 
r e f l e c t i o n  of the pay and grading s t ruc tu re  in  any s ing le  outside 
o rgan isat ion. I t  is  claimed th a t  Pay Research examines 
ind iv idua l  posts ra the r  than pay s t ruc tu res .
d. The P r ie s t le y  Commission an t ic ipa ted  th a t  there would be 
a v a r ie t y  o f  rates fo r  the anologues o f  each grade. I t  is 
claimed by the IPGS th a t  the evidence shows tha t  there is  not 
a s ing le  rate fo r  the job or f o r  th a t  matter a narrow band o f  
r a te s .
The problem o f  in te rna l  r e l a t i v i t i e s  is  an emotive issue because 
i t  a f fec ts  status and ind iv idu a l  esteem. Discussion with Mr W i l l ,  the 
National Chairman of the P&T group w i th in  the IPGS revealed tha t  senior 
IPGS o f f i c e r s  were extremely conscious o f  the status problem emanating 
from the existence o f  these hor izon ta l  r e l a t i v i t i e s .  He mentioned 
th a t  G iv i l  Service Department played down the sta tus dimension and 
appeared not to be concerned with  arguments regarding inequ i ty  and 
d iv is iv e n e s s .
The response to quest ion 6 ( i i )  raises a very in te re s t in g  po in t in 
view of Rosyth' s support and the IPCS's National Executive Counci l 's  
(NEC) c r i t i c i s m  o f  Pay Research. E i ther  the NEC's view was not 
shared by t h e i r  membership at Rosyth or the NEC had f a i le d  to 
communicate t h e i r  c r i t i c i s m s  and reserva t ions o f  Pay Research to  t h e i r  
members. However, there is  a p laus ib le  explanat ion fo r  the response 
to quest ion 6 ( i i ) .  In October 1980 the Government refused to publ ish 
the PRU's f ind ings  and t h i s  undoubtedly inf luenced the response to  the 
quest ion. The suppression of the PRU's f ind ings  obviously aroused 
suspicion amongst N on- Indus t r ia ls .  The most commonly voiced opinion
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v/as tha t  the PRU's f ind ings  were suppressed because i t  contained 
evidence which supported the b e l i e f  th a t  c i v i l  servants in general 
and the P&T group in  p a r t i c u la r  were doing less wel l  than other 
groups. I t  is  speculated tha t  any misgivings th a t  P&T group members 
a t  Rosyth may have had concerning Pay Research were temporar i ly  
overcome by the Government's act ion in  October 1980. Thus the
response to question 6 ( i i )  may have been inp a r t  a reac t ion  to  the 
October 1980 event.
Pay Enhancement and Overtime
At the beginning of th i s  chapter i t  was ind icated th a t  a pay 
perception problem existed among P&T grades at Rosyth. An attempt
w i l l  be made to estimate the extent o f  the percept ion issue.
Because percept ion is  an in ta n g ib le  dimension an attempt w i l l  be made 
to q u a l i f y  perception in terms of the d i f fe rence  between average gross 
sa la r ies  a t  Rosyth and in  the re s t  o f  indus t ry .  In e x t r i c a b ly  l inked
to pay enhancements is  the pos i t ion  and importance o f  overt ime. This 
sect ion w i l l  analyse the quest ions re la t in g  to  pay enhancements and 
the re la ted top ic  of overtime.
6 ( i i i )  How do you th ink  tha t  your pay compares w i th  rates in outs ide 
indus t ry  f o r  comparable work?
PTO I I PTO I I I PTO IV
Basic Pay + Very favourably 2 5 0
overtime and other Favourably 13 5 16
enhancements About the same 15 12 13
Unfavourably 62 58 55
Very unfavourably 8 20 17
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6(1v) Do you th ink  th a t  the award o f  extra  pay f o r  special
r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  (eg On 'Cal l  Al lowance’ , T r i a l s  pay) is  a
PTO I I PTO I I I PTO IV
Very good th ing 15 24 30
Good th ing 51 48 52
Don't know 4 7 11
Bad th ing 23 19 7.
Very bad th ing 6 2 0
6(v) Are you able to fo recas t  the amount o f overt ime th a t  you are 
l i k e l y  to work?
Very accurate ly 23 12 10
Accurate ly 23 10 11
F a i r l y  Accurate ly 36 51 37
Very 1 i t t l  e accuracy 11 12 32
None 6 15 10
th a t  the amount o f  overtime you work is
Far too much 4 3 4
Too much 19 13 11
About r i g h t 70 58 40
Too l i t t l e 4 20 34
Far too l i t t l e 2 7 12
Examining quest ion 6 ( i i i )  shows th a t  the percentage of the sample 
who consider t h e i r  pay plus enhancement compares e i t h e r  favourab ly  or 
very favourably  w ith  rates in  indus t ry  has increased by a fa c to r  o f  2,
As the datum f igu res  in 6(1) are small t h i s  is an i n s i g n i f i c a n t  
percentage of the sample. This is a somewhat cur ious r e s u l t  which is  
not re a d i l y  amenable to explanat ion in  view of the high leve ls  of 
overtime and sh i f tw ork  worked by a s i g n i f i c a n t  number o f  lower management
93
a t  Rosyth. In add i t ion  about 158 o f  the P&T group populat ion are 
in  posts which m er i t  en t i t lem en t  to  t r i a l s  pay. Although there is  
a great  v a r ia t io n  in the amount earned by in d iv id u a ls  the average 
is  approximately £1500 per year f o r  those e n t i t l e d .  Neither the 
r e l a t i v e l y  high ra te  of ove r t im e /sh i f twork  nor t r i a l s  pay are. 
re f le c te d  in the response to  quest ion 6 ( i i i ) .  In ea r ly  1981 
approximately 278 o f  PT I I I  and IV grades were earning, in  add i t ion  
to  t h e i r  basic pay, over £50 per week in overtime and s h i f t  payments 
whi le  the nat ional average f o r  comparable grades was £5 per week.
I t  is  these fac ts  coupled w ith  the response to quest ion 6 ( i i i )  
which i l l u s t r a t e s  the depth and strength of the pay percept ion 
problem e x is t in g  at Rosyth. Another possible  exp lanat ion may be 
associated w i th  the d i f f e r e n t i a l  between lower management and In d u s t r ia l s  
who also enjoy s i g n i f i c a n t  enhancements although they are not 
e l i g i b l e  f o r  t r i a l s  pay. T r ia ls  pay is  a contenions and con t ro ­
versy al nayment whi ch is  disguised as special  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  allowance 
With h inds igh t  a b e t te r  i n d ic a t io n  o f  the support f o r  t r i a l s  pay may 
have been obtained had reference to 'On C a l l '  al lowance been deleted 
from quest ion 5 { i v ) .
A possible explanat ion f o r  the en thus ias t ic  response to the 
quest ion o f  extra pay f o r  special r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  centres on the fa c t  
th a t  i t  is  considered b e t te r  to re ta in  what i s  a va i lab le  ra the r  than 
g iv e  up what could be a useful  bargaining po in t  a t  fu tu re  pay 
nego t ia t ions .
The f i n a n c ia l  cost of t r i a l s  pay is  r e l a t i v e l y  small to the 
organ isa t ion  compared to the Non- Industr ia l  overtime budget f o r  the 
dockyard. Obviously th i s  in no way detracts  from the importance o f  
t r i a l s  pay to r e c ip i e n t s .  Overtime payments on the other hand
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represent a sizeable pa r t  o f  gross sa la ry  f o r  more than 508 of 
the Non-Industr ia l  popula t ion. However, since the in t ro du c t io n  
o f  cash l im i t s  in 1980 there has been a progressive reduct ion in  the 
amount o f overtime work in  Rosyth dockyard. The current po s i t io n  (1982) 
regarding Non-Industr ia l  overtime is  th a t  on average approximately 320 
clock hours per person per year is  worked.
This is  not re a d i l y  t rans la ted  in to  money as the f i n a n c ia l  value 
o f  a clock hour depends on when the overtime is  worked, weekdays or 
weekends and the grade o f  the N on- Indus t r ia l .  I f  f o r  example a l l  
overtime is  worked on a Sunday insteady of a weekday i t  is worth twice 
as much to a PTO I I  or I I I .  In the case of a PTO IV overtime worked 
during the week a t t r a c t s  t ime and a h a l f j  t h i s  premium was introduced 
to create a reasonable d i f f e r e n t i a l  between the f i r s t  t i e r  of 
management and In d u s t r ia l s .
The m a jo r i t y  o f overtime at Rosyth is  worked as par t  o f  recognised 
s h i f t  patterns and th is  has an important bearing on the i n te rp re ta t io n  
of the response to  quest ion 6 ( v i ) .  There is a s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f fe rence  
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  between how accurate ly  PTO I l s  and the other two grades 
are able to fo recast overt ime. The reason is  due, probably, to the 
fa c t  tha t  although PTO I l s  do not work a l o t  o f  overt ime, as a group, 
they are able to fo recas t  the amount they are l i k e l y  to work because 
they are c lose ly  involved w ith  decisions a f fe c t in g  overt ime.
Non- Industr ia ls  involved with  sh i f twork  should be able to  fo recas t  
th a t  element o f overtime d i r e c t l y  l inked to the s h i f t ,  but probably 
with  less accuracy overtime worked outside the s h i f t  p a t te rn 's  
condit ioned hours. With respect to PTO I I I  and IV grades, the 
response to quest ion 6(v) probably re f le c te d  qu i te  accurate ly  the r a t i o  
o f casual overtime to tha t  worked as par t  of  a s h i f t  pa t te rn .
95
The accuracy w ith  which Non- Industr ia ls  are able to fo recas t
overt ime, w i l l  to some degree in f luence t h e i r  standard of l i v i n g
expectat ions. Prolonged periods of sh i f twork  accompanied with
s ig n i f i c a n t  overtime may encourage f in a n c ia l  commitment to be taken
on, f a r  in excess o f  those which could be supported on basic sa la ry .
I t  is  speculated th e re fo re ,  as th i s  quest ionnaire  was admin is trated
before the cur ren t  more r i g i d  p o l i c y  o f overtime contro l  was implemented
there may be s i g n i f i c a n t  number o f  Non- Industr ia ls  who have
experienced a d iminut ion of l i v i n g  standards.
Moving on to consider the response to quest ion 6 ( v i )  regarding
the amount o f  overtime work, th i s  quest ion again
d iv ides according to  grade. The m a jo r i t y  of PTO I l s  consider the
amount o f  overtime they work as about r i g h t  which is  not a su rp r is ing
r e s u l t  considering the average age of th i s  group, approximately 48 years
Although PTO I l l s  are genera l ly  s a t i s f i e d  with  the amount o f  overt ime
they work there are s i g n i f i c a n t  m in o r i t ie s  who consider tha t  they work
too much or too l i t t l e .
The only group which is  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w ith  the amount o f  overtime
they work is the PTO IV group. This response may be explained by the
fa c t  tha t  the PTO IV group embraces fou r  occupational groups. Table 6.1
shows in percentage terms the cons t i tuents  o f  the group-
Tabl e 6.1 - Breakdown o f  PTO JV Grade Quest ionnaire Respondents by 
Occupat io n a l  Group
Technical Supervisors 518
Estimators 198
Diagnost ic ians 138
Drawing O f f ice  178
Each group has varying oppo r tun i t ies  to work overt ime. Drawing
O f f ice  and Estimator grades have, on the whole, l i t t l e  oppor tun i ty  f o r
overtime compared to  Technical Supervisors.
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The PTO IV 's  response to question 5 ( v i )  has been broken down 
to show the response by occupational group
Technical 
Supervi sor Est imator Diagnosti  cian
Drawi ng 
O f f ice
Far too much 4 8 0 0
Too much 11 4 27 0
About r i g h t 49 38 33 38
Too l i t t l e  . 29 ■ 42 40 29
Far too l i t t l e ____ 7 29 0 33
The degreee of s a t i s fa c t i o n  with  the amount o f  overtime worked is  
to some extent re la ted  to the oppor tun i ty  that each group has fo r  
working overtime. The fa c t  tha t  Drawing O f f ice  and Est imator grades 
do not have a choice whether or not they work overt ime may have 
inf luenced t h e i r  response to question 6 ( v i ) .
The fa c t  tha t  the average age o f  the PTO IV group is  less than the 
PTO I I  and I I I  groups may be a co n t r ibu to ry  cause o f  d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  
because the f in a n c ia l  commitments o f  the younger men are probably greater
Taken o v e ra l l ,  the r e s u l t  demonstrates tha t  there was general 
s a t i s fa c t io n  with the amount o f overtime worked, but not w ith  the 
re s u l t in g  pay; th is  is  the inference drawn from the response to  
question 6 ( i i i )  (Basic pay + overtime and other enhancements). However, 
w ith  the in t ro du c t io n  of a more s t r i n g e n t  overtime po l i c y  there may be 
greater  d is s a t i s f a c t io n  than ind icated by. the response to  quest ion 6 ( v i )  
but t h i s  is  a sub jec t ive  assessment. There is  a view among some 
P&T grades, t y p i f i e d  by the fo l low ing  remark appended to a quest ionnaire , 
'o v e r t im e , l i k e  s h i f t  w ork ing , is  used as a hidden support f o r  poor wages'. 
The te rm 'soc ia l  ove r t im e ' is  not an uncommon remark to hear expressed in 
the dockyard.
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The Pension Dimension
5 ( v i i )  How much importance do you attach to your pension?
PTO I I PTO I I I PTO IV
Great Importance 53 46 47
Some Importance 36 34 38
Very l i t t l e  importance 11 11 9
None 0 4 2
Haven't thought about i t 0 5 4
does not r e a d i l y  f i t  in to any of the pay
re la ted  groups of quest ions, i t  w i l l  be analysed on i t s  own. Before 
proceeding i t  w i l l  be work not ing the average age o f  respondents by 
grade.
Table 6,2 - Average Age of Respondents by Grade
Grade Average Age
PTO I I  
PTO I I I  
PTO IV
46.1 years 
41 .4 years 
37.7 years
The response to quest ion 6 ( v i i )  is  somewhat p red ic tab le  from two 
counts, the average age o f  respondents and the fa c t  th a t  there 
is  a tendency fo r  s i g n i f i c a n t  numbers o f  c i v i l  servants to consider 
the Index l inked pension as a reward f o r  t h e i r  perceived unfavourable 
pay pos i t ion  v i z - a - v i z  other groups.
Pension schemes form an essent ia l  par t  of any modern pay system
in the UK. A pension scheme attempts simultaneously to s a t i s f y  a 
number of object ives. These, in no p a r t i c u la r  order ,  are;
a. To make employment w ith  the f i rm  or company more a t t r a c t i v e
and thus make i t  easier  to r e c r u i t  new employees o f  the r i g h t
c a l ib re .  .
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b. To encourage e x is t in g  employees to remain and thus to 
reduce the costs o f  labour tu rnover .
c. To provide an o rd e r ly  re t i rement  plan f o r  o lder  employees.
d. To s a t i s f y  nat ional l e g i s l a t i o n .
e. To help employees spread t h e i r  earnings over the whole of
t h e i r  l i v e s  to  best advantage.
How successful  has the C iv i l  Service pension scheme been in  meeting 
the above ob ject ives?  The answer must be at lea s t  moderately 
success fu l .
Despite the leve l  o f  a l ie n a t io n  generated by the pay issue Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  turnover a t  Rosyth is  low. This asser t ion  is  re in fo rced  
by Table 6.3 which shows a breakdown, by grade o f  length of serv ice in 
the Sea System area
Table 6.3 - Length o f  Service by Grade
Service in Years NumberPTO I I PTO I I I PTO IV
0-4 0 0 0
5-9 2 2 15
10-14 2 19 27
15-19 13 23 27
20-24 17 16 9
Over 25 66 40 22
I t  could be argued th a t  the a t t rac t iveness  o f  the pension scheme 
has been a d is in ce n t ive  f o r  Non- Industr ia l  s t a f f  to leave the C iv i l  
Service. This in  tu rn  is  one o f  the fac to rs  which has i n h ib i t e d  the 
f ree  f low o f  s t a f f  between the C iv i l  Service in general and the dockyards in
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p a r t i c u la r  and p r iva te  ind u s t ry .  To t h i s  end i t  may be concluded th a t  the
curren t  C iv i l  Service pension scheme meets the needs o f  the P & T  group
at  Rosyth. I t  can be in fe r re d  from the response to quest ion G .v i i  
th a t  the pension i s  perceived as an important reward by respondents. I t  
i s  speculated th a t  the importance o f  the pension, to the P & T  group, 
may not be f u l l y  appreciated by those responsib le f o r  nego t ia t ing  c i v i l  
servant 's  pay.
Non In d u s t r ia l  A t t i t u d e  to Incent ive  Schemes
An important po in t  to es tab l ish  p r i o r  to s t ru c tu r in g  systems o f
reward is  the r o le ,  i f  any, o f  f i n a n c ia l  incen t ives .  White e t  al (1968) 
comments th a t  t r a d i t i o n a l  a t t i t u d e s  towards f i n a n c ia l  mot iva t ion  as a basis 
f o r  greater  e f f i c i e n c y  in  B r i t i s h  indus t ry  have been those o f  scept ic ism. 
Central  to any scheme of f in a n c ia l  incent ives is  the o rg an isa t ion 's  a b i l i t y  
to measure performance and a systematic and d is c ip l in e d  d isc r im in a t io n  in 
favour of those co n t r ib u t in g  most .to improved e f f i c i e n c y .
This sect ion w i l l  attempt to assess the a t t i t u d e  o f  P&T grades a t
Rosyth to the quest ion o f  incent ives raised at the beginning o f  the Chapter; ;
proxy method was used to ascer ta in  the views o f  Non-Indus t r i a l s ,. I t  should be
noted the o f f i c i a l  po l i c y  o f  the IPGS is  one o f  oppos i t ion  to the
implementat ion of any scheme o f  f i n a n c ia l  incent ives f o r  i t s  members, but 
there is  an undercurrent o f  oppos i t ion  to th i s  p o l i c y .  The a t t i t u d e  o f  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l s  to incent ives is  i n e x t r i c a b ly  l inked to the emotive quest ion 
o f  r e l a t i v i t i e s .
The analys is  o f  responses to  questions on DES w i l l  attempt to evaluate 
how Non- Indus tr ia ls  perceive the scheme with  respect to both the 
ind iv idu a l  and the organ isa t ion .  Question 6 . v i i i  should permit an 
assessment to be made o f  the bene f i ts  which are l i k e l y  to accrue to the 
dockyard noting tha.t i t  has been estimated th a t  DES has e f f e c t i v e l y
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increased I n d u s t r i a l ' s  basic pay between 7 - 12%. Hence DES is  l i k e l y  
to  be instrumental in f u r t h e r  narrowing the d i f f e r e n t i a l  between 
In d u s t r ia l s  and lower management: th i s  may in f luence the l a t t e r  to 
conclude th a t  the organ isa t ion  has again acquiesced to i n d u s t r i a l  muscle 
and is  l i k e l y  to be re f le c te d  in  the response to questions r e la t i n g  to the 
DES.
6 ( v i i i )  How do you th ink  th a t  the Dockyard E f f ic ience  Scheme w i l l  a f f e c t  
the e f f i c ie n c y /p ro d u c t i v e  output o f the Dockyard?
performance?
Great ly  increase 0 0 1
Some increase 55 53 51
No change 32 35 37
Some decrease 12 9 10
Great ly  decrease 0 3 1
ir th a t  under the Dockyard E f f ic ie n c y  S* 
mus. In d u s t r ia l s  have to work
Very hard 2 0 4
F a i r l y  hard 23 24 38
About the same (as before) 70 70 52
Less than now 4 3 5
Very much less than now 0 2 0
1 th ink  the management w i l l be able to I
Very wel l 4 11 13
F a i r l y  wel l 19 22 24
Adequately 34 39 42
Badly 40 27 20
Very badly 2 1 1
Turning our a t te n t io n  to quest ion 6 ( v i i i )  a small m a jo r i t y  o f  
the sample populat ion th ink  th a t  there w i l l  be some increase in  p ro d u c t i v i t y
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However, the response to th i s  quest ion is  d i f f i c u l t  to reconc i le  w ith  
the response to question 6 . i x  where a s i g n i f i c a n t  number o f  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l s  th ink  th a t  the In d u s t r ia l s  w i l l  have to work about the same 
ra te  as now to earn a bonus. Although persuading employees to work 
harder i s  not necessar i ly  the only method of improving p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  
improving the q u a l i t y  o f  workmanship may be a very e f fe c t i v e  way o f  
increasing p ro d u c t i v i t y .  In other words ge t t ing  the job r i g h t  f i r s t  
t ime is  very important in  ship re p a i r  work. However, perhaps the response 
to quest ion 5 . v i i i  i s  more i n d ic a t i v e  o f  the under ly ing view p re va i l in g  
among Non-Industr ia l  grades th a t  the DES was introduced to achieve pay 
comparab i l i ty  f o r  I n d u s t r ia l s  in the four  home dockyards. In d u s t r ia l  
grades a t  Chatham had enjoyed a 20% pay enhancement emanating from the 
New Dockyard Wage Struc tu re  (NDWS). This pay scheme was in s t a l l e d  at 
Chatham in Ju ly  1975 as a t r i a l  w ith  the in te n t io n  o f  i n s t a l l i n g  i t  in 
the other three dockyards, but owing to a combination o f  Government pay 
po l icy  and the fa c t  th a t  there was only a marginal improvement in  
p ro d u c t i v i t y ,  i t  was never extended to the other dockyards.
The r e la t i v e  optimism concerning some increase in  output may be
explained by the fa c t  th a t  Non- Indus tr ia ls  may fee l  obl iged to ensure tha t
In d u s t r ia l  grades a c tu a l l y  earn t h e i r  bonus. I t  is  speculated th a t  there
may be a desire by Non- Indus t r ia ls  to see th a t  the In d u s t r ia l s  g ive some­
th ing in  re tu rn  f o r  what many consider to be a t h i n l y  disguised pay r i s e .  
One respondent commented th a t  b e t te r  S tar t -S top  times would have probably 
achieved the same r e s u l t  as the DES. I t  v.'as genera l ly  recognised th a t  
p r io r  to the in t ro du c t io n  o f  the DES the m a jo r i t y  o f I n d u s t r ia l s  employed 
on a f l o a t  work s ta r ted  work la te  and f in ish e d  ea r ly .
Another respondent questioned the a b i l i t y  o f  management to br ing 
about the necessary re laxa t ions  in trade demarcations to pave the way f o r  
increased output.
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The s i g n i f i c a n t  po in t  to emerge is  th a t  Non- Indus tr ia ls  do expect 
some increase in p ro d u c t i v i t y  which may motivate them to ensure th a t  
t h e i r  expectat ion is  re a l ise d .  However, there is  a s i g n i f i c a n t  body of 
opin ion which considers th a t  the in d u s t r i a l  has bene f i t ted  at the expense 
o f  the dockyard. This view is  somewhat re in forced by the response to 
quest ion 6 . i x  which in fe rs  th a t  In d u s t r ia l s  w i l l  on ly  have to work at the 
same ra te  to earn a bonus. However, a note of caut ion should be sounded 
because the response to  the quest ion has been made w ith  the knowledge 
th a t  lower management w i l l  not be p a r t i c ip a t i n g  in the e f f i c i e n c y  scheme. 
This f a c t  w i l l  undoubtedly have inf luenced t h e i r  response.
Although i t  has already been suggested tha t  the response to quest ion
6 . i x  may be incons is ten t  w ith  the response to Question G . v i i i ,  the 
fo l low ing  explanat ion is  o f fe red to show th a t  the r e s u l t  is  not as con tra ­
d ic to r y  as i t  might appear at f i r s t  s ig h t .  The exp lanat ion centres on 
i n t e rp r e ta t io n  and semantics associated w ith  the quest ion. I t  is  
suggested th a t  the word 'hard '  generates connotat ions o f  greater  work 
rate ra the r  than simply spending longer on the job ie  improved S tar t -S top  
d i s c i p l i n e .  I f  respondents have used the c r i t e r i o n  of work ra te  to assess 
how hard In d u s t r ia l s  would have to work to earn a bonus, then there is 
no inconsis tency w i th  quest ion 6 . v i i i l  on the other hand, i f  respondents 
considered th a t  I n d u s t r ia l s  could earn a s i g n i f i c a n t  bonus w i thou t  any 
increase in  p ro d u c t i v i t y  then’ there is  a degree o f  inconsis tency w ith  
quest ion G . v i i i .
A f u r th e r  explanat ion which mer i ts  considera t ion concerns the view 
p re va i l in g  among some respondents th a t  the t r i g g e r  po in t f o r  bonus payment 
has.been d e l i b e r a te l y  set low to  ensure tha t  the In d u s t r ia l s  receive a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  bonus. This view is  nurtured and sustained by a number o f  
emotive and in t e r re la te d  factory, erros ion o f  Non In d u s t r ia l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  
the percept ion th a t 'P  & T grades are underpaid and the view th a t
managerial a u th o r i t y  has decl ined over the past 10 years .
The response to the quest ion ind ica tes  tha t  Non In d u s t r ia l s  have no 
great expectat ion regarding increased p ro d u c t i v i t y  and th i s  r e a l l y  
re in fo rces  and strengthens the assessment th a t  they perceive the In d u s t r ia l s  
b e n e f i t t i n g  a t  the o rg an isa t ion 's  expense.
As prev ious ly  discussed an impor tant face t  in any incen t ive  scheme 
is  the a b i l i t y  o f  management to  measure performance accurate ly ,  A 
quest ion was inser ted in the quest ionnaire  to e l i c i t  the percept ion th a t  
lower management had o f  the organisat ion 's  a b i l i t y  to  quan t i fy  performance.
An assessment of the o rgan isa t ion 's  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  measuring performance 
may permit lower management to  have a b e t te r  apprec ia t ion of the 
ob jec t ives  of the e f f i c i e n c y  scheme. I f  lower management is  not 
convinced of the o rg an isa t ion 's  determinat ion to measure performance with  
any degree o f  accuracy then the motives f o r  in t roduc ing  the e f f i c i e n c y  
scheme are l i k e l y  to be quer ied. There is  a suspicion in some quar ters  
th a t  the e f f i c i e n c y  scheme was implemented to improve the pay of 
I n d u s t r i a l s ,  a po in t  we have already mentioned.
This r e s u l t  shows th a t  the PTO I I  grade is  less conf ident  than the 
other two grades in the a b i l i t y  of the dockyard to measure performance. 
S t a t i s t i c a l l y  there is  a s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f fe rence  between the response of 
PTO I l s  and the PTO IV to t h i s  quest ion. The frame o f  reference o f  
respondents enables them to make an o b jec t ive  assessment as a l l  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  grades in  the General Manager's department attend a f i v e  day 
course in  work measurement techniques and p ra c t i ces ,  based on the cu r ren t  
B r i t i s h  Standard, Comparative est imating techniques have been used in 
the dockyard fo r  several ye a rs . I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to be s p e c i f i c  about 
the e f fec t iveness o f  t h i s  technique f o r  prov id ing an absolute measure of 
p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  but i t  does provide a method f o r  monitor ing changes in 
p r o d u c t i v i t y .  However, the fa c t  th a t  employees are aware th a t  p ro d u c t i v i t y  
is  being measured may prompt an improvement in  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  An
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occupational group. Est imators , ex is ts  in  the dockyard to conduct job 
es t imat ing ;  members o f  th i s  group were included in the survey, and 
approximately 18% of PTO IV respondents were Est imators.
This group's involvement w ith  work measurement and the 
close associa t ion o f  th i s  dimension with performance assessment may 
exp la in  why the PTO IV group has made a more favourable assessment o f 
management's a b i l i t y  to measure performance. Based on a s e l f  esteem 
considera t ion i t  is  s u b je c t i v e ly  assessed th a t  the Est imators would be 
more favourab ly  pre-disposed to  assessing the o rg an isa t ion 's  a b i l i t y  to 
measure performance. I t  is  u n l i k e ly  th a t  the average in d iv idu a l  would 
acknowledge th a t  his performance is  less than f a i r .  Thus i t  i s  concluded 
th a t  the inc lus ion  of Estimators in  the PTO IV group may account f o r  the 
d i f fe rence  w ith  the PTO I I  group. However, an equa l ly  v a l id  i n t e rp r e ta t io n  
o f  the r e s u l t  could be th a t  the PTO I I  group is more suspicious of the 
o rgan isa t ion 's  motives f o r  implementing the scheme. The r e s u l t  ind ica tes  
th a t  there is  no great  confidence in  the o rg an isa t ion 's  a b i l i t y  to l i n k  
performance accura te ly  to bonus payments or indeed measure performance.
A t t i t u d e  and Commitment
An important ing red ien t  f o r  the success of any incen t ive  scheme, 
f o r  dockyard In d u s t r ia l  grades, is the a t t i t u d e  adopted'by Non- Industr ia l  
grades. Although some incen t ive  schemes are designed to provide s e l f  
m o t iva t ion ,  thus d im in ish ing the need fo r  superv is ion ,  the nature o f  ship 
re p a i r  work, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i t s  d i v e r s i t y ,  inter-dependence and complexity 
d ic ta te  th a t  a c e r ta in  minimum degree of superv is ion is  maintained. The 
prec ise level of superv is ion f o r  any p a r t i c u la r  job w i l l  be a matter f o r  
judgement by superv isors . I t  is  suggested th a t  the a t t i t u d e  adopted by Non' 
I n d u s t r ia l s  w i l l  to a large extent determine whether they are prepared 
to adopt a d iscern ing approach to supervi si on and enable the organ isa t ion  
to b ene f i t  from any s e l f  m ot iva t ion  tha t  the incen t ive  scheme might possess
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Among the many fac to rs  which w i l l  undoubtedly in f luence  the a t t i t u d e  
and approach o f  N on - Indus t r ia ls  to an incen t ive  scheme f o r  I n d u s t r i a l s ,  
is  whether the organ isat ion  was believed to  have given carefu l  
considerat ion to t h e i r  condi t ions o f  serv ice . In r e a l i t y  t h i s  means the 
thorny quest ion of d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between Non- Industr ia l  and In d u s t r ia l  
grades.
6 ( x i )  How much importance do you th in k  was attached to the quest ion 
o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  between Non- Indus tr ia ls  and In d u s t r ia l s  in the fo rmula t ion  
o f  the Dockyard E f f ic ie n c y  Scheme?
PTO I I I I I IV
Great importance 2 4 5
Some importance 9 3 5
Very l i t t l e  importance 23 17 36
None 66 71 50
Don't  know 0 5 4
6 ( x i i )  How important do you regard the commitment i
in  determining the success of the Dockyard Eff ic iency
C r i t i c a l l y  important 57 44 44
Very Important 42 47 47
F a i r l y  important 0 10 7
Very l i t t l e  importance 0 1 3
Don't know 0 1 0
The response to the quest ion 6 ( x i )  ind ica tes  th a t  the respondents 
s t rong ly  be l ieve  th a t  ‘ very l i t t l e '  or 'no importance' was attached to the 
quest ion of d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between In d u s t r ia l s  and Non- Indus tr ia ls  in  
the fo rmula t ion o f  DES. The erosion o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  in  the dockyard is  a 
content ious issue and undoubtedly contr ibuted to the m i l i t a n c y  o f  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l s  at Rosyth during the 1981 C iv i l  Service d ispute . However.
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to  i n f e r  th a t  the erosion of d i f f e r e n t i a l s  is  the p r in c ip le  cause o f  
Non-Industr ia l  unrest would be a fashionable over s im p l i f i c a t i o n  o f  
the problem.
The question also i l l u s t r a t e s  the po in t th a t  the m a jo r i ty  o f  respondents 
have short  memories.
Moving on to discuss the commitment dimension, a comment appended 
to a quest ionnaire  perhaps best summed up the p re va i l in g  a t t i t u d e  in  
February 1981 o f  Non In d u s t r ia l s  a t Rosyth; 'Non In d u s t r ia l s  w i l l  work 
under any scheme the quest ion is  how e f f e c t i v e l y ' .  The response to 
question 6 ( x i i )  is  whol ly  p red ic tab le .  I t  is  qu i te  log ica l  th a t  an 
ind iv idua l  should consider tha t  his co n t r ibu t io n  is  important to the 
success of the process. From a psychological aspect, the s e l f  esteem 
dimension w i l l  undoubtedly in f luence the degree to which an ind iv idu a l  
bel ieves in the i n d is p e n s a b i l i t y  o f  his commitment. The respondents 
obviously bel ieve th a t  t h e i r  management s k i l l s  are essent ia l  to the 
success of the DES. This wide ly  held view is  i l l u s t r a t e d  by a comment 
from a respondant ‘ the DES w i l l  be only as e f fe c t i v e  as the Non- 
In d u s t r ia ls  desire i t ' .
The In d u s t r ia l  Trade Union pos i t ion  on dockyard p ro d u c t i v i t y  is  
in te res t ing .  Within the context o f  the DES they argue th a t  the performance 
of Management w i l l  be a major determinant o f  bonus payments, but 
simultaneously they w i l l  f o r c i b l y  assert  tha t  they and they alone are 
responsib le f o r  improvement. One suspects th a t  the l a t t e r  pos i t ion  is 
adopted to ensure tha t  In d u s t r ia l s  are the sole b e ne f ic ia r ie s  of any 
rewards fo r  improved p ro d u c t i v i t y .  In the negot ia t ions leading to the 
in t ro du c t io n  o f  the DES, the In d u s t r ia l  Trade Unions made an issue of 
Non-Industr ia l  commitment to gain the best, possib le weight ing fa c to r
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f o r  wa i t ing  t ime. An i n t e rp re ta t io n  o f  the respondents' assessment o f 
t h e i r  importance concerning t h e i r  commitment to DES, re in fo rces  the 
view th a t  Non-Industr ia l  would wish to p a r t i c ip a te  or a t  l e a s t  to 
b e n e f i t  to some degree from DES. In other  words Non- Indus t r ia ls  are 
saying, 'We recognise the importance o f  our commitment; l e t  us 
p a r t i c ip a te  and thus maximise and re in fo rce  our commitment'.
In summary, Non- Indus t r ia ls  recognise t h e i r  importance to  DES 
and the r e s u l t  does ind ica te  that,  there is a des ire  by Non- Indus tr ia ls  
th a t  they should p a r t i c ip a te  in the scheme.
Towards an A l te rn a t ive  Pay D is t r ib u t i o n  System
6 ( x i i i )  Assuming a f ixed  sum is  ava i lab le  fo r  f in a n c ia l  remunerat ion,
which o f  the systems set out below would 
s p e c i f i c  other combination.
you prefer? Please t i  ck one, or
Basic Pay Set aside f o r  Pension Bonus Payment
Enhancement Annual PTO I I I I I IV
100% - - 26 26 20
90% 10 29 21 17
90% 10 4 9 10
90% 5 5 17 19 20
80% 20 - 2 2 7
80% - 20 8 8 11
80% 10 10 15 14 15
This quest ion was inves t iga ted  to determine whether N on- Indus t r ia ls  had 
id e n t ica l  pay needs. The re s u l t  c l e a r l y  shows th a t  in d iv id u a ls  have 
d i f f e r e n t  pay needs and supports the view o f  the l i t e r a t u r e  on th i s  issue. 
That there is  a tendency f o r  in d iv id u a ls  to under-est imate the f in a n c ia l  
cost o f  f r in g e  benef i ts  and the fa c t  th a t  some bene f i ts  may not be desired,
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indicates th a t  organisat ions may not be ge t t ing  the best re tu rn  fo r  a 
given f in a n c ia l  ou t lay .  This f a c t  demonstrates th a t  there are ce r ta in  
po ten t ia l  advantages to be gained by in t roduc ing  a personal ised payment 
system.
A Pearson c o r re la t io n  was ca r r ied  out to ascer ta in  whether perceived 
pay needs cor re la ted  w ith  grade and age. The lack o f  any s i g n i f i c a n t  
c o r re la t io n  with  age is  perhaps su rp r is ing  as the l i t e r a t u r e  does suggest 
th a t  men with  young fa m i l ie s  requ i re  more o f  t h e i r  pay in  the form o f  
money than o lder  men who are normal ly considered to be more in te res ted  
in  the se cu r i t y  aspect. I t  is  suggested th a t  the lack o f  any s i g n i f i c a n t  
c o r re la t io n  supports the case f o r  a personalised pay system in  some form 
or other .
A fo l lo w  up quest ionnaire  was administered,  w i th  a b r i e f  d e sc r ip t ion  
o f  personal ised pay system, to determine the degree o f  support th a t  such 
a system might enjoy at Rosyth. The response demonstrated th a t  there was 
considerable support f o r  a personal ised pay system. However, the response 
may have been inf luenced by expectat ions th a t  change would mean some form 
o f  pay enhancement. The issue of pay persona l isa t ion  w i l l  be fu r t h e r  
discussed in Chapter 8.
In d u s t r ia l  Relat ion Dimension
I t  is  recognised th a t  asking quest ions r e la t in g  to the DES and 
in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  in v i t e s  speculat ion. There i s  l i k e l y  to be a degree 
o f  c o r re la t i o n ,  in a speculat ive sense, between the a f f e c t  on In d u s t r ia l  
r e la t io n s  and the percept ion o f  the deal th a t  the In d u s t r ia l s  achieved. A 
fashionable view among many Non- Indus tr ia ls  i s  th a t  management w i l l  be 
unable to persuade the trade unions to d e l i v e r ,  in  the sens i t ive  area o f  
re laxa t ion  o f  trade demarcation, although the loosening o f  trade demarcation 
was perceived as the p r in c ip le  reason f o r  the in t ro d u c t io n  o f  the e f f i c i e n c y  
scheme by the o rgan isa t ion  (see Question 9 Appendix 1), where "To improve
labour f l e x i b i l i t y " s c o r e d  highest .
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6 (x iv )  How do you th ink  the Dockyard E f f ic ie n c y  Scheme w i l l  a f f e c t  
In d u s t r ia l  re la t ions?
PTO I I I I I IV
Great ly  decrease number o f  
disputes
2 3 2
Decrease number o f  disputes 28 26 27
No change 42 52 50
Increase number o f  disputes 28 17 21
Great ly  increase number o f  disputes 0 1 1
6(xv) What so r t  o f  deal to the In d u s t r ia ls do you th in k  th a t  the
Dockyard E f f ic ie n c y  Scheme represents?
Very good 28 30 24
Good 66 60 58
Don't  know 6 5 7
Poor 0 3 9
Very poor 0 0 1
Question 6 (x iv )  brought no consensus of view re gard ing the e f f e c t
o f  DES on in d u s t r ia l  re la t io n s .  A number o f poss ib le  explanat ions w i l
be considered.
Those who consider th a t  there w i l l  be a decrees e in the number of
disputes probably base t h e i r  assessment on two fa c to rs .  F i r s t l y ,  the 
formal undertakings o f  DES agreed between management and unions are 
considered to provide a degree o f  assurance against i n d u s t r i a l  d i pûtes. 
Secondly, the po ten t ia l  s ize o f  the bonus coupled w ith  the apprec ia t ion  
th a t  the bonus is  dependent on ove ra l l  dockyard performance may be viewed 
as a moderating in f luence in the arena o f  i n d u s t r i a l  d isputes.
I t  is  speculated tha t  the 'No Change' choice may have been sub­
consciously t rans la ted  by respondents to a 'Don't  know' choice and answered 
accord ing ly .  The fa c t  tha t  the quest ionnaire  was admin is tra ted before 
the implementation o f  DES strengthens th i s  hypotehsis.
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Turning to the group who consider th a t  there w i l l  be an increase 
in  d isputes, i t  is  suggested th a t  t h e i r  percept ion may have been 
inf luenced by the po ten t ia l  f o r  d ispute created by the two t i e r  bonus 
system. The de l inea t ion  between product ive and non-product ive workers has 
caused controversy in some areas. In d u s t r ia l  c r a f t  f i t t e r s  working in 
the fa c to ry  are def ined as product ive workers whereas progressmen, ex 
c r a f t  f i t t e r s ,  who are responsib le fo r  carry ing out dimensional checks 
and spec ify ing  machining d e ta i l s  o f  jobs are categorised as non­
product ive workers. This is. despite  the fa c t  tha t  t h e i r  work forms an 
in te g ra l  par t  o f  the m a c h in in g / f i t t i n g  work o f  the fa c to ry .  In add i t ion  
progressmen belong to the same union (AUEW) as the f i t t e r s .  This 
problem serves to i l l u s t r a t e  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  which may a r ise  where a 
bonus system is  s truc tu red  in such a way th a t  the maximum bonus ava i lab le  
to some c’-'oups is  d i f f e r e n t  from th a t  ava i lab le  to o ther  grouos.
Some of the cynicism regarding the post DES in d u s t r i a l  r e la t io n s  
scene is  probably in f luenced by the fe e l in g  th a t  unions are u n l i k e ly  to 
subordinate sect iona l in te re s ts  to produce the c l imate  necessary f o r  
high bonus payments.
A f u r th e r  fa c to r  which may have prompted some respondents to deduce 
a d e te r io ra t io n  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  r e la t io n s  emanates from the fa c t  th a t  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l s  do not p a r t i c ip a te  in  DES. Ampli fy ing comments were received 
regarding the d iv is iveness  o f  DES because of n o n -p a r t i c ip a t io n  by Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  s .
In summary, the response to quest ion 5 (x iv )  shows th a t  there is  a 
considerable v a r ia t io n  o f  op in ion as to the e f f e c t  th a t  DES may have on 
the in d u s t r i a l  r e la t io n  scene.
The f i n a l  quest ion 6(xv) i n v i t e s  Non- Industr ia ls  to speculate the 
so r t  o f  deal DES represents to In d u s t r ia l s .  The response to quest ion 
6(xv) w i l l  undoubtedly be inf luenced by the f a c t  th a t  the respondents have 
been in v i te d  to appraise the scheme as non-pa r t ic ipan ts  so i t  is
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an t ic ipa ted  th a t  some w i l l  au tomat ica l ly  assume th a t  the In d u s t r ia l  
has obtained a bargain.
The response to t h i s  quest ion tends to support the popular b e l i e f  
th a t  the In d u s t r ia l s  have obtained a very good deal.  This b e l i e f  w i l l
c e r t a in l y  re in fo rce  the fe e l in g  o f  ine q u i ty  experienced by the Non- 
In d u s t r ia l s  set against the backcloth o f  t h e i r  1981 pay award o f  7.5%. A
number of respondents expressed disappointment th a t  they were not able to
p a r t i c ip a te  in the DES, The scheme was considered by a few to be d i v i s i v e  
and generate f r i c t i o n  a t  the PTO IV In d u s t r ia l  in te r fa c e .
A fu r th e r  fa c to r  probably in f lu e n c in g  t h e i r  assessment i s  the 
conv ic t ion  th a t  management is  u n l i k e ly  to be able to hold the trade unions 
to the condi t ions o f  the scheme. The a b i l i t y  o f  a bureaucrat ic  o rgan isa t ion  
to erase s u f f i c i e n t  customs and pract ices to achieve higher p ro d u c t i v i t y  
is  questioned by a somewhat r e c a lc i t r a n t  lower management.
One is  aware o f  a ce r ta in  undertone o f  resentment among lower 
management because they fee l th a t  the trade unions have succeeded in 
negot ia t ing  an incen t ive  scheme which gives them a l o t  more pay f o r  very 
l i t t l e  increase in e f f o r t .  The f a c t  th a t  i t  is  o f f i c i a l  IPGS p o l i c y  not 
to p a r t i c ip a te  in  incen t ive  schemes is  a source o f  f r u s t r a t i o n  to some Non- 
In d u s t r i a l s .  The response to th is  quest ion suggests th a t  the m a jo r i t y  o f 
P&T grades would be happy to p a r t i c ip a te  in the DES.
Summary
The main points to emerge from th is  examination o f  the substa t ive  
issues r e la t in g  to pay and the Dockyard E f f ic ie n cy  Scheme are;
a. Confirmation o f  the existence of a pay percept ion problem 
at Rosyth.
b. S e n s i t i v i t y  o f  lower management to the Low Pay d i f f e r e n t i a l  
e x is t in g  between Non- Industr ia l  and In d u s t r ia l  grades.
c. The b e l i e f  by lower management th a t  the In d u s t r ia l  trade 
unions have success fu l ly  negot iated an e f f i c i e n c y  scheme which w i l l  
g re a t ly  b e ne f i t  t h e i r  members.
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d. An in d ic a t io n  th a t  Non- Industr ia ls  would l i k e  to p a r t i c ip a te  
in the rece n t ly  implemented Dockyard E f f ic ie n cy  Scheme.
e. An in d ic a t io n  th a t  perceived ind iv idu a l  pay needs o f  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l s  vary.
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CHAPTER 7 
PROMOTION - ANALYSIS OF SURVEY
In troduc t ion
This chapter w i l l  e f f e c t i v e l y  cons is t  o f  two pa r ts ,  the analysis 
o f  questions r e la t in g  to the promotion issue and the second p a r t ,  an 
exposi t ion  of an a l t e r n a t i v e  system f o r  admin is te r ing promotion in 
dockyards. The major par t  o f  the f i r s t  sect ion w i l l  focus on the 
substant ive issues r e la t in g  to the cur ren t  promotion system a t  Rosyth 
Dockyard, In a d d i t io n ,  quest ions r e la t in g  to managerial a u th o r i t y  w i l l  
also be analysed because a u th o r i t y  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  are re la ted  to the 
promotion reward. An analys is  o f  these two in t e r - r e l a te d  dimensions should 
provide us with  some idea o f  how they might in f luence  the a t t rac t iveness  
o f  the promotion reward. As in Chapter 6 quest ions w i l l  be grouped in 
c lus te rs  f o r  analys is .
With respect to the promotion dimension quest ions w i l l  be analysed 
to determine the degree to which both ind iv idua l  and o rgan isa t iona l  expectat 
ions are s a t i s f i e d .  Promotion must simultaneously serve as a reward to 
motivate good performance and s a t i s f y  the o rgan isa t ion 's  requirements 
f o r  the prov is ion  o f  people o f  the r i g h t  c a l ib re  to f i l l  managerial and 
s p e c ia l i s t  posts. The r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  o f  these two funct ions is  not simple, 
promotion fo r  example, is  not a f l e x i b l e  reward, i t  is  hard to give on 
anyth ing, but an ind iv idu a l  basis. The issue may also be complicated by 
the fa c t  th a t  the organ isa t ion  may be using promotion to p a r t l y  comoensate 
fo r  low pay. For a promotion system to be successful  ther must be a 
measure o f  commonality o f  ob jec t ives  between those o f  the ind iv idu a l  and 
o rgan isa t ion .  Thus the substant ive issues raised with  respect to the 
promotion system w i l l  be evaluated against the backdrop o f  ind iv idu a l  
versus organ isat iona l  expecta t ions.
The Performance Appraisal System
7 . ( i )  How would you assess the way each o f  the fo l lo w in g  mark Annual 
S ta f f  reports? Please t i c k  each l in e  as appropr ia te  to your grade, ie  
'Y ou rse l f '  and 'subord ina te '  not app l icab le  to PTO IV.
Generously About r i g h t  Too s t r i c t l y  Don't  Know 
PTO I I  I I I  IV I I  I I I  IV I I  I I I  IV I I  I I I  IV
Superiors 9 21 4 81 64 41 6 11 7 4 4 48
Yourse l f  15 16 77 66 4 6 4 11
Subordinates 47 45 2 6
7 . ( i i )  How much contro l  do you th in k  th a t  each dockyard should have over 
the se lec t ion  o f  s t a f f  f o r  promotion?
PTO I I I I I IV
Complete 13 22 40
A s ig n i f i c a n t  amount 60 64 46
A l i t t l e 19 10 8
None 8 4 4
Don't  know 0 0 2
1 consider the a b o l i t i o n  of the old type
nation to have been:
Very good decis ion 2 5 7
Good decis ion 19 19 24
Don't know 2 12 18
Bad decis ion 36 41 36
Very bad decision 40 23 15
Performance appra isal  is  an essent ia l  element o f  any promotion system 
which i s  based on m er i t .  The appraisal system is  a c ruc ia l  element o f  the 
promotion process, in  f a c t ,  i t  is  the foundation o f  the system and there fo re  
any lack o f  confidence in  the system w i l l  amost c e r t a in l y  debase the promotion 
system. Although the Non In d u s t r ia l  s t a f f  repor t  i s  seen p r im a r i l y  in 
terms o f  the promotion dimension, i t  serves an equa l ly  impor tant func t ion  
o f  career development and planning.
Before proceeding, i t  is  worth not ing tha t  the s t a f f  repo r t  
is  w r i t t e n  by the in d iv id u a l^  immediate super io r  and passed to the 
a u th o r ’ s super io r  f o r  appra isal and support ing comment. The response 
to quest ion 7 ( i )  ind ica tes  th a t  lower management are genera l ly  
s a t i s f i e d  w i th  the way th a t  super iors mark s t a f f  repo r ts "  However, i t  
i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  th a t  47% o f  PTO I l s  thought th a t  PTOs marked t h e i r  
subord inate 's  reports  generously. Comments by senior s t a f f  who have 
served on se lec t ion  boards ind ica te  th a t  over-marking i s  a problem. To 
i l l u s t r a t e  the size o f  the problem, t h e -1981 PTO I I  se lec t ion  board was 
tasked with  selecing 20 PTO I l s .  In accordance with normal p rac t ice  the board 
had to se lec t  approximately 60 candidates to in te rv ie w  from a popula t ion of 
over a 1000 e l i g i b l e  candidates; based on s t a f f  repo r t  promotabi1i t y  
assessment. To put the problem in  perspect ive, the to ta l  populat ion o f  
t h i s  group is  approximately 2,300 in  other words 43% o f  the group had been 
assessed as e l i g i b l e  f o r  promotion. I t  is  speculated th a t  i f  s t a f f  reports  
had been marked less generously the se lec t ion  board's task may have been 
less arduous. However, the lack of promotion oppo r tun i t ies  in 1981 
ra ises the issue whether promotion oppo r tun i t ies  o f  less than one per 
cent per annum act as an in ce n t ive .  However, 1981 was not a representa t ive  
year,  but nevertheless the f i g u re  ra re ly  exceeded three per cent per annum 
fo r  PTO I I I  to PTO I I .
A member o f  the 1981 PTO I I I  to PTO I I  promotion board commented on 
the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  se lec t ing  candidates to in te rv iew  when confronted w ith  
a large number o f  s t a f f  repor ts  which did not adequately d isc r im ina te  
between the a t t r i b u te s  o f  in d iv id u a ls .  He went on to mention th a t  personal 
knowledge o f  candidates, by se lec t ion  board members sometimes plays a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  ro le  in  se lec t ing  in terviewees. I t  is  suggested th a t  over 
generous marking may penal ise some able ind iv id u a ls  because they are 
unknown, on a personal basis,  to board members. The u n o f f i c i a l  se lec t ion
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process tends to favour the more senior  s t a f f  as there I s a  greater  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  them being acquainted w ith  at leas t  one member o f  the 
board. The response to quest ion 7 ( i )  does suggest a degree of 
complacency w ith  the cur ren t  repor t ing  system. Nevertheless there is  an 
awareness by a s i g n i f i c a n t  number (47%) o f  PTO I l s  th a t  there is  a lack 
o f  c r i t i c a l  appra isa l by PTO I l l s  in  the assessment o f  t h e i r  s t a f f ’ s 
performance.
The reluctance o f  super iors to make d isc r im ina to ry  remarks about 
t h e i r  subordinates has meant th a t  members o f  promotion boards have adopted 
a less formal se lec t ion  procedure. This feature  o f  the cur ren t  system is  
an argument f o r  making each dockyard responsible f o r  the se lec t ion  o f  s t a f f  
f o r  promotion. Question 7 ( i i )  was set to es tab l ish  i f  there was support f o r  
increas ing the contro l  th a t  each dockyard should have over se lec t ion  of 
s t a f f .  The response showed th a t  73% o f  PTO I l s  and 86% o f  PTO I l l s  and IVs 
thought th a t  each dockyard should have e i th e r  complete or a s i g n i f i c a n t  
amount o f  contro l  over the se lec t ion  o f  s t a f f  fo r  promotion.
In searching fo r  an explanat ion fo r  th i s  r e s u l t  i t  is  suggested th a t  
the perceived remoteness o f  the present promotion system may engender a 
degree o f  doubt regarding i t s  fa i r n e s s ,  a oo in t  re in fo rced  by the h igh ly  
bureaucra t ic  s t ruc tu re  o f  the o rgan isa t ion  in which the promotion system 
operates. The mechanics o f  the cur ren t  promotion system are wel l  under­
stood by Non- Indus tr ia ls  i e ,  the s t a f f  repor t  is  the veh ic le  f o r  ge t t ing  
an ind iv idu a l  to the promotion' board, but i t  is  the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
performance in  f r o n t  o f  the board which determines whether or not he is  
selected f o r  promotion. The fo l low ing  remark i s  t y p ic a l  o f  comments 
received regarding quest ion 7 ( i i )  "on ly  loca l management r e a l l y  knows 
i f  an in d iv idu a l  is  worthy o f  promotion".
The response does ind ica te  th a t  senior management would have the 
suppor t -o f  lower management i f  they decided to take the oppo r tu n i ty ,  af forded 
by the in e v i ta b le  r e s t ru c tu r in g  o f  the Dockyard o rgan isa t ion ,  fo l lo w ing  the 
June 1981 defence review, to develop a promotion system more r e f l e c t i v e
o f  both organ isat iona l  and ind iv id u a l  expectat ions, Non- Indus tr ia ls  
c le a r l y  feel tha t  the present system does not demonstrate a c lea r  l i n k  
between performance and reward. The p ropos i t ion  there fo re  is  that by 
invo lv ing  local senior  management more in t im a te ly  w ith  the se lec t ion  
process, the performance - reward l i n k  would be strengthened.
Further v e r i f i c a t i o n  th a t  there i s  an under-current o f  d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  
w i th  the present system may be found in  the response to quest ion 7 ( i i i ) .  
There are two p e r fe c t l y  fe a s ib le  explanat ions fo r  t h i s  p a r t i c u la r  response, 
on the one hand there may be a genuine desi re  to re tu rn  to a system o f  
formal examination and on the o ther ,  i t  may represent a d is s a t i s f a c t io n  
w ith  the curren t  system and thus any system is  considered p re fe rab ly .
The survey shows th a t  the desire  to re tu rn  to a system o f  formal 
examination is  s trongest amongst PTO I l s  and decreases w i th  managerial 
grade. A possible  explanat ion fo r  th i s  d i f fe rence  in response between the 
grades is  tha t  the PTO I I  group may perceive themselves as being in  a more 
favourable pos i t ion  to determine who should be permit ted to s i t  any 
recons t i tu ted  formal promotion examination. This percept ion is  probably 
based on the assumption th a t  middle management would probably nominate 
candidates to s i t  these formal examinations.
A fu r th e r  po in t  to emerge, i s  the group most c r i t i c a l  to any re -  
in t ro d u c t io n  o f  these old type examinations i s  the group whose members 
would be most a f fec ted .  I t  is  speculated tha t  s im i l a r  c r i t i c i s m  would 
be leve l led  a t  any w r i t t e n  examination as there i s  at the cur ren t  method 
o f  oral  board - i t  tends to favour a p a r t i c u la r  group.
In summary i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to ascer ta in  whether there is  a genuine 
desire or not f o r  a r e - in t ro d u c t io n  o f  these old type examinations or i f  the 
response simply ind ica tes a d is s a t i s f a c t io n  with  the cu r ren t  system. My 
own observat ions and discussions suggest th a t  i t  is  a mixture o f  both.
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A Pearson c o r re la t io n  was car r ied  out between quest ions 7 ( i i )  and 
7 ( i i i )  to es tab l ish  i f  any s i g n f i i c a n t  co r re la t io n  ex is ted between the 
responses to these quest ions; i t  did not. This r e s u l t  is  not a l toge the r  
su rp r is ing  as those a t t ra c ted  to examination tend to be those who do 
wel l  in  examinations and th i s  a t t r i b u t e  tends to be r e l a t i v e l y  independent 
o f  age or grade.
In concluding th is  sect ion i t  is  suggested th a t  the a t t i t u d e  of 
superiors to performance appra isa l ,  although one o f  generosi ty  to 
subordinates is  denying the organ isat ion o f  the services of some able 
performers. In other words the p rac t ice  increases the p ro b a b i l i t y  tha t  
an able man w i l l  be selected la te  f o r  promotion or indeed missed.
Promotion Prospects and Se lect ion o f  Promotion Board Candidates
This sect ion w i l l  examine quest ions r e la t in g  to promotion prospect 
and numbers o f  candidates ca l led  annual ly  fo r  a promotion in te rv iew .  
C lear ly  one of the purposes o f  the s t a f f  repor t  is to i d e n t i f y  those 
in d iv idu a ls  worthy o f  promotion, in  other words i t  acts as a f i l t e r .  Some 
would argue th a t  the organ isat ion  should in te rv iew  a l l  those assessed as 
e i t h e r .  F i t te d  or Well F i t te d  f o r  promotion, th i s  would be an almost 
impossible task as wel l  as cos t ly .  To quan t i fy  the problem i t  would mean 
in te rv iew ing  approximately 1000 PTO I l l s  to f i l l  some 20 PTO I I  posts, 
there fo re  a balance must be achieved between the desi re  o f  in d iv id u a ls  
and the requirements o f  the organ isa t ion .  The cur ren t  c i v i l  service 
promotion system has a number o f  features which have been b u i l t  in  to meet 
part-way the desire o f  s t a f f ;  the r i g h t  to appear before a se lec t ion  
board a f te r  a s p e c i f i c  period in a grade fo r  example.
As prev ious ly  mentioned promotion may only be deemed as an e f fe c t i v e  
reward i f  i t  is  perceived as being achievable. I f  i t  is  made too 
d i f f i c u l t  i t  is  u n l i k e ly  to ac t as a mot iva to r ,  against t h i s ,  i f  i t  is  
made re a d i l y  ava i lab le  to everyone, i t  may lose much o f  i t s  value.
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7 . ( i v ) How do you assess your promotion prospect f o r  promotion in  the fu ture?
PTO I I I l l IV
Good 8 10 10
Fair 38 34 31
Don't  know 0 19 23
Poor 45 27 23
Very Poor 9 11 14
7 , (v ) Do you th ink  th a t  the number o f  candidates ca l led  f o r  promotion
board in te rv iew  in r e la t i o n  to the number of vacancies i s :
Far too many 4 14 22
Too many 43 32 27
About r i g h t 42 46 41
Too few 11 8 11
Far too few 0. 1 0
7 . (V i ) How important do you consider i t tha t  a l l  s t a f f  a f t e r  5 years
in  the grade have an automatic r i g h t  to appear before a se lec t ion  board?
Very impor tant 23 27 24
Important 55 40 46
Don't  Know 0 6 7
Unimportant 19 20 20
Very unimportan t  2 7 4
An1 important dimension in any organ isat ion is  the career fa c to r
tha t  is the pos i t ion  in  the h ierarchy th a t  an ind iv id u a l  nay reasonably 
expect to asp ire .  Noting th a t  the r a t i o  o f  numbers in  the three lower 
grades o f  management in ascending order i s ,  6 .4 3 .8 r  1 .3 i t  is
assessed tha t  PTO I I I  is  the average careei' f a c to r .
. Turning to quest ion 7 ( i v )  i t  is  important to note th a t  the 
quest ionnaire  was administered post pub l ica t ion  o f  the Dockyard Study 
repor t  and some four  months p r io r  to the announcement th a t  there is  to be a 
cessation o f  r e f i t t i n g  at Chatham and a rundown a t  Portsmouth, In the wake 
o f  the June 1981 defence statement,  i t  is  there fore  suggested th a t  the
percentage o f  those assessing t h e i r  promotion prospects as e i t h e r  " f a i r "  or 
"good" would probably be somewhat less than 44%. The f a c t  th a t  only 44% 
assess t h e i r  promotion prospects o p t i m i s t i c a l l y  has important ra m i f ica t io n s  
f o r  managerial mot iva t ion .  Is i t  r e a l i s t i c  fo r  the organ isa t ion  to look 
on promotion as a mot iva tor  o f  good performance? As mentioned e a r l i e r  
promotion must be perceived as a t ta in a b le  to s t imu la te  good performance.
Indeed th i s  r e s u l t  is  s u rp r is in g  in view o f  promotion oppo r tun i t ies  
o f  between 1 and 3 per cent per annum mentioned e a r l i e r .
I t  has been custom and p rac t ice  in recent years f o r  ce r ta in  promotion 
boards to be convened annual ly ,  however, in  1980 the PTO I I I  to PTO I I  
board was not convened, th i s  f a c t  may have inf luenced the response to 
quest ion 7( iv ) .  I t  would have been reasonable to assume th a t  those nearing 
r e t i r i n g  age may have assessed t h e i r  chance o f  promotion as low, but a 
Pearson c o r re la t io n  f a i l e d  to es tab l ish  a s i g n i f i c a n t  re la t io n s h ip  between 
age and promotion expectat ion. However, t h i s  might be explained by the fa c t  
th a t  there is  no upper age l i m i t  above which Non- Indus tr ia ls  are not 
considered e l i g i b l e  f o r  promotion. Thus the f a c t  th a t  there is  no s ig n i f i c a iT  
co r re la t io n  between age and promotion expectat ion ind ica tes  th a t  the 
promotion reward is  a useful  m o t iva to r  up to re t i rem ent  age.
Turning to quest ion 7(v) op in ion is  evenly d iv ided between those who 
th ink  th a t  the number o f  candidates ca l led  fo r  in te rv iew  is  about r i g h t  
and those who th ink  too many are ca l le d .  The o f f i c i a l  p o l i c y  is  to c a l l  
approximately three times the number o f  candidates as there are vacancies, 
but th i s  r a t i o  is  normal ly increased to f i v e  to one by successful  appelants 
and those exerc is ing t h e i r  r i g h t  (5 years in the grade) to appear before 
a se lec t ion  board.
I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to e s tab l ish  whether P&T grades are aware o f  the 
candidate to vacancy r a t i o .  From discussions some obviously are and these 
tend to be in d iv id u a ls  who have been before a number of se lec t ion  boards.
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Thus the response to quest ion 7(v) is  probably based on a vague knowledge 
o f  the number o f  candidates ca l led  fo r  in te rv iew .
Question 7(v/) was inser ted to es tab l ish  the support tha t  the 
automatic r i g h t  to appear before apromotion se lec t ion  board a f t e r  5 years in  
a p a r t i c u la r  grade enjoyed a t  Rosyth. The National Chairman of P&T group,
Mr WILL, described th is  r i g h t  as the promotion system's safe ty  va lve.
A respondent commented "over the years I have not iced th a t  men under 
ce r ta in  supervisors get less chance o f  obta in ing a promotion in te rv iew  
than others and there fo re  th i s  r i g h t  provides them w i th  some redress" .
I t  is  s u b je c t i v e ly  assessed th a t  th is  r i g h t  may nuture expectat ions 
th a t  unfavourable s t a f f  reports  can be neut ra l ised  in the conf ines of the 
in te rv iew  room. These expectat ions are sustained by the knowledge th a t  i t  
i s  not uncommon f o r  in d iv id u a ls  exerc is ing th i s  r i g h t  to be selected fo r  
promotion. However, th is  automatic r i g h t  cond i t ion  does h ig h l ig h t  
o rg a n is a t io n a l - in d iv id u a l  c o n f l i c t  because the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  dockyard may 
f i n d  d i f f i c u l t y  in placing him in  a post in the higher grade because of 
local management's doubts about his  a b i l i t y  and there is  l i t t l e  oppor tun i ty  
to have him t rans fe r red .
To the i n d i v id u a l ,  the r i g h t  to appear before a promotion board is  
obv ious ly  perceived as provid ing him with an oppor tun i ty  to demonstrate his 
s u i t a b i l i t y  f o r  promotion which he fee ls  has gone unnot iced by his superiors 
I t  could be argued from an organ isat iona l  standpoint  tha t  th i s  r i g h t ,  which 
is  e f f e c t i v e l y  a promotion system reduces organ isat iona l  e f fec t iveness by 
a f fo rd ing  the oppor tun i ty  to bypass a few less able performers to gain 
nromotion. Against t h i s ,  the automatic r i g h t  is perhaps viewed as a counter 
balance to any fe e l in g  of remoteness created by the bureaucrat ic  nature of 
the organ isa t ion .  I t  is  a matter o f  opinion whether or not organ isat iona l  
e f fect iveness is l i k e l y  to be more than pe rcep t ib ly  a f fec ted  by current 
regu la t ions  governing the promotion system, but in view o f  the support tha t
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t h i s  aspect o f  the system enjoys, i t  would be f o o l i s h  to de le te  the r i g h t  
to appear before a se lec t ion  board. In the event o f  the promotion 
system being devolved, to the two remaining dockyards, ( a f t e r  1984) 
the remoteness fa c to r  w i l l  be removed and consequentia l ly  a reappra isa l 
would be appropr ia te.
The Experience and S e n io r i t y  Dimension
The c i v i l  serv ice has been subject  to c r i t i c i s m  (Garre t t  1980) about 
i t s  ove r - re l iance  on s e n io r i t y  as a p re - re q u is i te  f o r  promotion. Since 
the p u b l ica t io n  o f  the Fulton repo r t  in  1958 there has been a developing 
awareness amongst senior  c i v i l  servants prompted by comments in  var ious 
Parl iamentary Expenditure Committee reports  tha t  a s e n io r i t y  based 
promotion system does l i t t l e  to enhance organ isat iona l  e f fec t iveness .
The concept o f  Buggin's turn was u n t i l  recen t ly  accepted because s e n io r i t y  
tended to be convenient ly  associated w ith  experience. In a sense the 
s e n io r i t y  based promotion system provided the ind iv id u a l  w i th  a measure 
o f  se cu r i t y  associated with  the knowledge tha t  i f  he performed s a t i s f a c t o r i 1, 
he would be su i ta b ly  rewarded w ith  promotion.
Questions r e la t in g  to experience and s e n io r i t y  were inse r ted ,  
p r i n c i p a l l y ,  to es tab l ish  the degree o f  awareness among P&T grades o f  these 
issues. Loosely re la ted  to both o f  these points is  the quest ion o f  
c reat ing s p e c i f i c  promotion e l i g i b i l i t y  windows in  each grade.
7 ( v i i )  A repor t  on the C iv i l  Service in  1958 was c r i t i c a l  o f  the 
f a c t  th a t  se lec t ion  boards f o r  promotion attached too much importance to 
the candidate 's  s e n io r i t y .  How would you assess the present s i tu a t io n ?
PTO I I I I I IV
Great ly  improved 17 4 4
Improved 47 44 40
Don't  know 28 38 50
S l i g h t l y  worse 6 6 6
Much worse 2 8 0
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7 , (v1 i1 )  How much importance do you th in k  promotion boards attach to 
experience when.select ing candidates f o r  promotion.
grade?
PTO I I I I I IV
Great importance 9 11 13
Some importance 61 46 43
Very l i t t l e  importance 21 33 33
None 4 6 3
Don't  know 4 4 9
you th ink  there should be s p e c i f i c zones fo r
is  only e l i g i b l e  fo r  promotion between 3 and
Strongly  agree 11 10 10
Agree 32 27 30
Don't  know 6 3 6
Disagree 40 44 44
Strongly  disagree 11 16 10
Question 7 ( v i i )  was inser ted in  the knowledge th a t  the frame o f  
reference o f  the respondents would probably permit  only a sub jec t ive  
assessment, the size o f  the Don^  t  Know response provided v e r i f i c a t i o n  
o f  t h i s  po in t .  The in te re s t in g  po in t  i s  th a t  aporoximately 50% o f  the 
sample thought th a t  the s i t u a t i o n  had improved.
I t  is  extremely d i f f i c u l t  to ascer ta in  how much weight a re po r t ing  
o f f i c e r  assigns to s e n io r i t y  when assessing his subordinates s u i t a b i l i t y  f o r  
promotion. However, there is  a suggest ion tha t  Non- Industr ia l  Trade 
Union appointed s t a f f  repo r t  sc ru t ineers  who are appointed by loca l 
o f f i c i a l s  from w i th in  the dockyards are more l i k e l y  to query a 'wel l  f i t t e d '  
promotion assessment when awarded to an ind iv id u a l  w ith  only a few years 
s e n io r i t y  than to a more senior  person in the same grade.
A po in t  worth noting is  th a t  the 'D o n ' t  know' response is  inve rse ly  
p ropor t ional  to grade suggest ing perhaps tha t  the more promotion boards an 
ind iv idu a l  has success fu l ly  passed, the more he probably appreciates th a t  
s e n io r i t y  is  not a s i g n i f i c a n t  dete rminant. However, an a l t e rn a t i v e  
explanat ion may be th a t  the more senior  grades are more re lu c ta n t  to 
admit the weight they assign to s e n io r i t y ,  in  other words, p u b l i c ly
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acknowle d ing th a t  m e r i t ,  not s e n io r i t y  should be the c r i t e r i o n ,  but 
p r i v a t e l y  p lac ing more emphasis on s e n io r i t y  because o f  associa t ion with  
the t r a d i t i o n a l l y  s e n io r i t y  o r ien ta ted  promotion system.
Moving on to explore the experience dimension i t  has already been 
suggested th a t  there is  a tendency to consider experience and s e n io r i t y  as 
quasi synonymous dimensions. Before attempting to analyse the response to 
quest ion 7 ( v i i i )  i t  i s  necessary to  def ine what i s  meant by experience. 
Promotion boards def ine i t  as Breadth o f  knowledge, se lec t ion  boards may 
award candidates up to 15% o f  t o ta l  marks fo r  t h i s  dimension. About 75% 
o f  the sample thought th a t  'some or very l i t t l e  importance' is  attached to 
experience. This accords roughly with  the percentage o f  marks a l loca ted  by 
the se lec t ion  board. The PTO I I  group over-est imated the marks a l loca ted  fo r  
t h i s  a t t r i b u t e .  From an organ isa t iona l  view po in t  i t  is  important th a t  only  
experienced and able s t a f f  are promoted.
A way open to the dockyard to ensure tha t  promotees have a minimum 
experience and also th a t  very senior  s t a f f  are not promoted, i t  to es tab l ish  
s p e c i f i c  zones f o r  promotion. Question 7 . ( i x )  shows th a t  t h i s  concept v/as 
a t t r a c t i v e  to less than 40% o f  respondents and th a t  a high degree of 
unanimity between the grades was evident on th is  p o in t .  However, a number of 
ampl i fy ing  comments were received to the e f f e c t  th a t  there should be a 
minimum period o f  serv ice in  each grade as a p re - re q u is i te  f o r  appearing 
before a promotion board.
I t  is  acknowledged th a t  the concept o f  promotion zones would create 
problems o f  managerial obsolescence unless prov is ion was made f o r  some so r t  
o f  phased re t i rement  scheme fo r  over-zoned s t a f f .  S ig n i f i c a n t  numbers of 
over-zoned s t a f f  would undoubtedly create Non- Industr ia l  mot iva t ion  and 
job s a t i s fa c t i o n  problems fo r  the o rgan isa t ion .  The more chal lenging jobs 
would have to be reserved f o r  those in-zone Non- Indus tr ia ls  to te s t  t h e i r
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s k i l l s .  Cer ta in bene f i ts  would accrue to the dockyard as the more 
important and key pos i t ions  would be f i l l e d  with s t a f f  who would be 
conscious o f  a strong l i n k  between performance and reward.
On the other hand the dockyard would have a group o f  managers 
who would be 'coast ing* to pension w ith  l i t t l e  incen t ive  to keep abreast 
o f  l a t e s t  techniques and prac t ices .  The size o f  t h i s  problem would be 
re la ted  to the r a t i o  o f  in-zone to over-zoned managers. The advantages 
associated w i th  and the arguments f o r  and against  promotion zones have been 
examined and i t  i s  concluded th a t  although there would be m er i t  in  having 
a minimum time requirement in  each grade, i t  would not be in  the 
o rgan isa t ion 's  i n t e r e s t  to have an upper l i m i t .  Support f o r  t h i s  view may 
be in fe r re d  from the response to quest ion 7 . ( i v )  which shows th a t  promotion 
expectat ions do not s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d imin ish with  age. This suggests th a t  the 
dockyard should be able to re ly  on the promotion reward to motivate s t a f f  to 
w i t h in  a few years o f  re t i rem en t  age.
Manager i a l  Au th o r i t y
The inc lus ion  o f  quest ions r e la t in g  to managerial a u th o r i t y  in t h i s  
chapter,  is  j u s t i f i e d ,  we be l ieve ,  on the grounds th a t  a u th o r i t y  and 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  may be cor re la ted  loosely  w ith  management grade which in 
tu rn  is  re la ted  to promotion. The desi re  to seek promotion is  in f luenced 
by a complex in te r a c t io n  o f  several dimensions o f  which pay s tatus and 
enhanced a u th o r i t y  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  are judged to be important.  Thus 
expectat ion o f  greater  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  may provide an inducement to gain 
promotion. An analys is  o f quest ions re la t in g  to a u th o r i t y  should enable us 
to gain an idea o f  the N o n - In d u s t r ia l 's  percept ion of his a u th o r i t y  and 
th a t  o f  other grades. From th i s  we hope to be able to  deduce the
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co n t r ib u t io n  th a t  these two dimensions make to the a t t rac t iveness  or 
the valency o f  the promotion reward. In other  words what c o n t r ib u t io n  
does the (P'~>0)V term, fo r  a u th o r i t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  make to the 
o ve ra l l  ( P-f 0 )V term from our model.
We have mentioned both r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and a u th o r i t y  and ra ther  
impl ied tha t  these two dimensions are synonymous, t h i s  is  not necessar i ly  
co r re c t ,  a person can have a l o t  o f  a u th o r i t y  w i thou t  much r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  
However, w i th in  the scope o f  the dockyard i t  is  reasonable to assume 
f o r  the m a jo r i ty  o f  N on - Indus t r ia ls ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o r re la t io n  ex is ts  
between a u th o r i t y  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  Thus inferences about a u th o r i t y  may 
be assumed to apply to r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .
7 . ( x )  How would you describe the degree o f  a u th o r i t y  you have as a 
manager?
PTO I I I I I IV
A great deal 2 0 3
Quite a b i t 36 21 17
Very l i t t l e 57 60 46
Occasional 4 11 10
None 0 9 24
7 . ( x i )  a. Do you th in k  th a t  there has been a dec l ine  in  management 
a u th o r i t y  over the past 10 years in the dockyard?
Very considerable 43 42 30
Consi derable 40 50 44
A 1i t t l e 13 8 19
None 4 0 2
Don' t  Know 0 0 4
b . I f  yes - what t i e r  o f  management do you th in k  has l o s t  
most au tho r i ty?
Senior management 11 14 10
Middle management 68 38 39
Lower management 21 48 50
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7 . ( x i i )  There are e igh t  t i e r s  o f  management in  the Dockyard’ s 
management s t ru c tu re .  Do you regard th i s  as
PTO I I I I I IV
Far too many 19 17 14
Too many 64 57 59
About r i g h t 17 27 25
Too few 0 0 1
Far too few 0 0 1
7 . ( x i i i )  Do you th in k  the re - in t ro d u c t io n  o f  the post o f  Chargeman, as 
an in d u s t r i a l  grade, in the dockyard would be
Very good decis ion 11 16 12
Good decis ion 38 29 15
Don't  know 4 10 14
Bad decis ion 32 33 38
Very bad decis ion 15 12 21
Examining quest ion 7(x) shows a considerable divergence o f  op in ion 
between PTO I l s  and other  two grades on the quest ion a u th o r i t y .  The 
fa c t  th a t  55% o f  respondents assessed t h e i r  a u th o r i t y  as 'very  l i t t l e '  has 
impor tant connotat ions f o r  the dockyard, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  view o f  the 
importance I'espondents assigned to 'o p po r tun i ty  f o r  resoons ib i1i t y ' as a 
p re - re q u is i te  f o r  job s a t i s f a c t i o n .  (See Q. 2 Appendix 2 ) .  This r e s u l t  
does suggest th a t  Non- Industr ia l  expectat ions in t h i s  area are l i k e l y  to 
mean tha t  the (P-4' o)V term f o r  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and a u th o r i t y  is  l i k e l y  to be 
low. We have already mentioned th a t  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and a u th o r i t y  are not 
necessar i ly  synonymous and to support th is  po in t  some respondents commented 
th a t  they had considerable r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  but in  t h e i r  op in ion ,  they did not 
have a commensurate degree o f  a u th o r i t y .
A number o f comments were received to the e f f e c t  th a t  the po s i t io n  
o f  Non- Industr ia ls  in  j u n io r  l i n e  management jobs was being sys tem a t ica l ly  
undermined by the a t t i t u d e  adopted by senior  management; p a r t i c u la r  
mention was made o f  the problem of enforc ing d i s c i p l i n e  amongst In d u s t r ia l  
grades. This group be l ieve th a t  they are in  a no-win s i t u a t i o n  when they
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t r y  and enforce re g u la t io ns .  Senior management is  perceived as making every 
endeavour to placate In d u s t r ia l  grades. I t  is  perhaps f a i r  to po in t  out th a t  
in  many cases, d i s c i p l i n e  charges brought against In d u s t r ia l s  are dismissed 
because ju n io r  l i n e  managers had f a i l e d  to fo l lo w  the co r rec t  procedures.
This serves simply to re in fo rce  t h e i r  view th a t  the innumerable ru les and 
regu la t ions  have been s t ruc tu red  to make l i f e  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the Non- 
Indus t r i  a l .
Question 7 ( x i )  shows th a t  there i s  almost unanimous agreement th a t  
there has been a dec l ine  in management a u th o r i t y  over the past ten years. 
There is  some disagreement about the degree and which Non- Industr ia l  grade 
has l o s t  most. The tenor o f  comments which accompanied th i s  quest ion 
placed the blame fo r  the dec l ine o f  j u n io r  l in e  managers' a u th o r i t y  f i r m l y  
a t  the door o f  senior management. Comments such as abdicat ion o f  managerial 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  re luctance to deal w ith  Trade Union in t rans igence ,  f a i l u r e  
o f  senior managers to support j u n io r  l i n e  managers in  t h e i r  deal ings w ith  
shop stewards and c r i t i c i s m  about apparent lack o f  commitment to Rosyth 
dockyard by some senior  managers serve to i l l u s t r a t e  the depth o f  fe e l in g  
on th i s  issue. The r e l a t i v e l y  high turnover o f  senior managers was c i ted  
as being detr imenta l  to the long term i n t e r e s t  o f the dockyard.
A fe e l in g  ex is ts  amongst some P&T grades th a t  Rosyth dockyard is  
managed to a short  horizon time frame, t h i s  po in t  emerged from discussions 
and comments received. The r e l a t i v e l y  high turnover o f  senior  managers 
c e r t a i n l y  creates the impression th a t  some decisions p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  the 
f i e l d  o f  In d u s t r ia l  Relations are based on expediency ra the r  than in  the 
long term in t e r e s t  o f  the dockyard. Although i t  should be pointed out 
th a t  a determined e f f o r t  has been made to ensure th a t  management's terms 
f o r  s e t t l i n g  disputes must take f u l l  account o f  the long term in te r e s t .
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A number o f PTO I l s  commented th a t  the dec l ine in  managerial 
a u th o r i t y  was a t t r i b u te d  to excessive in te r fe rence  by outs ide a u th o r i t i e s  
in  p a r t i c u la r  the CED department. There is  an awareness p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t 
PTO I I  grade th a t  pressure is  sometimes exerted on senior  management 
to s e t t l e  i n d u s t r i a l  d isputes, on terms not always in  the dockyard's 
long term in t e r e s t ,  so th a t  work on the Po lar is  de te r ren t  is  not 
i n te r ru p te d .
F in a l l y  PTO I l s  consider th a t  middle management's a u th o r i t y  has 
decl ined most whereas PTO I l l s  and IVs consider lower management's 
a u th o r i t y  has decl ined the most, in other  words each group perceive 
t h e i r  group's a u th o r i t y  having decl ined the most,
A fea ture  normal ly associated w i th  a bureaucrat ic  o rgan isa t ion  
is  an abundance o f  t i e r s  o f  management. In Rosyth dockyard there are 
e ig h t ,  although there are seldom more than seven in  any chain. There i s  a 
w ide ly  held view among Non In d u s t r ia l s  th a t  there are too many t i e r s  o f  
management in  the dockyard, the response to quest ion 7 ( x i i )  supports 
th i s  view. The PTO I I I  and IV grades are marg ina l ly  less c r i t i c a l  o f  the 
cur ren t  h ie ra rch ica l  s t ru c tu re  than the PTO I I  grade. Although there is  
agreement th a t  there are too many, there is  l i t t l e  agreement concerning 
which and how many t i e r s  should be abol ished, a preference was stated fo r  
PTO I and PTO I I I  grades w ith  PPTO grade a close t h i r d .  Based on a r a t i o  
o f  PTO I l l s  to PTO IVs o f  1:1 in  the Technical supervisory r o le ,  suggests 
th a t  one o f  these grades should be abol ished and based on our survey, the 
suggestion i s  PTO I I I .  However, the a b o l i t i o n  o f  say the PTO I I I  grade 
would have serious im p l ica t ions  fo r  promotion prospects. Any reduct ion in 
the number o f  t i e r s  o f  management p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t j u n i o r  leve l would 
obviously a f f e c t  oppo r tun i t ies  fo r  promotion and consequently the 
mot iva t iona l  value o f  the promotion reward. Thus the des ire  by the 
organ isa t ion  to reduce the number o f  t i e r s  o f  management must be weighed 
against the de le te r ious  e f f e c t  o f  reduced promotion prospects f o r  s t a f f .
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This issue v/as mentioned b r i e f l y  in  Chapter 4.
To abol ish one or even two t i e r s  o f  management by e d ic t  in  the 
dockyard might appear r e l a t i v e l y  simple, but i t  would be extremely 
d i f f i c u l t  to execute in  p rac t ice  because o f  the C iv i l  Service 
u n i f ie d  grading s t ru c tu re .  I t  would, f o r  example, make i t  v i r t u a l l y  
impossible to operate the common C iv i l  Service system o f  career planning 
and promotion in the dockyard. This po in t  serves to i l l u s t r a t e  some of 
the problems a r is in g  from applying a r i g i d  buraeucrat ic  management system, 
designed f o r  admin is te r ing the func t ion  o f  government, to a jobbing 
indus t ry .  The u n sa t is fa c to ry  s ta te  of the management system is  f u r th e r  
underl ined by the f a c t  th a t  60% o f  PTO I l l s  and IVs d i r e c t l y  supervise two 
or less (Question 37 Appendix 1). A common theme in  many o f  the ampli fy ing  
remarks was c r i t i c i s m  o f  the p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  Non- Industr ia l  posts over the 
past 20 years. Indeed one can de tect  a fe e l in g  among some Non- Indus tr ia ls  
th a t  they would welcome a reduct ion in  the number o f  posts provided i t  
did not d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  them.
One way th a t  a reduct ion in  the number of t i e r s  of management could be 
achieved would be to abol ish the lowest t i e r  o f  management, the PTO IV (T/5) 
grade. This would also have the e f f e c t  o f  reducing the number o f  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  grades, f o r  example at Rosyth; t h i s  would reduce the Non- 
In d u s t r ia l s  by approximately 300, The basic work group in the dockyard 
is  the workgang, th i s  consis ts  o f  between 6 to 12 In d u s t r i a l s ,  The 
managerial grade who d i r e c t l y  supervises th i s  group is  the PTO IV 
(Technical superv iso r ) .  However, the workgang u n t i l  the 1960s was 
supervised by an In d u s t r ia l  grade known as a chargehand. I t  is  considered 
by some Non- Indus tr ia ls  th a t  a re tu rn  to th a t  system would counter the 
in f luence  o f  the workgang's shop steward. To es tab l ish  the support th a t  
such a rad ica l  move might enjoy we need to examine the quest ion 7 ( x i i i ) .
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Opinion amongst. PTC I l s  and I l l s  i s  evenly d iv ided regarding the 
re - in t ro d u c t io n  o f  the post o f  chargeman as an In d u s t r ia l  grade. As 
an t ic ipa ted  the idea f inds  l i t t l e  favour among PTO IVs, t h i s  group would 
be d i r e c t l y  a ffected by the re - in t ro d u c t io n  o f  t h i s  post.  Obviously 
PTO IV respondents were prompted to consider t h e i r  own fu tu re  by th is  
quest ion, would they be reverted to In d u s t r ia l  status or might t h e i r  grade 
be amalgamated with  the PTO I I I  grade? This question obviously created 
uncertai  nty.
The demise of substan t ia l  numbers o f  PTO IVs to In d u s t r ia l  s ta tus would 
be an emotive issue, f o r  the in d iv id u a ls  involved i t  would mean a loss o f  
s ta tus ,  t h e i r  percept ion of t h e i r  standing in  the community would also be 
a f fec ted .  One respondent mentioned o f  loss of c r e d i t a b i1i t y  in  the eyes of 
the workforce. However, a fev/ respondents pointed out th a t  there would be 
considerable f i n a n c ia l  advantages, an In d u s t r ia l  chargeman would be 
e l i g i b l e  to p a r t i c ip a te  in the DES and as i t  is  an t ic ipa ted  tha t  they would 
also receive some s o r t  o f  charge allowance, the consensus was th a t  i t  would' 
be very a t t r a c t i v e  f i n a n c i a l l y .
Although the resu r rec t ion  o f  the chargehand's post has ce r ta in  
a t t r a c t io n s  with respect to countering shop steward in f lu e n ce ,  i t  would do 
nothing to s im p l i f y  the curren t  management s t ruc tu re .
As the ob jec t ive  is  to improve organ isat iona l  e f fec t iveness ,  i t  i s  
h igh ly  improbable th a t  t h i s  could be achieved with  a group o f  key ind iv id u a ls  
s tr ipped of t h e i r  ‘ white c o l l a r '  s ta tus . F in a l l y  the survey shows th a t  
support fo r  re - in t ro d u c t io n  o f  the chargehand does not warrant the organ isat ion  
exp lor ing th i s  op t ion ,  i t  would be detr imental  to both the organ isat ion and 
the i n d i v i d u a l .
The Trade Union Dimension
No discussion r e la t in g  to managerial a u th o r i t y  in  the workplace would • 
be complete w ithout  reference to the shop steward's pos i t ion .  Many features
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o f  modern day soc ie ty  in  p a r t i c u la r  greater  ind iv idu a l  se l f - con f idence ,  
emphasis on r ig h t s  ra the r  than o b l ig a t io n s  and encouragement to quest ion 
and c r i t i c i s e  have been re f le c te d  in a progressive increase in  the 
assert iveness o f  shop stewards. In p a ra l le l  w ith  t h i s  trend there has 
been a d r i f t  o f  p o l i c y  in  many trade unions towards devolving power to the 
shop f l o o r .  This s h i f t  in  power from the f u l l  t ime trade union o f f i c i a l  
res id ing  in  the loca l  t rade union headquarters has resu l ted  in  senior 
management having to negot ia te  w i th  a d i f f e r e n t  type o f  trade union 
represen ta t ive .  Whereas the f u l l - t i m e  o f f i c i a l  was remote from the shop 
f l o o r  the shop steward is  l i k e l y  to be a member o f  a workgang and 
there fore  in  d i r e c t  contact w ith  j u n io r  l i n e  management. In d ispute s i t u a t i o n  
i t  is  rare fo r  j u n io r  l i n e  management grades to p a r t i c ip a te  in  nego t ia t ions .
I t  i s  normal p rac t ice  fo r  these to be conducted between senior management 
or the Personnel department, the shop stewards d i r e c t l y  involved and the 
appropr ia te  senior shop stewards. This p rac t ice  tends to leave j u n io r  
l i n e  managers iso la ted .
7 , (x iv ) .  What do you th in k  greater  Trade Union p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in
the day to day business o f  the Dockyard w i l l  mean to you as a manager?
PTO 11 I I I IV
More Au th o r i t y 2 0 2
S l i g h t l y  more a u th o r i t y 2 4 3
No change 19 27 35
Less A u th o r i t y 64 52 50
Much Less A u th o r i t y 13 16 10
The response to quest ion 7 (x iv )  should be considered against  the 
backcloth o f  the shop stewards enhanced ro le  and the concomitant apparent 
dec l ine in  lower l i n e  management's a u th o r i t y ,  a po in t  which is  supported 
by the response to quest ion 7 . ( x i ) .  Another development which ind ica tes  
greater  trade union p a r t i c ip a t i o n  concerns an EEC i n i t i a t i v e  which suggests 
th a t  workers should be o f fe red  s ta tu to ry  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  in  decis ions made by 
a l l ,  but the smal lest  f i rm s .  Adoption of t h i s  suggest ion would undoubtedly
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be seen by j u n io r  l i n e  managers as a fu r th e r  t r a n s fe r  o f  a u th o r i t y  away 
from lower management and consequent degradat ion o f  t h e i r  p o s i t io n .
Examining lower management percept ion o f  the cu r ren t  s i t u a t i o n ,  we 
have an in te re s t in g  response to quest ion 7 . ( x i v )  although the three grades 
consider th a t  greater  trade union p a r t i c ip a t i o n  w i l l  mean a decrease in 
managerial a u th o r i t y ,  the survey shows th a t  f i r s t  leve l supervisors (PTO IV) 
see th is  as less o f  a problem than do more senior grades. There is  a 
fash ionable view among management th a t  increased trade union p a r t i c ip a t i o n  
means less managerial a u th o r i t y .
In Rosyth Dockyard trade union p a r t i c ip a t i o n  takes a number o f  
d i f f e r e n t  fo rms, there are j o i n t  management committees monitor ing overt ime, 
product ion and general condi t ions o f  serv ice. The cur ren t  focus o f  trade 
union p a r t i c ip a t i o n  involves the DES with  i t s  32 f u l l  t ime trade union 
representa t ives o f  senior  shop steward s ta tus .  But probably the area where 
trade union p a r t i c ip a t i o n  makes the greatest impact in  the day to day 
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the dockyard, centres on theHealth and Safety a t Work 
l e g i s l a t i o n  and the s ix  f u l l  t ime trade union representa t ives employed in  th i s  
f i e l d .  These f u l l  time representa t ives are supported by par t  time 
representa t ives in the various trade centres throughout the dockyard.
The perceived a u th o r i t y  o f  the safe ty  representa t ives is  f re q u en t ly  
c r i t i c i s e d  by Non- Indus tr ia ls  in  j u n io r  l i n e  management pos i t ions .  The 
a p p l i ca t io n  o f  Health and Safety standards in  a dockyard, must by the nature 
o f  the work be a combination o f  experience, judgement and in t e r p r e ta t io n  o f  
regu la t ions .  The In d u s t r ia l  workforce is  not slow on occasion to use the 
Health and Safety dimension to usurp the a u th o r i t y  o f  management in  general 
and lower management in p a r t i c u la r .  Because o f  the judgemental aspect o f  
what is  or is  not acceptable, m idd le /sen io r  management are placed in  an 
awkward pos i t ion .  They must be seen to be act ing respons ib ly  and because 
from t h e i r  remoter po s i t io n  they are in  a be t te r  pos i t ion  to make a more 
ob jec t ive  assessment than the immediate superv isor ,  t h e i r  assessment tends
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to co incide w ith  th a t  o f  the f u l l  t ime sa fe ty  re p re se n ta t ive .  The net
r e s u l t  is  tha t  lower management fee l  l e t  down. Lower management are in  
/
an unenviable p o s i t io n ,  they are exhorted by t h e i r  super iors  to mainta in  
progress w h i l s t  s imul taneously  they are harr ied  by a l l i a n c e  o f  senior  
management and trade u n io n is t  to s a t i s f y  Health and Safety  requirement.
I t  is  argued th a t  i t  is  these s i tu a t i o n a l  fac to rs  which most in f luence  
the views o f  respondents in  assessing the e f f e c t  o f  g rea ter  trade union 
p a r t i c ip a t i o n  on t h e i r  a u th o r i t y .  Al though f i r s t  l i n e  superv isors do not 
fea r  more p a r t i c ip a t i o n  qu i te  as much as t h e i r  super io rs ,  nevertheless the 
survey does show th a t  f u r t h e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  is  perceived as a d im inu t ion  o f  
managerial a u th o r i t y  by the m a jo r i t y  o f  respondents.
I t  would be t o t a l l y  u n r e a l i s t i c  f o r  management to attempt to t r y  and 
r o l l  back the inexorable advance o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Management must endeavour 
to manipulate the a sp i ra t io n s  o f  In d u s t r i a l s  to encourage genuine co-operat ion 
and develop a c l imate  conducive to the abandonment o f  some o f  the more 
r e s t r i c t i v e  work p ra c t ices .  The a tta inment o f  such ob jec t ives  w i l l  undoubtedly 
mean a less a u to c ra t ic  and s t ruc tu red  s ty le  o f  management, but t h i s  need not 
necessar i ly  mean a decrease in the a u th o r i t y  o f  managers.
SUMMARY
Before moving on to explore and develop an a l t e rn a t i v e  promotion system, 
the main points to emerge from our analys is  o f  the substant ive  issues r e la t in g  
to promotion and managerial a u th o r i t y  are summarised below:
a. Non- Indus tr ia ls  a t Rosyth Dockyard consider th a t  each dockyard 
should have greater  contro l  over the se lec t ion  o f  s t a f f  f o r  promotion.
b. There is  a general b e l i e f  tha t  s e n io r i t y  is  s t i l l  a s ig n i f i ca n t ,  
moderating fa c to r  in  the se lec t ion  o f  s t a f f  f o r  promotion.
■c. The automatic r i g h t  to appear before a promotion se lec t ion  board 
is  considered a valued r i g h t .
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d. A strong b e l i e f  ex is ts  among Non-Industr ia l  grades at Rosyth 
th a t  managerial a u th o r i t y  has declined over the past 10 years.
e. There is  an awareness among PTO I I ,  I I I ,  and IV grades th a t  there 
are too many t i e r s  o f  management in  the dockyard's h ie ra rch ica l  
s t ruc tu re  although there is  no general consensus about which t i e r /  
t i e r s  should be abol ished.
f .  Greater trade union p a r t i c ip a t i o n  in  the running o f  the dockyard 
is  perceived as a th re a t  to management's a u th o r i t y .
These points are i n d i c a t i v e  and a man ifes ta t ion  o f  ce r ta in  
organ isa t iona l  weaknesses namely, perceived remoteness o f  senior management 
by j u n io r  employees, an over dependency on bureaucracy and a re luctance to 
devolve managerial a u th o r i t y  coupled w i th  an ascendancy o f  trade union power 
These c h a ra c te r i s t i c s  are not conducive to the s t im u la t io n  and development 
o f  innovat ive management behaviour which is  important to the e f fe c t i v e  
performance o f  a jobbing indus t ry .  Thus in order f o r  any a l t e rn a t i v e  
promotion system to create impact an attempt must be made to co r rec t  some 
o f  the more d e b i l i t a t i n g  a f fe c ts  emanating from these weaknesses. This w i l l  
be d i f f i c u l t .  For example, one way to remove remoteness and increase 
a u th o r i t y  might be to reduce the number of t i e r s  o f  management and managers, 
but th i s  would g re a t ly  reduce promotion o p po r tu n i t ie s .  A reduct ion in  the 
number o f  promotion oppo r tun i t ies  would in e v i t a b ly  dimin ish the value o f  
the promotion reward to the organ isa t ion .
However, we shal l  move on to examine an a l t e rn a t i v e  promotion system 
in  the knowledge th a t  l i t t l e  can or is  l i k e l y  to be done to co r rec t  these 
weaknesses in  the shor t  term. But nevertheless i t  is  considered th a t  by 
strengthening the performance promotion reward l i n k  a c o n t r ib u t io n  would 
be made to o rgan isa t iona l  e f fec t iveness .
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TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM OF PROMOTION
I ntroduct ion
Ar is ing  from our e a r l i e r  examination o f  the C iv i l  Service promotion 
system, as operated in  Naval dockyards two i n te r re la te d  weaknesses were 
i d e n t i f i e d .  These were, f i r s t l y  the tenuousness o f  the l i n k  between the 
promotion reward and performance a t  the workplace and secondly, the lack 
o f  d isc r im ina t ion  in s t a f f  repo r t ing .  I m p l i c i t  in our c r i t i c i s m  of the 
C iv i l  Service promotion system, in  Chapter 4, is  th a t  i t  has a propensi ty  
to encourage m ed iocr i ty .  This perspect ive is  o f  course an over­
s im p l i f i c a t i o n  of the issue. But the weaknesses we have i d e n t i f i e d  in 
the promotion process may pre jud ice attempts to improve the mot iva t ion  o f  
j u n io r  Non-Industr ia l  grades.
This sect ion w i l l  be concerned with  developing an a l t e rn a t i v e  
promotion process which w i l l  strengthen the l i n k  between the promotion 
reward and performance. We w i l l  s t a r t  by surveying fac to rs  re levant  
to any promotion system and then move on to examine the in te ra c t io n  
between motiva t ion and the promotion reward using the Expectancy model 
developed in Chapter 1. The case fo r  a dockyard based promotion system 
w i l l  be examined and p r in c ip le s  establ ished f o r  a proposed a l t e rn a t i v e  
promotion process. In the f i n a l  sect ion we shal l  describe the 
operation o f  the proposed a l t e rn a t i v e  system.
The promotion process which we shal l  o f f e r ,  as an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  
has been s t ruc tu red  to take account o f  the preferences of the P & T 
grades as revealed by the survey. A system based on the preferences 
of Non- Industr ia ls  is  more l i k e l y  to promote behaviour favourably  to the 
aims o f  dockyard management than a system which has been a r b i t r a r i l y
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introduced w ithout  cognizance o f  peoples’ views.
Factors Relevant to an A l te rn a t iv e  Promotion System
In the C iv i l  Service promotion is  the p r in c ip a l  reward f o r  m er i t .
I t  o f fe rs  c i v i l  servants the promise o f  fu tu re  rewards in re tu rn  f o r  
present e f f o r t s .  However, a necessary p re - re q u is i te  f o r  the promotion 
reward to s t imu la te  e f f o r t  is  th a t  i t s  a v a i l a b i l i t y  should be perceived 
c l e a r l y ,  in other words people must have reasonable expectat ion of 
promotion. In any organ isa t ion  oppor tun i t ies  f o r  promotion are a func t ion  
o f  organ isat ion s ize ,  s t a f f  tu rnover ,  number o f  managers, number o f  t i e r s  
o f  management and whether the o rgan isa t ion  is  expanding, steady s ta te  
or con t rac t ing .
Relat ing these fa c to rs  to the dockyard as an o rgan isa t ion ,  on the 
one hand we have a large undertaking with  a high r a t i o  o f "white' to 'b lue '  
c o l l a r  worker and a long management chain and on the other  we have lo\/ 
s t a f f  tu rnover and a con t rac t ing  organ isa t ion .  I t  i s  these l a s t  two 
fa c to rs  which la rg e ly  determine promotion oppo r tun i t ies  in  an organ isa t ion
Relat ing these fa c to rs  to the dockyards we have low s t a f f  tu rnover ,  
a f a c t  c le a r l y  i l l u s t r a t e d  by the response to quest ion number (-^0 ) from 
the quest ionnaire . In a d d i t io n ,  the pro jected rundown o f  the dockyard 
serv ice w i l l  reduce promotion o p p o r tu n i t ie s ,  at leas t  in  the shor t  term. 
Another fa c to r  which could f u r t h e r  reduce promotion o p po r tun i t ies  concerns 
the number o f  t i e r s  o f  management in the dockyard's s t ru c tu re .  In 
Chapter 3 we were c r i t i c a l  of  the length of the management chain and 
indeed the survey showed (quest ion 7 . x i i )  th a t  the P & T group themselves 
were conscious th a t  there were too many t i e r s  o f  management at Rosyth 
Dockyard. To complete th i s  ana lys is ,  the inference from the response 
to quest ions r e la t in g  to a u th o r i t y  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  suggests th a t  the 
to ta l  Non- Industr ia l  popula t ion at Rosyth Dockyard is  considered by the 
P & T group to be too large.
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This b r i e f  analys is  would ind ica te  th a t  i r re s p e c t i v e  o f  what act ion 
,is l i k e l y  to be taken in  the fu tu re ,  save fo r  a rapid expansion o f  the 
dockyard serv ice ,  promotion prospects f o r  P & T grades working in 
dockyards are l i k e l y  to dec l ine .  I f  promotion prospects are perceived to 
have decl ined s i g n i f i c a n t l y  by s t a f f ,  then th i s  w i l l  d imin ish i t s  value 
as a motiva to r  of good performance. I f  promotion oppo r tun i t ies  decl ine 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from 3% per annum per grade then t h e i r  value as a meaning­
fu l  reward would be debatable.
Recent discussions with  the Deputy Personnel Manager a t  Rosyth 
revealed th a t  to maintain a populat ion o f  approximately 30 PTO Is i t  
would be necessary to promote 3 PTO I l s  per year from a populat ion o f  
130. Assuming th a t  Rosyth's requirement is  representa t ive  o f  dockyard 
needs th i s  provides a promotion fa c to r  o f  s l i g h t l y  less than 2.5% per 
annum fo r  the PTO I I  grade. Although t h i s  f i g u re  is  less than 3%, i t  
is  considered tha t  promotion is  s t i l l  a meaningful reward fo r  PTO I l s .
Theoret ica l  Considerat ions
We have already ind icated th a t  a p ra c t ica l  promotion process consists  
o f two d i s t i n c t  phases.
a. Performance assessment o f  candidates.
b. Select ion of candidates f o r  promotion.
With the aid o f  the Expectancy model set out in Chapter 1 we w i l l  
analyse the two phases o f  the promotion process to enable us to propose 
standards fo r  s t a f f  repor t ing  and determine an appropr ia te  method fo r  
se lec t ing  s t a f f  f o r  promotion. Our th e o re t ica l  expression fo r  mot iva t ion  
i s :
%E X ]^ (P  0) ( v T
The second term o f  the expression (P-0){V) may be re w r i t te n  as 
S ta f f  Report Promotion 
fo l lows (P Q){V) + (P ^  0) (V) .
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Figure 7.1 Model o f  an A l te rn a t iv e  Promotion System
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Thus w i th in  the frame o f  reference o f  the promotion process we have 
two outcomes f o r  good performance, rewards emanating from good s t a f f  
reports  and promotion. In order th a t  each term may make a p o s i t i v e  
co n t r ib u t io n  to mot iva t ion  the outcomes (V) must be des ired. Assuming 
th a t  promotion is  a desired outcome, i t  should be the reward f o r  a 
series o f  good s t a f f  repor ts .  Thus our p ropos i t ion  i s  th a t  there should 
be a strong l i n k  between a series of good s t a f f  repor ts  and the promotion 
reward. To achieve t h i s ,  s t a f f  repor ts  must r e f l e c t  accurate ly  the 
performance o f  in d iv id u a ls  and secondly promotion must be based on 
performance a t  the workplace ra the r  than in  the conf ines o f  the in te rv iew  
room.
The Case f o r  a Dockyard Based Promotion System
We shal l  move on to develop a model f o r  an a l t e r n a t i v e  promotion 
system drawing on the considerat ions emanating from our th e o re t ica l  
analys is  o f  the promotion process.. To a s s is t  in  the development o f  an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  system a model o f  a proposed system is  set out a t Figure 7.1. 
This model is  a d e r iv a t i v e  o f  the model (Figure 4.1) shown at Chapter 4. 
From th i s  model we w i l l  go on to formulate a proposed system o f  
promotion which we bel ieve would be more attuned to the needs o f  Naval 
dockyards. The a l t e rn a t i v e  system, is  designed to e l im ina te  the major 
weaknesses i d e n t i f i e d  in  the cu r ren t  system.
F i r s t l y ,  i t  would meet the desires o f  the P & T group at Rosyth who 
showed a strong preference f o r  the management a t  each dockyard having 
g reater  contro l  over the se lec t ion  o f  s t a f f  f o r  promotion. Devolving 
the promotion process to each dockyard would reduce the degree o f  remote­
ness which is  a fea ture  o f  the present system. I t  is  speculated th a t  
th is  in turn would lessen the importance attached to the automatic r i g h t  
to appear before a promotion se lec t ion  board a f t e r  having served f i v e  years 
in a p a r t i c u la r  grade.
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Secondly, i t  would avoid dockyard management being landed w ith  an 
in d iv idu a l  who has been promoted, but in  whom they have l i t t l e  
confidence. This s i t u a t i o n  can a r ise  when a person exerc is ing  t h e i r  
r i g h t  to a promotion in te rv iew ' is  selected f o r  promotion, a not 
uncommon event.
T h i rd ly ,  i t  would provide f l e x i b i l i t y ,  pe rm i t t ing  local management 
to se lec t  the r i g h t  number o f  people f o r  promotion o f  the r i g h t  
d is c ip l in e s  to match actual needs. Current ly  i t  is  not uncommon fo r  there 
to  be an overbearing o f  s t a f f  in  one d is c ip l i n e  w ith  an underbearing in  
another. This necessi tates local management promoting s t a f f  on a 
temporary basis to cover the s h o r t f a l l .
Four th ly ,  and perhaps most im po r tan t ly ,  i t  strengthens the l i n k  
between performance in  the workplace and the promotion reward. Although 
we would advocate the re ten t ion  o f  the formal se lec t ion  board i t s  
members would be able to draw on f i r s t  hand knowledge o f  the candidates 
to a ss is t  them in deciding who to se lec t  f o r  promotion.
The concept o f  in t roduc ing  a dockyard based promotion system has 
been discussed with  senior management a t  Rosyth, Indeed Rosyth dockyard 
is  c u r re n t ly  endeavouring to gain greater  contro l  over the se lec t ion  o f  
candidates f o r  promotion. A short  l i s t  o f  favoured candidates is  
compiled l o c a l l y  and forwarded to the se lec t ion  boards. However, Rosyth's 
attempt to l i n k  the promotion reward more c lose ly  to performance in  the 
workplace has not been e n th u s ia s t i c a l l y  received by Headquarters. In 
add i t ion  there are ind ica t ion s  th a t  the I PCS is  suspicious of Rosyth‘ s 
i n i t i a t i v e .  Thus there is  a d i s t i n c t  danger th a t  t h i s  enlightened 
approach may not be endorsed f o r  reasons which are a t  present unclear.  
P r inc ip les  fo r  a Dockyard Based Promotion System
Before moving on to discuss the d e ta i l s  o f  a dockyard based promotion 
system there is  a need to evolve some general p r in c ip le s  fo r  the
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operat ion o f  the process w i th in  the frame o f  reference th a t  we have 
proposed. For example, do we wish to promote candidates on p o ten t ia l  
or proven a b i l i t y ?  As we are deal ing w ith  a group whose career 
expecta t ion is  r e l a t i v e l y  modest then proven a b i l i t y  ra th e r  than 
po ten t ia l  is  considered to be more important.  In o ther words i n i t i a t i v e  
and capaci ty  f o r  innovat ion would be key a t t r i b u te s  in  the superv is ing 
and managing o f  jobbing work.
The next aspect to consider re la tes  to the type o f  c l imate  we 
would wish to promote in  the dockyard. For example do we want a h igh ly  
compet i t ive c l imate  or do we wish to  promote group consciousness w ith  
i t s  concomitant co-operat ion? These considerat ions w i l l  in f luence the 
sta tus th a t  the organ isat ion accords to the promotion dimension. I t  
is  important th a t  promotion not only serves to prompt good performance, 
but also serves the func t ion  o f  prov id ing the o rgan isa t ion  w i th  a 
cont inual supply o f  able replacements f o r  s t a f f  who leave the organ isat ion, 
There are po ten t ia l  dangers f o r  any organ isat ion which attempts to 
l i n k  promotion too t i g h t l y  to performance. Tensions may be introduced 
in to  the organ isat ion leading to a lack o f  co-operat ion among peers 
competing f o r  the same promotion reward.
Operation of a Dockyard Based Promotion System
Dealing f i r s t l y  w ith  the performance appraisal issue, we have 
already examined the cur ren t  C iv i l  Service s t a f f  repo r t ing  system and 
noted i t s  comprehensiveness. The repor t ing  system s a t i s f i e s  the 
m a jo r i t y  o f  c r i t e r i a  considered by the l i t e r a t u r e  to be necessary f o r  an 
e f fe c t i v e  appra isal  system. I t  i s  our judgement th a t  the cur ren t  s t a f f  
repor t ing  system needs l i t t l e  a l t e r a t i o n .  However, whether the s t a f f  
repor t ing  system would need to be as comprehensive as i t  is  now to support 
a devolved promotion system is  a matter f o r  con jec tu re . However, the 
f a c t  th a t  the mechanics o f  the system are wel l  understood and th a t  the
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system appears to enjoy confidence s t rong ly  ind ica tes th a t  i t  should not 
be a l te red  g re a t ly .
There is  however, one aspect o f  the system which needs a t te n t i o n ,  
th a t  o f  s lack s t a f f  re p o r t in g .  We have already mentioned th is  p o in t ,  
but the need f o r  d isc r im ina to ry  s t a f f  repor t ing  cannot be over-emphasised, 
The cu r ren t  tendency to over mark s t a f f  is  u n fa i r  to good performers and 
is  harmful to the organ isa t ion  in  the long term.
As the p rac t ice  o f  over-marking s t a f f  would be p o t e n t i a l l y  h igh ly  
damaging, to the devolved promotion system a necessary p re - re q u is i te  would 
be the i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  local  seminars on s t a f f  repo r t ing  o rac t ice .  The 
o b jec t ive  o f  these seminars would be to set stnadards f o r  performance 
appraisal o f  s t a f f .  A useful  technique fo r  mainta in ing a reasonable 
degree o f  d is c r im ina t io n  in s t a f f  appraisal is  to set quotas f o r  each 
assessment scale. This creates a momentum of i t s  own f o r  encouraging 
sound standards o f  s t a f f  repo r t ing .
Turning to the se lec t ion  process, i t  is  considered th a t  in order 
to maintain the impact o f  the promotion reward, se lec t ion  boards would 
cont inue to be convened annual ly .  The process would be s ta r ted  each year 
by the General Manager convening se lec t ion  boards, one board f o r  each 
grade. Membership o f  each board being adjusted as necessary to 
accommodate the three main d is c ip l i n e s  o f  mechanical, e le c t r i c a l  and 
cons t ruc t ive .
The func t ion  o f  each s leec t ion  board would be to  se lec t  appropr ia te  
candidates fo r  promotion based on t h e i r  s t a f f  re p o r ts ,  but in te rv iew  
them so le ly  to es tab l ish  i f  they had the necessary f l a i r  and presence to 
ca r ry  out the dut ies  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  o f  the higher grade. To 
ensure tha t  the s t a f f  repo r t  was the dominant in f luence on whether or not 
a person was promoted we would propose th a t  se lec t ion  board marks should
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be a l loca ted  as fo l lo w s , .  This a l lo c a t io n  of marks would represent a 
departure from cur ren t  board marking p rac t ice .
i .  S ta f f  reports  75%
i i .  Performance a t  Board 25%
To give some idea o f  the numbers o f  s t a f f  th a t  would need to be 
promoted each year a t  Rosyth we have estimated th a t  approximately 
10 PTO I l s  and 25 PTO I l l s  would need to be promoted to  maintain a 
popula t ion o f  130 PTO I l s  and 350 PTO I l l s  based on an average age on 
promotion of 40 and 35 years re sp ec t ive ly .  For Devonport these numbers 
should be m u l t ip l ie d  by 3. In the event o f there being i n s u f f i c i e n t  
candidates o f  the r i g h t  c a l ib re  a t  one dockyard, appoin t ing between the 
two dockyards would be necessary so tha t  wel l q u a l i f i e d  s t a f f  in  one 
dockyard would not be d isc r im ina ted  against f o r  promotion. To overcome 
the problem o f  common standards one member o f  each se lec t ion  could be 
drawn from the other  dockyard.
The problem o f  ensuring a minimum level o f  experience f o r  promotion 
candidates could be catered f o r  by creat ing s p e c i f i c  se lec t ion  zones.
For example before a Non- Industr ia l  could be considered fo r  promotion he 
would have to serve a spec i f ied  minimum time in his  present grade. This 
minimum period could be set by consu l ta t ion  between the Non- Industr ia l  
trade union and loca l dockyard senior  management. As a r e s u l t  o f  the 
response to quest ion 7 . i x  we would not be inc l in ed  to  set an upper l i m i t  
f o r  promotion.
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CHAPTER 8 
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE PAY SYSTEM
In t ro d u c t i  on
This chapter w i l l  examine and discuss a l t e rn a t i v e s  to the cu r ren t  
payment by time system fo r  Non- Industr ia ls  in  dockyards. I t  is  not the 
i n te n t io n  to design a s p e c i f i c  new payment system fo r  N on - Indus t r ia ls ,  
but to provide suggest ions concerning the development o f  an a l t e r n a t i v e  
pay system. The design o f  an e f fe c t i v e  pay system depends to some extent 
on judgement, but nevertheless an appropria te  pay system is  one which 
‘ f i t s  i n '  wel l  w ith  the s i t u a t i o n  in  the dockyard and provides f o r  i t s  
main requirements.
The examination o f  the cu r ren t  pay system in Chapter 3 revealed th a t  
despite r e l a t i v e l y  high leve ls  o f  gross pay there appeared to be weak 
'managerial '  contro l  over the re la t io n s h ip  between these earnings and 
p r o d u c t i v i t y .  This has been a t t r i b u te d  to  the f a c t  th a t  no perceived 
l i n k  ex is ts  between performance and pay in the dockyards. On the assumption 
th a t  th is  prognosis is  sens ib ly  co r re c t ,  i t  would ind ica te  th a t  any 
a l t e rn a t i v e  pay system would need to embody an element which l in k s  pay 
to dockyard output.  The propos i t ion  tha t  an a l t e rn a t i v e  pay system 
should include a major incen t ive  element accords with Megaw's (1982) 
preference f o r  performance-related pay.
To guide us in the development o f an appropr iate  pay system 
embodying a major incen t ive  element we w i l l  draw on the re su l ts  from the 
quest ionna ire . The survey, f o r  example, showed th a t  the P&T group were 
favourably  inc l ined  towards the idea of being included in the DES.
This chapter w i l l  be set out in three par ts .  F i r s t l y ,  we sha l l  
develop the o u t l in e  f o r  an a l t e rn a t i v e  pay model. Secondly, we sha l l  
deal w ith  the incen t ive  issue focussing on the development o f  an 
appropria te  performance-related pay system fo r  Non- Indus tr ia ls  in dockyards. 
T h i rd ly ,  we shal l  discuss an a l t e rn a t i v e  method o f  pay d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r
Non- Indus tr ia ls .
An Outl ine Model f o r  a Non-Industr ia l  Pay System
White (1981) in analysing the appropriateness of a pay system stated
th a t  i t  was useful  to th ink  of pay system design as invo lv ing  f i v e  main
choices of emphasis. We shal l  draw on White's work to develop a model
f o r  an a l t e rn a t i v e  pay system.for Non-Industr ia l  grades working in 
dockyards. White's f i v e  main choices of emphasis are:
a. A choice between l in k in g  the system to external comparisons 
or making i t  r e l a t i v e l y  independent o f  external comparisons,
b. A choice between emphasising in te rna l  comaprab i l i ty  ( ie  
uniform across departments and equiva lent groups) or emphasising 
'de-coupled'  s t ruc tu res  ( ie  where the d i f f e r e n t  department may have 
d i f f e r e n t  pay p rov is ions ) .
c. A choice between systems tha t  are based on universal ru les ( ru les  
which apply to a l l  equa l ly  - as in job grading) or those where many 
sa la ry  decisions are made on a personal case-by-case basis.
d. A choice between systems which ai'e based on f ixed  increments, 
or systems tha t  are not based on increments, but on some va r iab le  
review method.
e. A choice between systems th a t  include a major incen t ive  element, 
ie  a par t  of  the pay varies w ith  performance - and those which 
include l i t t l e  or no incen t ive  element.
Set out at Table 8.1 in synopsis form are the key choices f o r  
sa la r ied  s t a f f  pay schemes.
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Table 8.1 Key Choices f o r  Salar ied S ta f f  Pay Schemes
a. Emphasis on external  
comparabi1i t y .
No emphasis on external 
comparabi1i ty
1. Competi t ive job market 
i i .  Mobile s t a f f  
’H i .  Standard jobs i n t e r ­
changeable between f i rms 
i V . Formal q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  
requi re d .
i .  Geographical remoteness 
o f  f i rm .
i i .  Jobs and s k i l l s  special  
to f i rm .
b. Emphasis on in te rna l  
comparabi1i ty
Emphasis on separate or 
'de-coupled'  t reatment 
of s t a f f .
1 . In terna l  m o b i l i t y  
i i .  High contact and 
communication between s t a f f  
groups.
i . Highly spec ia l ised 
s t a f f  groups w ith  
important ro le
c. Emphasis on universal 
r u l e s .
Emphasis on personal case 
by case treatment.
i .  Size of o rgan isa t ion  
1 arge
i .  Size o f  organ isat ion
i i .  Family managed type 
of business.
i i i .  F lu id  - r a p id ly  
changing s i t u a t i o n .
d. Emphasis on f ixe d  
i ncrements
Emphasis on va r iab le  
review method.
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i . Long term career 
commitment o f  s t a f f  to 
organ isat ion
i i .  High s t a b i l i t y  o f  s t a f f  
in  t h e i r  jobs
i i i .  Size o f  organ isat ion 
large (tendency to 
bureaucracy)
i v .  I n f l a t i o n a r y  pressure
e. Emphasis on incent ives
i .  Mobile s t a f f
i i .  Rapid career 
p rogress ion .
i i i .  F inanc ia l  i n s t a b i l i t y  
o f  business.
No use o f  incen t ives
i .  High degree of 
performance measurement f o r  
sa la r ied  s t a f f
i .  Not possib le  to measure 
performance o f  sa la r ied  
s t a f f .
In p ra c t i ce ,  these choices are not between two simple extremes, but 
more a matter  o f f i n d in g  a su i ta b le  balance between the extremes.
As th i s  chapter w i l l  be concerned mainly w i th  the quest ion of 
incent ives we shal l  f i r s t  deal b r i e f l y  w ith  the other  fou r  main choices 
o f  emphasis. We have already discussed the dimensions th a t  these choices 
embody, a lb e i t  not in the format set out by White. However, as these 
fac to rs  have great  relevance to the design o f  any pay system the s a l i e n t  
points from our e a r l i e r  examination w i l l  be drawn together to provide an 
o u t l in e  model f o r  a dockyard pay system.
Dependent Versus Independent o f  External Conparisons
. We have already seen th a t  pay leve ls  in  the C iv i l  Service have been 
set by external comparisons and al though th is  method has been the subject 
o f  much debate, i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to see an acceptable a l t e rn a t i v e  being 
developed. Indeed Megaw (1982) recommended external comparisons should
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cont inue to be used, but they should have a much less dec is ive  in f luence 
than in the past.  Thus in  the absence o f  any v iab le  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  the 
basic pay o f  dockyard Non- Indus tr ia ls  should cont inue to be set by 
comparisons w ith  s im i l a r  groups employed on comparable work, but modif ied 
by the dockyard’ s a b i l i t y  to r e c r u i t  and re ta in  s t a f f .
Uniform Versus Decoupled Pay S t ru c tu re . We have already noted the problems 
th a t  can occur as the r e s u l t  o f  the existence of hor izon ta l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  
In any organ isat ion where people have been accustomed to operat ing w i th in  
a grading s t ruc tu re  which has a system o f  o f f i c i a l l y  recognised equiva lent 
grades i t  is  important th a t  hor izon ta l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  are not permit ted to 
develop. I t  is  impor tant there fore  tha t  a pay system dependent on 
external comparisons should be s u f f i c i e n t l y  f l e x i b l e  to avoid d i v i s i v e  
hor izonta l  pay d i f f e r e n t i a l s  emerging.
Universal Rules versus Personal Bas is . The choice here is  s e l f  ev ident 
as we are deal ing with  a large o rgan isa t ion .  There i s ,  however, an 
oppor tun i ty  to introduce an element o f  personal choice in determining an 
appropria te  method f o r  pay d i s t r i b u t i o n .  At the end o f  th i s  chapter we 
shal l  examine an a l t e rn a t i v e  method o f  pay d i s t r i b u t i o n  which incorporates 
an element o f ind iv idua l  choice. However, on the quest ion o f  basic pay, 
universal ru les are deemed to be o f  paramount importance.
Increments - Fixed or Based on a Variable Review Method. The advantage 
o f  f ixed increments is  tha t  i t  removes the element o f  uncer ta in ty .
Although f ixed  increments represent a f in a n c ia l  commitment by the 
organ isat ion th i s  is  considered to be outweighed by the benef i ts  o f  paying 
inexperienced s t a f f  less than experienced s t a f f .  In the dockyard where 
s t a f f  th ink  of t h e i r  employment as a long term career an incremental 
approach is most appropr ia te.
Incent ive Element. Whether or not an organ isat ion incorporates a 
performance-related incen t ive  element in i t s  pay system is  much less 
dependent on outside circumstances than any o f  the other  choices. The
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main c o n s t ra in t  is  whether i t  is  possible and meaningful to measure 
performance in the type o f  jobs.  White (1981) queries whether i t  is  
meaningful to apply an incen t ive  scheme to government se rv ices ,  but he 
does acknowledge th a t  developments in measuring performance and de f in ing  
'w h i te '  c o l l a r  tasks enlarge the scope fo r  incen t ives .  In the ra th e r  
special  s i t u a t i o n  th a t  c i v i l  servants f in d  themselves in dockyards, the 
problem o f  performance measurement is  not insurmountable. Set out a t 
Appendix 3 is  an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  how performance is  c u r re n t l y  measured in 
support o f  the DES.
Before applying an incen t ive  system to Î to n - In d u s t r ia l s we must be 
qu i te  c lea r  what we are t r y i n g  to  achieve. For example, do we want them 
to work harder? The answer is  not necessari ly  yes, but c e r t a i n l y  we would 
expect a higher q u a l i t y  o f  work coupled with  greater  commitment. 
J u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  the in t ro d u c t io n  o f  an incent ive scheme is  based on the 
propos i t ion  th a t  by improving the q u a l i t y  o f work done by Non In d u s t r ia l  
grades and strengthening t h e i r  commitment w i l l  r e s u l t  in  improved dockyard 
performance.
Before moving on to examine and explore the issue o f  performance- 
re la ted  pay, we sha l l  cons t ruc t  a model o f  a proposed pay system 
(Figure 8.2) based on our b r i e f  t r e a t i s e  o f  White's (1981) f i v e  main 
choices o f  emphasis f o r  a pay system.
Incent ive Scheme O b jec t ives
Before proceeding to examine the d is t ingu ish ing  features o f  incen t ive  
schemes, i t  is  necessary to examine incent ive  scheme ob jec t ives  from both 
organ isa t iona l  and employee standpoin ts . C lear ly  the expectat ions o f  senio) 
management w i l l  d i f f e r  from th a t  o f  j u n io r  management which in turn w i l l  
d i f f e r  from th a t  o f  In d u s t r ia l  grades. Indeed Perrow (1962) makes a 
fu r th e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  between ' o f f i c i a l  goal statements'  o f  i n t e r e s t  f o r  
the organ isat ion  as a whole and 'opera t ion goals'  or the ends sought
to
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through the operat ing a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the organ isat ion . The r e c o n c i l ia t i o n  
o f  these c o n f l i c t i n g  organ isat iona l  ob jec t ives and ind iv idua l  
expectat ions w i l l  be centra l  to the success o f  any incent ive  system.
The appropriateness o f  a p a r t i c u la r  incent ive  system w i l l  depend 
not only on the nature o f  organ isat iona l  and environmental ch a ra c te r is t i c s  
and t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but also on the process f o r  formulat ing 
ob jec t ives .  An apprec ia t ion o f  o rganisat ional ob jec t ives is  there fore  
important f o r  two reasons. F i r s t ,  i t  provides a basis f o r  assessing 
whether the scheme selected is  appropria te  to the organ isat iona l  precepts. 
Second, the corporate ob jec t ives  are themselves an important frame o f  
reference fo r  the design o f  an appropria te  incent ive  system.
Bowey and Thorpe (1982) examined incent ive  scheme ob jec t ives using 
a three behavioural  perspect ives approach which is  best i l l u s t r a t e d  by 
the model (Figure 8,3) which they developed.
The model (Figure 8.3) suggests tha t  a successful  incen t ive  scheme 
must in e v i t a b ly  be a compromise to accommodate c o n f l i c t i n g  organisat ional  
goals and ind iv idua l  expectat ions.
Pros and Cons o f  Pr inc ipa l  D is t ingu ish ing  Features o f  Incent ive  Systems
For convenience the p r in c ip a l  d is t ingu ish ing  features o f  incen t ive  
systems are set out in  Table 8.4 to i d e n t i f y  the strengths and weaknesses 
associated with  each dimension. The tab le  provides a veh ic le  to appraise 
th e o r e t i c a l ,  s i tu a t io n a l  and p ra c t ica l  considerat ions re levant  to the 
fo rmula t ion  o f  any incen t ive  scheme fo r  Non-Industr ia l  grades in dockyards 
I t  has emerged from an examination o f  the l i t e r a t u r e  th a t  there are 
persuasive arguments to support the concept o f  an incent ive  approach as a 
method o f  improving dockyard e ffec t iveness .  Indeed Megaw (1982) stated 
th a t  performance-related pay should be introduced a t  a l l  but the most 
senior leve ls .  The t ra n s la t io n  o f  the concept o f  performance-related pay 
in to  a workable and p ra c t i ca l  scheme presents d i f f i c u l t i e s .  In e v i ta b ly
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th e o re t ica l  considerat ions become ta in ted  and compromised by r e a l i t i e s  
imposed by organ isa t iona l  c h a ra c te r i s t i c s  and p ra c t i ca l  cons idera t ions.
Thus the fo rmula t ion o f  any incen t ive  scheme must be a compromise between 
the c o n f l i c t i n g  requirements o f  theory and p rac t ice .  In a d d i t io n ,  any 
incen t ive  scheme must have the c a p a b i l i t y  and f a c i l i t y  to  accommodate 
change.
I t  is  v i t a l l y  important th a t  an incen t ive  scheme is  not seen j u s t  in 
the narrow context o f  increasing pay by encouraging people to work harder,  
but ra ther  in  the oppor tun i ty  i t  creates to permit  management to make wide 
changes in the organ isat ion thereby c rea t ing  the p o ten t ia l  f o r  increased 
p ro d u c t i v i t y .  One o f  the key f ind ings  o f  recent research by Bowey and 
Thorpe et al (1982) is  th a t  when f i rms i n s t a l l  incen t ive  schemes they often 
f a i l  to carry  through the mot iva t iona l  assumptions underlying the incen t ive  
scheme to a l l  facets o f  the o rgan isa t ion .  The Researchers commented th a t  
some f i rms miss the oppor tun i ty  to  make wider changes th a t  would re in fo rce  
the scheme or y ie ld  other  bene f i ts  to the organ isa t ion  as a whole, such as 
the in t roduc t ion  o f  new technology or a change in operat ing systems. 
However, in some organ isa t ions .  Trade Union res is tance and int rans igence 
may prevent management from e x p lo i t i n g  the f u l l  p o ten t ia l  o f  an incen t ive  
scheme. Indeed the in t ro d u c t io n  o f  the DES in to  the dockyards i s  an 
example o f  how Trade Union a t t i t u d e s  prevented the po ten t ia l  bene f i ts  o f  
the scheme being f u l l y  rea l ised .
A convenient s ta r t i n g  po in t  f o r  the appraisal of the d is t in g u is h in g  
fea tures o f  incent ives systems is  to determine p rec ise ly  which dimensions 
we bel ieve are necessary fo r  improved organ isat ion performance. I t  is  
o b je c t i v e ly  assessed, based on the l i t e r a t u r e  in general and the 
Expectancy model in p a r t i c u la r  th a t  the fo l low ing  features are a necessary 
p re - re q u is i te  f o r  improved dockyard performance.
a. Strengthening o f  the performance-reward l i n k .
b. Encouragement o f  group consciousness and s o c ia l l y  i n t e g ra t i v e
1 R?
behaviour.
c. Mechanism to f a c i l i t a t e  cont inual re inforcement o f  
commi tment.
d. C u l t i v a t io n  o f  a cl imate o f  t r u s t  between N on- Indus t r ia ls  and 
In d u s t r ia l  grades, in other  words the need to promote a sense o f  
i d e n t i t y  between the P & T Group and shopf loor workers.
In add i t ion  there is  a need to  ensure th a t  the sceheme is  not 
perceived as being remote, thus contro l  should be exercised l o c a l l y  as 
approved to c e n t r a l l y .
Relat ing 'a '  and ' b ' to Table 8.4 i t  can be seen th a t  a c o n f l i c t  
emerges whether the dockyard should be advised to adopt an Ind iv idua l  or 
Group based incen t ive  scheme. There is  a view held by M erre t t  e t  al (1968) 
th a t  managerial grades respond be t te r  to an i n d i v i d u a l l y  based incen t ive  
scheme because o f  enhanced compet i t ive behaviour associated w ith  th a t  
group compared to 'b lue '  c o l l a r  groups. Thus from a mot iva t iona l  
considera t ion an i n d i v i d u a l l y  based scheme would be most appropria te  f o r  
dockyard Non- Industr ia l  s. But a fundamental quest ion is  whether the 
inducement o f  compet i t ive behaviour would be cons is ten t  w i th  ship re p a i r  
work. As ship re p a i r  work is  a mult i  d i s c i p l i n e  jobbing a c t i v i t y  where 
in te r -g roup  co-operat ion between workgangstakes on a special  s ig n i f i ca nce  
an i n d i v i d u a l l y  based incen t ive  scheme would be harmful to the dockyard. 
Indeed the progressive increase in nuclear submarine r e f i t t i n g  gives 
added impetus f o r  the need to strengthen the co-operat ion dimension.
However, i t  must be borne in mind th a t  one of the c h ie f  p o te n t ia l  
weaknesses o f  group bonus schemes l i e s  in the r e l a t i v e l y  low incen t ive  
they provide to the i n d i v id u a l .  Although in some instances i t  may be 
possible to o f f s e t  or compensate f o r  th i s  low incen t ive  by prov id ing 
oppo r tun i t ies  f o r  each employee to p a r t i c ip a te  so th a t  he may perceive 
his co n t r ibu t io n  to improved performance, th i s  would be d i f f i c u l t  to 
achieve in  p ra c t ice .  Noting the size o f  the dockyards and the curren t
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h igh ly  bureaucrat ic s ty le  o f management, the p a r t i c i p a t i v e  approach as a 
means o f  compensating f o r  group incen t ive  scheme weaknesses is  not a 
feas ib le  p ropos i t ion .
Moving on to discuss ' c ' ,  the reinforcement o f  commitment, th i s  
w i l l  be discussed under two headings, i n i t i a l  commitment and cont inuat ion 
o f  commitment. Although both dimensions are in te r r e la te d ,  f o r  c l a r i t y ,  
we shal l  deal with  them separate ly .
Dealing f i r s t l y ,  w ith  i n i t i a l  commitment or acceptance o f  the 
incent ive  by employees. Bowey and Thorpe et al (1982) found th a t  the breadth 
and extent o f  consu l ta t ion  and negot ia t ion  in preparat ion f o r  the 
in t roduc t ion  o f  incent ives schemes was the major determinant o f  the 
degree o f  success eventua l ly  achieved with  these schemes. This important 
f a c t  emerged from a s tu d y , 'E f fe c ts  o f  Incent ive  Payments Systems 1977- 
80{ conducted by Strathc lyde U n ive rs i t y .  The Researchers found th a t  the 
amount o f  time tha t  management had spent in discussions with  people at 
a l l  leve ls  and in  a l l  funct ions o f  t h e i r  o rgan isat ion about the type o f  
payment system to be introduced and the way i t  was to be operated 
d e f i n i t e l y  paid dividends in terms o f  improved p ro d u c t i v i t y .
The way in  which the DES was introduced in to  the dockyards s t rong ly  
supports these f in d in g s .  At employee level there was no consu l ta t ion .
The scheme was designed by the Chief Executive Royal Dockyards' personnel 
s t a f f  and negot iated w i th  the Trade Unions represented on the Shipbui ld ing 
Trades Jo in t  Counci l.  Although employees were aware negot ia t ions were 
being conducted the scheme was not welcomed by some Trade Unions at local 
le ve l .  In order to get the scheme accepted the 'Centre '  threatened to 
withdraw the scheme unless a l l  Trade Unions signed the agreement. Detai led 
negot ia t ions on the various undertakings associated w ith  the scheme were 
conducted between local management and Trade Unions, Because of the 
acrimony generated over the i n i t i a l  implementat ion coupled w ith  union
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suspicion about management's motives did l i t t l e  to con t r ibu te  to the 
a m ic a b i l i t y  o f  these nego t ia t ions .  Consequently management were unable 
to get the degree o f  change which would have helped to re in fo rce  the 
scheme and improve dockyard performance.
Because the shopf loor workers were remote from even these local 
negot ia t ions they f e l t  l i t t l e  or no involvement w ith  a re s u l ta n t  
commensurate lack o f  commitment. Hence the comments by the P & T group 
tha t  the incen t ive  scheme was l i t t l e  more than a t h i n l y  disguised pay r i s e  
would appear to have substance.
Turning, secondly, to the quest ion o f  susta in ing commitment, t h i s  is  
l i k e l y  to be d i f f i c u l t  to achieve i f  there is  l i t t l e  i n i t i a l  commitment. 
However, given a reasonable leve l o f  i n i t i a l  commitment, the most e f fe c t i v e  
way to maintain i t ,  is  to ensure th a t  bonus payments are paid on a 
regu la r  basis. I t  is  impor tant th a t  these payments are kept d i s t i n c t  from 
basic sa la ry  as they would be q u ick ly  subsumed as par t  o f  basic pay.
The l a s t  po in t ,  ' d ' ,  the need to c u l t i v a t e  a c l imate  o f  t r u s t  between 
the Non-Industr ia l  and In d u s t r ia l  groups is  fundamental to the dockyard's 
a b i l i t y  to achieve high p ro d u c t i v i t y .  An incen t ive  scheme which embraces 
both Non-Industr ia l  and In d u s t r ia l  grades would s imul taneously  s a t i s f y  a 
number o f  fa c to rs .  F i r s t l y ,  i t  would reduce the scept ic ism o f  In d u s t r ia l  
grades concerning the commitment o f  Non- Industr ia l  grades to the cur ren t  
DES. Secondly, i t  would help to promote a more equ i tab le  i n d u s t r i a l  
r e la t io n s  c l imate .
However the inc lus ion  o f  Non- Industr ia l  grades would also create 
problems. For example, should execut ive grades working in dockyards be 
included? Good c l e r i c a l  or adm in is t ra t ive  work is  j u s t  as important 
in a jobbing indus t ry  as good planning. To exclude execut ive grades 
the re fo re ,  might have a serious d e b i l i t a t i n g  e f f e c t  on dockyard performance
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Discussions w ith  Senior Management a t  Rosyth concerning the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  extending the DES to inc lude Non- Indus tr ia ls  revealed th a t  
the issue o f  who to inc lude in the scheme ra ised very d i f f i c u l t  problems.
As the DES is  a two t i e r  bonus scheme th is  presents add i t iona l  problems 
in  deciding who should be e l i g i b l e  f o r  which bonuses.
Group or an Ind iv idua l  Bonus Scheme
There is  the need to resolve whether i t  would be more appropr ia te to 
administer an i n d i v i d u a l l y  or group based incen t ive  scheme to Non- 
In d u s t r ia ls  working in dockyards. Using technology and size o f  workforce 
as our s ta r t i n g  p o in t ,  the most promising avenue to improved dockyard 
performance would seem to  be through improving group consciousness and 
es tab l ish ing  and developing a sense o f  i d e n t i t y  between the R & T group 
and In d u s t r ia l  grades. Having i d e n t i f i e d  the features which, we be l ieve ,  
hold the key to improved dockyard performance guides as f i r m l y  to the 
choice o f  a group based incen t ive  scheme. Although we have advocated 
a group based scheme th is  does not preclude i t  from embodying an i n d i v i d u a l l y  
based element.
We sha l l  move on to consider a group based incen t ive  scheme and a 
group scheme incorporat ing  an i n d i v i d u a l l y  based element. The group 
scheme we shal l  consider is  extending the DES to inc lude Non- Indus tr ia ls  
up to PTO I grade. This choice is  inf luenced by the fa c t  th a t  the DES 
was introduced f o r  In d u s t r ia l  grades in A p r i l  1981.
Inc lus ion of Non- Industr ia l  Gr ades in the DES'
A b e ne f i t  which would accrue from extending the DES to include Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  grades up to PTO I level would be the v i r t u a l  disappearance 
o f  the d i f f e r e n t i a l  problem between PTO IV and In d u s t r ia l  grades. Tables 
3.6 and 3.7 in Chapter 3 i l l u s t r a t e  the size of the problem. I f ,  f o r  
example, an In d u s t r ia l  c r a f t  grade were to earn a 35T e f f i c i e n c y  bonus
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(20% e f f i c i e n c y  + 15% product ive bonuses) his gross pay would exceed 
th a t  o f  his superv isor .  This cross over o f  gross earnings is  an 
emotive and content ious issue which does l i t t l e  to promote a harmonious 
i n d u s t r i a l  c l imate .  The proposal to include dockyard Non- Indus tr ia ls  
in  the DES is  based on an analys is  o f  the survey re s u l t s .  This ind ica te d ,  
supported by comments appended to quest ionna ires , th a t  the P & T group 
were a t t ra c ted  to the DES. C lear ly  t h i s  preference was inf luenced by the 
percept ion th a t  I n d u s t r ia l s  have achieved a t h i n l y  disguised pay r i s e .
The inc lus ion  o f  Non- Industr ia l  grades in the DES would probably 
i n c l i n e  In d u s t r ia l  grades to be more favourably  disposed towards the 
scheme. Indeed i t  is  s u b je c t i v e ly  assessed th a t  i t  would strengthen 
t h e i r  commitment to  the DES. Owing to  the n o n -p a r t i c ip a t io n  o f  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  l i n e  managers in the scheme there is  a tendency f o r  In d u s t r ia l  
grades to accuse management o f  f a i l i n g  to get t h e i r  planning r i g h t  i f  
ta rge ts  are not met. Because supervisors are perceived by t h e i r  subordinates 
as not d i r e c t l y  b e n e f i t in g  from the scheme, i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  management 
to re fu te  these c r i t i c i s m s  to a degree which convinces the In d u s t r ia l  grades.
I t  is  speculated th a t  the p r in c ip a l  b e n e f i t  to be gained from 
inc lud ing  Non- Industr ia l  grades in the DES would be the propagation of a 
commonality o f purpose w i th in  the dockyard. I t  would also create a 
sense o f  i d e n t i t y  between the two groups. Although the expectat ions of 
the two groups might s t i l l  d i f f e r ,  the fa c t  th a t  both groups would have a 
common goal might create o p po r tun i t ies  f o r  greater worker supervisor 
co-operat ion. From th is  co-operat ion fu r th e r  oppo r tun i t ies  might present 
themselves to enable senior  management to make wider changes which would 
y i e l d  other  benef i ts  to the organ isat ion as a whole, fo r  example, a l ign ing  
Non- Industr ia l  and In d u s t r ia l  meal breaks.
So fa r  we have e x to l le d  the bene f i ts  o f  inc lud ing  ce r ta in  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  grades in the DES, but there would also be problems. There is
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the obvious d i f f i c u l t y  o f  t r e a t in g  a m in o r i t y  group o f  Non- Indus t r ia ls  
d i f f e r e n t l y  from the main group o f  c i v i l  servants. However, problems 
might also a r ise  associated w ith  the operat ion of the DES. For example, 
we have already mentioned the p rac t ice  o f  job s t re tch ing  f o r  the purpose 
o f  obta in ing over-t ime work. Thi$ p rac t ice  might be more d i f f i c u l t  to 
contro l  i f  the DES was appl ied to Non- Industr ia l  grades.
Although we have commended the v i r tu e s  o f  strengthening the sense of 
i d e n t i t y  and commonality o f  purpose between the two groups, problems 
could be created f o r  senior management i f  th i s  was taken to extremes.
An explanat ion fo r  t h i s  assessment centres on the fa c t  th a t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
number of P & T grades are promoted from the shop- f loo r  workers, and hence 
brought w ith  them t h e i r  value system from the shop- f loo r .  Indeed recent 
Non- Industr ia l  ac t ion by c i v i l  servants has to some exten t  po la r ised 
a t t i tu d e s  between senior management and other 'w h i te '  c o l l a r  groups. The 
concern would be tha t  by c o n t in u a l l y  re in fo rc in g  th i s  sense of i d e n t i t y  botwee 
lower management and In d u s t r ia l s  is  th a t  i t  might eventua l ly  be counter­
product ive .
Combi ne Bonus Scheme
Up to now we have concentrated on a group incen t ive  scheme f o r  Non- 
I n d u s t r i a l s ,  but Table 8.4 shows th a t  an ind iv idua l -based incen t ive  
scheme has a strong performance-reward l i n k .  We w i l l  examine whether i t  is  
p ra c t ica l  to develop an incen t ive  scheme fo r  Non- Indus t r ia ls  which contains 
an element based on in d iv idu a l  performance. Before examining the 
p r a c t i c a b i l i t i e s  o f  designing a two t i e r  bonus system i t  would be useful  
to expla in  why Non- Indus tr ia ls  are l i k e l y  to respond more re a d i l y  to an 
incent ive  scheme which has been p a r t l y  i n d iv id u a l is e d .
The explanat ion revolves around s i tu a t io n a l  fac to rs  and a t t i t u d e s .
Non-Industr ia l  grades by v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  pos i t ion  in  the organ isa t ion  
have accepted, a lb e i t  in  some instances subconsciously,  a degree of
competit iveness in t h e i r  work s i t u a t i o n .  To a t ta in  the f i r s t  step on 
the managerial ladder,  f o r  example, they had to compete with  fe l lo w  
In d u s t r ia l  grades and in order to progress up the managerial ladder 
they have to indulge in  competi t ion with  t h e i r  peers. In career 
development there may also be an element o f  competi t ion with respect to 
being placed on p res t ig ious  courses. The In d u s t r ia l  grade on the other  
hand does not operate in  t h i s  compet i t ive environment. His strength is  
derived from the degree o f  u n i t y  tha t  he and his f e l lo w  workers can 
generate in  order to confront  management from a p o s i t io n  o f  s t rength .
Thus i t  is  argued th a t  a group incen t ive  scheme is  who l ly  cons is tent 
with  the expectat ion o f  I n d u s t r i a l s ,  but not necessar i ly  Non- Indus tr ia ls  
who need a degree o f  compet i t ion to s t imu la te  m ot iva t ion .
We have already examined the group based element o f  a proposed two 
t i e r  bonus system: we sha l l  now explore the p r a c t i c a l i t y  of
incorporat ing  in the ind iv idua l  element so tha t  advantage may be taken o f  
the pos i t ive  elements o f  both the ind iv idua l  and group based incen t ive  
systems.
The f i r s t  po in t  to es tab l ish  i s  whether there is  machinery to 
measure the performance of i n d iv id u a ls .  As mentioned in Chapter 4 there is 
an elaborate s t a f f  repor t ing  system which could e a s i l y  be adapted to 
provide a method f o r  the a l l o c a t io n  of incent ive  payments. Although 
q u a l i t a t i v e  methods o f  assessing performance are open to c r i t i c i s m  (and 
indeed in  Chapter 4 we i d e n t i f i e d  th a t  s t a f f  repor ts  lacked d isc r im in a t io n )  
there is  nevertheless a persuasive case fo r  the inc lus ion  of some form of 
ind iv idua l  based element in  any incen t ive  scheme fo r  N on- Indus t r ia ls .  The 
lack o f  d isc r im ina to ry  repor t ing  by superiors could be n u l l i f i e d  to some 
extent by the simple expedient o f  assigning a ce r ta in  pre-determined 
number o f  s t a f f  to each assessment category. Table 8.5 shows the maximum 
percentage o f  populat ion which would be assigned to each performance 
assessment category.
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Figure 8.6. Diagrammatical Arrangement Showing Postulated 
In te ra c t io n  Between In d i v id u a l l y  and Group Based Incent ive Schemes
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Table 8.5 Percentage D is t r i b u t i o n  o f  Populat ion in  Each Grade 
Versus Assessment Category
Assessment
Category
% o f  Populat ion 
in  Each Grade
Very Good 15
Good 20
Average 30
Fai r 20
Adequate 15
These assessment categories would correspond to some leve l o f  bonus 
payment. See Table 8.8.
The bene f i t  o f  a l l o c a t in g  a predetermined percentage o f  s t a f f  to 
each assessment category would g re a t ly  reduce the l i k e l ih o o d  o f  the 
phenomenon o f  d r i f t  mentioned by Lupton e t  al (1983). However, there is  
a danger th a t  the operat ion o f  a two t i e r  bonus system may create 
o ppor tun i t ies  fo r  employees to t r y  and o f f s e t  a small bonus in one t i e r  
by demanding a compensatory increase in the p o te n t ia l  bonus a va i lab le  
in  the other t i e r .
I t  is  speculated th a t  the operat ion o f  a combine bonus scheme along 
the l ines  which we have ind ica ted  could provide a ce r ta in  degree o f  
mutual reinforcement as ind ica ted  by the model ( f i g u re  8 .6 ) .  This model 
postu lates a degree of in te ra c t io n  between the group and i n d i v i d u a l l y  
based incent ive  schemes. Successful e x p lo i t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  in t e ra c t io n  is  
dependent on improving the q u a l i t y  o f  s t a f f  re p o r t in g .  The group element 
o f  the incen t ive  scheme provides an oppor tun i ty  to do t h i s ,  by l in k in g  an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  s t a f f  repor t  assessment to the performance o f  the i n d i v i d u a l ' s
work-gangs or centre . This scheme would be dependent on the a b i l i t y  to 
'measure the performance o f  these groups. A technique is  c u r re n t ly  
a va i lab le  to measure the performance o f  dockyard work groups, invo lv ing  
the cons truc t ion  o f  U t i l i s a t i o n  Factors. An exp lanat ion o f  t h e i r  d e r iva t io n  
is  contained a t  Appendix 3.
Sett ing the Level o f Bonus Payment
We have examined a combined bonus scheme and suggested th a t  the 
group element should be based on the cu r ren t  DES with the in d iv idu a l  
element using a q u a l i t a t i v e  method o f  performance measurement based on the 
cur ren t  s t a f f  re p o r t .  The next problem to examine, concerns the size 
o f  the to ta l  bonus and how i t  should be apportioned between the two 
elements. I t  i s  genera l ly  acknowledged th a t  f o r  a bonus scheme to be 
a t t r a c t i v e ,  bonus payments must not be less than 20% o f  basic pay. For
example, the DES maximum p o ten t ia l  bonus f o r  product ive workers is  
35%. Commonsense, the re fo re ,  suggests th a t  the Non- Indus t r ia ls  would 
have to be o ffered a comparable po ten t ia l  bonus, in the i n t e r e s t  o f  
harmonious re la t io n s  between Non- Indus tr ia ls  and In d u s t r ia l  grades we 
would recommend th a t  35% should be set f o r  N on- Indus t r ia ls .
The way th a t  t h i s  35% is  u l t im a te l y  d iv ided between the two elements 
o f  the scheme w i l l  to some extent be a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  sen io r  management's 
desire to promote a sense o f  i d e n t i t y  between 'b lue '  and 'w h i te '  c o l l a r  
workers or ind iv idu a l  i n i t i a t i v e  and innovat ive behaviour. Another fa c to r
which might in f luence the way the bonus is  div ided between the two 
elements concerns pay d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between Non- Indus tr ia ls  and In d u s t r i a l s .  
For our purposes l e t  us assign 20% to the group element and 15% to the 
in d iv idu a l  element.
The actual a r i th m e t ica l  re la t io n s h ip  between performance c r i t e r i a  and 
incen t ive  payment must be c l e a r l y  understood by a l l  p a r t i c ip a n ts .  For
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the group based element o f  the incen t ive  scheme a l i n e a r  re la t io n s h ip  
o f  the form shown in Figure 8.7 would be appropr ia te . The slope o f  the 
bonus l in e  and i t s  in te rs e c t io n  with  the 'X' axis w i l l  determine the 
e f fo r t - re w a rd  r e la t io n s h ip .  The in te rse c t io n  o f  the bonus l i n e  w ith  the 
‘ X‘ axis would be a management dec is ion. To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o in t ,
Line A would represent a generous bonus scheme whi le  Line C would 
represent a t i g h t  one.
Figure 8.7 Graph o f  Bonus Performance Versus Bonus as % of Basic Pay
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Turning to the ind iv idu a l  element o f  the scheme, we have already 
suggested th a t  bonus payments should be l inked to s t a f f  repor t  performance 
assessment. The actual bonus awarded would depend on how the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
performance had been assessed. Table 8.8 shows a proposed d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
bonus payment versus performance assessment category.
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Table 8.8. Assessment Category Versus Proposed Bonus Payment 
f o r  I n d i v i du a l l y  Based Incent ive  Element - Showing Equivalent Cash 
Bonus Value
Assessment Category Proposed Bonus Payment As 
'% o f  Basic pay - 
Equivalent Value o f  Bonus 
£
X; o i ’ Basi  
Pay. PTO I I PTO I I I PTO IV
£ £
Very good 15 1304 1041 1015
Good 12 1043 890 802
Average 9 783 667 609
Fair 6 521 444 406
Adequate 3 260 232 203
Based on 1981/82 pay scales and PTO I I  + 111 f  IV Popula t ion  
per annum = £658,900 (Fixed cost)
Total cost o f  combine bonus scheme (Maximum)
In d iv id u a l l y  based element = 658,900
Group " " = 1,686,000
Cost
£2,344,900
This compares with  Overtime and T r ia ls  payments f o r  1981/82 (estimated) 
Overtime = 1,200,000
T r ia ls  Pay = 306,000
£1 ,506,000
This would obviously represent an increase in the Non-Industr ia l  wage 
b i l l .  The ' i n d i v i d u a l l y '  based element would be a f i xed  cost propor t ional  
to the number o f Non- Industr ia l  trades encompassed by the scheme. The 
'group' element would be va r iab le  cost l inked to the dockyard's output.
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Relat ing the cost o f  the proposed combined bonus scheme to dockyard ou t ­
put ind icates tha t  f o r  a 5% Increase in p r o d u c t i v i t y  a £3M reduct ion (1980 
costs) in  the cost o f  shipwork might be achieved a t  Rosyth. (See Addendum 
Page 169 f o r  d e r iva t io n  o f  £3M f i g u r e ) .  I t  should be noted th a t  we have
ignored the cost o f  the DES bonus up t i l l  now.
The cost o f  achieving t h i s  reduct ion would be in the regi-on o f  £3.5 -
£4.5 M (1980/81 wage ra te s ) .  This assessment is  based on the assumption 
th a t  In d u s t r ia l  grades have achieved t h e i r  output ta rge ts  under the DES 
to j u s t i f y  payment o f  the f u l l  f l a t  ra te  bonus o f  20%. Equating to an
increase in dockyard output o f  approximately 5%, The break even po in t  f o r
our proposed incent ive  scheme encompassing both Non-Industr ia l  and In d u s t r ia l  
grades would be achieved i f  dockyard output could be increased by 14%, 
f ig u re  8.9.
Figure 8.9 Graph of Increased Output versus Cost
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The proposed d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  bonus payments f o r  Non- Industr ia l  grades 
has been struc tu red to ensure tha t  the scheme creates impact w h i l s t  
s imultaneously inco rpo ra t ing  an element o f  d isc r im ina t io n  to 
st imu la te  mot iva t ion .  The ininact of a bonus scheme can also be
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af fec ted  by the way bonuses are d i s t r ib u te d .  This ra ises the quest ion o f  
how should bonuses be paid. In order to maintain a degree o f  earning 
s t a b i l i t y  bonuses should be paid monthly alongside normal sa la ry ,  but 
computed on a s ix  month moving average. However, to help to re ta in  the 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between bonus and normal earnings some o f  the bonus should 
be held over and paid as a lump sum a t  h a l f  ye a r ly  i n t e r v a l s .  A r e f i n e ­
ment o f th i s  method o f  bonus d i s t r i b u t i o n  would be to pay the bonus 
accruing from the group element annual ly which f o r  the ind iv idua l  
assessed as 'adequate' would be a minimum o f  £203 see Table 8.8.
Although we have given the impression th a t  bonus payments would be 
in  the form o f  cash th is  need not necessari ly  be the case, payments could 
be in the form o f  extra  leave, enhanced pension, co n t r ibu t io n  towards a 
medical care insurance plan or other  assurance schemes, the l i s t  is  
extensive. A problem w ith  b e n e f i t s ,  not in  the form of d i r e c t  wages, is 
t h a t  peoples' needs vary. We shal l  now go on to examine ways o f  ca te r ing 
w ith  th is  problem.
Pay D is t r ib u t io n
An in teg ra l  par t  o f  any pay system concerns the way pay i s  d is t r ib u te d  
to ind iv idu a ls  by the o rgan isa t ion .  Should pay be d is t r ib u te d  t o t a l l y  in 
the form of money or should there be a mix o f  money and non-money 
payments. What, f o r  example, should the r e la t i v e  percentage o f  f r in g e  
benef i ts  to money be and should i t  be .constant. I t  has long been 
recognised tha t  there is a loose c o r re la t io n  between age and monetary 
needs. A man with  a young fam i ly  and a r e l a t i v e l y  high mortgage is  l i k e l y  
to require  a la rge r  percentage o f  his sa la ry  in  the form o f  money compared 
w ith  an o lder  man whose fam i ly  has l e f t  school and has been a home owner 
f o r  a number o f  years. The o lder  man on the other  hand may want to 
enhance his re t i rement pension.
The aforegoing serves to i l l u s t r a t e  th a t  ind iv idu a l  pay needs are
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not i d e n t ica l  and hence provides organisat ions with oppo r tun i t ies  to 
package t h e i r  employee's pay to maximise i t s  a t t ra c t ive n e ss .  One way 
th a t  t h i s  may be achieved is  by the in d i v id u a l i s a t i o n  o f  pay packets 
evidence th a t  th i s  type o f  payment system would be acceptable o r ,  more 
p re c ise ly ,  is  desi red, is  shown by the response to quest ion 11 in the 
quest ionnaire . The quest ion was "assuming a f ixed  sum is  ava i lab le  f o r  
pay, which o f  the systems set out below would you p re fe r? " .  Three 
elements, Basic pay. Add it iona l  pension enhancement and Annual bonus 
payments were presented to respondents, in  a series o f  permutat ions, in 
f a c t  a to ta l  o f  7 choices were ava i la b le .  No s ing le  combination was 
preferred to the o thers ,  in d ica t in g  tha t  respondents fiave d i f f e r i n g  pay 
requirements. Fur ther evidence to support the view th a t  employees would 
p re fer  to have t h e i r  pay packets ind iv id u a l ise d  comes from a f i e l d  study 
conducted by Th ie rry  (1980) in co-operat ion with  a large Dutch-owned 
company. The study involved some 400 managers and revealed th a t  the 
m a jo r i ty  preferred some form o f  i n d i v id u a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  pay packet.
A very in te re s t in g  po in t  to emerge from T h ie r ry 's  study was th a t  employees 
underestimate the cost o f f r i n g e  benef i ts  to the organ isa t ion .
A pay system which permits employees to p a r t i c ip a te  in the compila t ion 
of t h e i r  pay packet is  the Cafeter ia  Plan. The core of the Cafeter ia  Plan 
is  th a t  each employee in the organ isat ion may make choices each year or at 
some other  predetermined time, i n t e r v a l ,  among a l t e rn a t i v e  opt ions as to how 
he would l i k e  to get a predetermined par t  o f  his income. A whole range of 
benef i ts  are poss ib le , at lea s t  in  th e o ry . They r e f e r ,  f o r  instance, to 
a shor te r  working week, more leave, educat ional leave, cash pay, p r iva te  
health schemes, and so f o r t h .  The options may be presented to employees 
in a v a r ie ty  o f ways, such as, a ser ies o f  a l t e rn a t i v e  packages out of 
which he may se lec t  one, a l i s t  o f  a l te rn a t ive s  on the basis o f  which
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he designs his own package, or  a combination o f  these two methods. Where 
employees se lec t  t h e i r  own package they would be a l loca ted  a number of 
un i ts  based on t h e i r  grade and perhaps s e n io r i t y  then i t  is  simply a case 
o f  each person compil ing t h e i r  own package u n t i l  the spec i f ied  spend is  
reached. Although t h i s  sounds simple i t  is  recognised th a t  i t  would 
require  considerable adm in is t ra t ive  e f f o r t  to set the system up.
Th ie rry  (1977) suggests th a t  one o f  the most favourable featu res of
the Cafeter ia  Plan is  th a t  i t  has the po ten t ia l  f o r  o f fe r in g  employees a
considerable amount o f  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  in the composition o f  t h e i r  pay 
packet. The Cafeter ia  approach enables a c r i t i c a l  appraisal to be made 
o f  the usefulness as wel l  as the e f fec t iveness  o f  a payment package th a t  is  
tuned to the average employee under average condi t ions with  average needs 
and preferences. F i r s t l y ,  ind iv idu a l  d i f fe rences  among employees a f fe c ts  
the meaning and value o f  money and other  bene f i t s .  Secondly, domestic 
and personal condi t ions are a func t ion  o f  t ime, f o r  example, fa m i ly  s ize ,  
age o f  dependants, mortgage payments, etc and consequently the employee's 
expectat ions and requirements as to the spending o f  his  sa la ry .
In an appraisal o f  employee benef i ts  f o r  'w h i te '  c o l l a r  groups,
Cockman (1982) enunciates an important caveat concerning the ro le  o f
benef i ts  in  a pay system. Cockman asserts tha t  the prime po in t  when 
es tab l ish ing  a complete set o f  benef i ts  is  to re a l i s e  th a t  i t  w i l l  be 
e f fe c t i v e  only so long as the sa la ry  s t ruc tu re  is  s a t i s f a c t o r y . The best 
benef i ts  package may turn a suspect pay system in to  one which is  j u s t  
about acceptable, but i t  w i l l  not turn a bad sa la ry  s t ruc tu re  in to  one 
which is  acceptable. Conversely, a bad benef i ts  package can tu rn  a good 
sa lary  s t ruc tu re  in to  an unacceptable one.
Summary
In our expos i t ion  o f  a l te rn a t iv e s  to the current dockyard pay system 
we consciously focused on performance-related pay, because the other main
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choices o f  emphasis, enumerated by White (1981), have to vary ing degrees 
been examined by Megaw (1982). The Government's preference f o r  some form 
o f  incen t ive  element to be incorporated in  C iv i l  Servants'  pay make i t  
l i k e l y  tha t  some movement on th i s  f r o n t  may wel l  take place s h o r t l y .  The 
dockyards might be a good choice to operate a p i l o t  scheme. F i r s t l y ,  they 
are are e a s i l y  i d e n t i f i a b le  u n i t .  Secondly, they are remote from the 
mainstream C iv i l  Service,
An incen t ive  scheme along the l ines  we have suggested would undoubtedly 
increase the Non- Industr ia l  sa la ry  b i l l .  But we have endeavoured to show
th a t  some o f  the increase in cost would be o f f s e t  by the a b o l i t i o n  o f  T r ia ls  
pay and a reduct ion in overtime working. In add i t ion  the demise or decl ine 
o f  these payments would mean th a t  high gross earnings would be more c lose ly  
re la ted  to performance ra th e r  than place o f  employment in the dockyard i.e. 
posts which a t t r a c t  T r ia ls  pay or provide oppor tun i t ies  to work overt ime. 
However, i t  is  envisaged tha t  the p r in c ip la  savings would accrue from an 
increase in  dockyard output s t imula ted by the Non- Industr ia l  incen t ive  
scheme. Indeed t h i s  would represent the acid te s t  o f  the scheme's 
e f fec t iveness  prov id ing o f  course t l iere is  a r e l i a b le  method f o r  measuring 
changes in dockyard output.
In our conclusions to the study we shal l  concentrate on the performance 
re la ted  pay issue and attempt to draw conclusions concerning the way 
incent ives are l i k e l y  to in t e r a c t  with  other dockyard c h a r a c te r i s t i c s .  The 
re la t io n s h ip  between a pay system and o rgan isa t iona l  c h a ra c te r i s t i c s  i s  in 
many ways analogous to the r e la t io n s h ip  we discussed e a r l i e r  between a 
pay system and i t s  accompanying bene f i ts  package.
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ADDENDUM
De r iv a t io n  o f  £3M Reduction on Shipwork Costs at Rosyth
Breakdown o f  Shipwork Cost as Percentage
Labour 19%
Services 9%
Product ion Overhead 20%
Admin is t ra t ion & General
Overhead 30%
Materia l  22%
Total cost o f  shipwork a t  Rosyth £84M (1979-80) (Source Dockyard Annual
Report 1980).
A 5% increase in  p ro d u c t i v i t y  may be represented as a 5% saving on 
Labour Services, Product ion Overhead and 22% o f  Admin is t ra t ion  and Genera' 
Overhead.
This computation gives:
(19 -t- 9 + 20 f  22) X 84 X 0,05 -  £2.94M — £3M
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS
The assumption which underpins t h i s  study is  th a t  s t im u la t ion  of 
Non In d u s t r ia l  motiva t ion w i l l  r e s u l t  in an overa l l  enhanced performance by 
Naval Dockyard and th i s  w i l l  be re f le c te d  in an enhanced level o f  ship re p a i r  
support to the F lee t ,  We have endeavoured to show th a t  mot iva t ion  is  a 
func t ion  of a m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  d ive rse ,  but i n te r re la te d  fa c to rs .  Prominent 
amongst these are the var iab les  pay, promotion and o rgan isa t iona l  s t ru c tu re  
which form the t r e l l i s  to which the study is  laced.
Attempts to remedy cu r ren t  weaknesses by simply in t roduc ing ,  f o r  
example, a new pay or promotion system w ithout  reference to other  
organ isa t iona l  cons iderat ions such as, the way the work is  organised, is  
l i k e l y  to  r e s u l t  in  a remedy being appl ied to an e f f e c t  instead o f  a 
cause. For c l a r i t y  we sha l l  consider each of the var iab les  separate ly  to 
assess t h e i r  impact and the e f f e c t  th a t  each has on the a t t i tu d e s  and 
behaviour o f  Non- Indus tr ia ls  in dockyards. F in a l l y  the conclusions have 
been set out on the assumption tha t  remedial act ion to improve dockyard 
performance should be accorded a high p r i o r i t y .  Hence proposed so lu t ions  
are not constrained to accord or be cons is tent w ith  cur ren t  p o l i c y  or 
necessar i ly  correspond with  the cu r ren t  lay -o u t  o f  the machinery o f  the 
C iv i l  Service.
Fay
The resu l ts  o f  the survey show very c le a r l y  th a t  the P & T group at 
Rosyth is  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w ith  t h e i r  level o f  pay. Fur ther  evidence of th is  
d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  w ith  pay was demonstrated by the vigorous support given by 
the P & T group at Rosyth fo r  the act ion taken by the CSSU in p u rs u i t  o f  
the c i v i l  servants 1981/82 pay claim,. However, the evidence suggests tha t  
ove ra l l  P r ie s t le y  was operated by the Government and Unions in  a way which
170
succeeded in  keeping C iv i l  Service pay broadly in  l i n e  vn'th outside 
pay. Indeed tak ing in to  account the amount o f  overtime worked a t  Rosyth 
by N on- Indus t r ia ls ,  i t  is  considered th a t  average gross earnings compared 
very favourably  w ith  comparable groups in both the p r iva te  and
nat iona l ised  sector .  Nevertheless the response to the pay quest ions in the
survey demonstrates th a t  there is  a gr ievance about pay. Such a p o la r i t y  
o f  views presents a s ta rk  enigma. How can th is  pay issue be reconci led
with  the publ ished evidence? The IPGS' oos i t ion  is  th a t  high average gross paj
i s  i r r e le v a n t  because these earnings are not d is t r ib u te d  u n i fo rm i l y  amongst 
i t s  members. This is  a very v a l i d  po in t  and provides a powerful 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the organ isat ion attempting to r e d i s t r i b u te  gross 
earnings more evenly amongst employees, Hence the d is p o s i t io n  towards 
some form o f  performance-related pay as a method o f  achieving th i s  goal.
We have s t i l l  not provided a s a t i s fa c to r y  explanat ion f o r  t h i s  pay 
grievance. Despite IPGS p ro te s ta t io ns ,  the evidence c le a r l y  shows th a t  
gross earnings at Rosyth are high and th is  fa c t  is  c e r t a i n l y  not 
re f le c te d  in the response to the quest ionnaire . I f  the P & T group at Rosyth 
do not accept the evidence then we must conclude th a t  th i s  pay grievance is  
a manifestat ion o f  a pay percept ion problem. The existence o f  such things 
as hor izonta l  r e l a t i v i t i e s  between some equivalent grades provides 
re inforcement o f th i s  percept ion.
An ove r r id ing  p r i o r i t y  f o r  the o rgan isa t ion ,  in the area o f  pay, is  
the need to a l t e r  the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  perception concerning his pay. This 
may not be an easy task given the current cons t ra in ts  o f  the cen t ra l ised  
G iv i l  Service pay system. However, the removal o f the hor izonta l  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  between the PTO 11 and HEO which ensued from the now defunct 
Pay Research meachinery which was used fo r  se t t in g  pay rates in the C iv i l  
Service u n t i l  1980 would represent a s i g n i f i c a n t  step in  co r rec t ing  th i s  
percept ion problem. But th i s  prompts the quest ion, what so r t  of
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percept ion would we expect P & T grades to have about pay under normal 
circumstances? Unfor tunate ly  th i s  is  not a d e te rm in is t i c  problem. However, 
Handy (1976) in  discussing the issue suggests th a t  the percept ion o f  most
managers was th a t  they are not rewarded f o r  p a r t i c u la r  re s u l t s ,  but ra the r
f o r  s e n io r i t y  and experience. This p ropos i t ion  has v a l i d i t y  in a system 
where s e n io r i t y  is  the reward f o r  success and pay fo l lows s e n io r i t y .
A r is ing  from our analys is  o f  the pay issue in Chapter 3 is  the pers­
pect ive tha t  c i v i l  servants working in dockyards need to be treated 
d i f f e r e n t l y  from other c i v i l  servants f o r  pay purposes. How may th is  
be effected? We note from the survey (analysis o f quest ion at
Appendix ?.) th a t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  number (60%) o f  P&T grades be l ieve tha t
Naval Dockyards should be separated from the C iv i l  Service, so th a t  
provides one approach. Discussion o f  th i s  r e s u l t  w ith  some members of 
senior management tended to suggest tha t  they as a group were much less 
en thus ias t ic  about separat ing the dockyards from the C iv i l  Service than 
were the Rosyth P & T group.
Howeve^a less d ra s t i c  so lu t ion  would be to delegate r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  
pay to Dockyard Management. Although Megaw (1982) was a t t rac ted  to the 
concept o f  d e c e n t ra l i s a t io n ,  the repo r t  doubted whether the necessary 
f in a n c ia l  and budgetary contro l  exis ted to enable such a system to 
operate e f f e c t i v e l y  anywhere in  the C iv i l  Service. I t  is  speculated tha t  
the in t roduc t ion  o f  a dockyard Trading Fund, as envisaged by the Dockyard 
Study Report (1980), would have probably s a t i s f i e d  the requirement o f  the 
Megaw committee on th i s  issue o f  f in a n c ia l  a c c o u n ta b i l i t y  thus i n c l i n in g  
them to have been favourably  disposed towards a decentra l ised pay 
system fo r  dockyards.
More s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  however, Megaw's (1982) preference f o r  performance 
re la ted  pay p a ra l le l s  our idea tha t  the l i n k  between performance and pay in 
the dockyard needs to be strengthened. Indeed the adopt ion o f  Megaw' s
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recommendation f o r  performance re la ted  pay fo r  the C iv i l  Service would 
represent a fundamental change in  pay p o l i c y .  In th e o re t ica l  terms i t  
would mean a s h i f t  from a pure time based system o f  payment to a system 
o f  payment incorporat ing  a s i g n i f i c a n t  measure o f  payment by re s u l t s .
Drawing together the various threads re la t in g  to pay systems and 
tak ing in to  account the f a c t  tha t '  the P&T group seemed to be in c l in e d  
towards the Dockyard E f f ic ie n c y  Study ind icates tha t  some form o f  
performance re la ted pay system would bene f i t  the dockyards. The propos i t ion  
is  tha t  a f fo rd ing  Non- Industr ia l  the oppor tun i ty  to share in the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  rewards to which they have contr ibu ted  w i l l  improve t h e i r  
mot iva t ion .  Developing th i s  then br ings us to the key dimension of 
the study, namely how can a performance re la ted pay system be introduced 
to accommodate the needs o f  the dockyards. To maximise the bene f i ts  accruing 
from the in t roduc t ion  o f  a performance-related pay system i t  would 
necessar i ly  have to be accompanied by a systematic plan to cliange other  
fac to rs  a f fe c t in g  organ isat iona l  performance. An important fa c to r  in th is  
respect is the need to r e f l e c t  a sense o f  i d e n t i t y  between the j u n io r  P & T 
grades and shopf loor workers, although we expressed caut ion about tak ing 
th is  to extremes.
Before reviewing s p e c i f i c  models f o r  a performance re la ted  pay system 
i t  is important tha t  those who would be responsible f o r  designing an 
incent ive  scheme fo r  dockyard Non-Industr ia l  grades consider i t s  ob jec t ives 
c a r e fu l l y  along with  the c h a ra c te r is t i c s  o f tfie dockyards. They must beware 
of the f a l l a c y  th a t  an a t t r a c t i v e  or c le v e r ly  designed incen t ive  scheme 
is the panacea f o r  symptoms o f  a disease tha t  may be o rgan isa t iona l .  Of 
equal importance to incen t ive  scheme design, is  the way th a t  the scheme 
is implemented and operated. According to recent research by BOWEY (1932)
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an o rgan isa t ion 's  performance is  l i k e l y  to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f fec ted by the 
amount o f  management e f f o r t  involved in es tab l ish ing  and implementing the 
payment scheme. An important ing red ien t  fo r  the continued e f fe c t i v e  
operat ion o f  any incent ive  scheme is  the p a r t i c ip a n ts '  cogn i t ive  
understanding o f  the re la t io n s h ip  between t h e i r  performance and gross pay.
The lack o f  th is  understanding is  one reason why incen t ive  schemes f a i l  to 
meet management's expectat ions al though i t  must be accepted th a t  in  any 
large organ isat ion  the problem of c o n t in u a l ly  re in fo rc in g  the perceived 
l i n k  between performance and gross earnings presents management w ith  an 
unremitt ing  task.
Inc lus ion o f  Non- Industr ia ls  in the DES
This scheme has a t t r a c t i o n s ,  not leas t  o f  them, the fa c t  th a t  the 
survey ind icated tha t  the P & T  group would be favourably  inc l ined  towards 
being included in the DES. This preference was probably inf luenced by the 
view tha t  the i n d u s t r i a l  grade was perceived to have negot iated a good 
deal.  The l in k in g  o f  Non-Industr ia l  grades to the DES would help to 
create a c l imate conducive fo r  fo s te r in g  group consciousness and thus 
es tab l ish ing  a sense o f  i d e n t i t y  between P & T grades and the 'shop f l o o r '  
workers. This would be re in forced by the knowledge th a t  a l l  those who 
contr ibuted to a bonus would share in i t s  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  I t  is  suggested 
tha t  t h i s  type o f  incen t ive  scheme would create oppor tun i t ies  f o r  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l  and In d u s t r ia l  grades to co-operate in d ismantl ing some o f  the 
very r e s t r i c t i v e  and irksome trade pract ices and demarcations. This i s  an 
area where the dockyard could derive meaningful b e n e f i t s ,  by incorpora t ing  
Non-Industr ia l  grades in the DES. Through a combination of many in te r re la te d  
fac to rs  dockyard management in the past have been in h ib i t e d  from carry ing 
through the motiva t iona l  assumptions underpinning the incen t ive  scheme to 
a l l  facets o f  the dockyards. On the one hand oppor tun i t ies  have been missed 
because of trade union res is tance to new technology and techniques and on
the other the impact o f  the incent ive  scheme has not been maintained 
because wider changes th a t  would have re in forced the scheme were not made, 
again p a r t l y  due to Trade Union in t rans igence.
However^it may also be surmised th a t  the inc lus ion  o f  Non- Industr ia l  
grades in the DES would present some long term problems. F i r s t l y  there is  
the quest ion o f  who would be inc luded, i e ,  only P & T grades or a l l  
s p e c ia l i s t  groups working in the General Manager's department. Secondly, 
and more impor tan t ly  is  the e f f e c t  on Non In d u s t r ia l  a t t i t u d e s  by t r e a t in g  
them the same as In d u s t r ia l  grades. A degree o f  dissonance could wel l  
be generated p a r t i c u l a r l y  among supervisory  grades emanating from ce r ta in  
a f f i l i a t i o n s  tha t  they have w ith  shopf loor  workers, which might be re in fo rced  
by t h e i r  inc lus ion  in  the DES, w h i l s t  s imultaenously attempting to behave and 
act as members o f  the management group.
Ind iv idua l  Based Incent ive Scheme
In th i s  type o f  incen t ive  scheme there is  a strong l i n k  between 
performance and rewards w i th  a commensurate e f f e c t  on m ot iva t ion .  A 
c h a ra c te r i s t i c  o f  th i s  type o f  incen t ive  scheme is  th a t  the degree o f  
competit iveness wi th in  the organ isat ion is  heightened. Unfor tunate ly  t h i s  
competit iveness is  usua l ly  accompanied by a dec l ine in group co-operat ion.
We have already suggested th a t  group co-operat ion is  a necessary pre­
re q u is i te  f o r  e f fec t iveness  in a jobbing undertaking. Although an ind iv idu a l  
based incent ive  scheme would s a t i s f y  curren t  th in k in g  on performance 
re la ted  pay i t  would not be cons is ten t  w ith  ship re p a i r  work. I t  is  
important tha t  the payment system is  cons is ten t  with the technology.
Combined In^ i vidual and_Gro^jp Based Incent i v e  Scherne
The assumption underpinning th i s  approach is  th a t  the p o s i t i ve  features 
o f  the Ind iv idua l  and Group Schemes are in tegra ted  to maximise mot iva t ion .  
This type o f  incen t ive  scheme has a number o f  a t t r a c t io n s  and as such would 
provide the basis f o r  a dockyard based incen t ive  scheme.
F i r s t l y  i t  would s a t i s f y  some o f  the innate desires o f  Non- Industr ia ls
to b e ne f i t  more d i r e c t l y  from t h e i r  e f f o r t s  w h i l s t  s imultaneously 
ass is t ing  in  the promotion o f  group consciousness and helping to es tab l ish  
a sense o f  i d e n t i t y  between Non In d u s t r ia l s  and In d u s t r i a l s .  Secondly, i t  v/oul 
modify some o f  the more extreme features o f  the Ind iv idua l  and Group based 
schemes. For example, in a Group based scheme, encompassing both groups, 
there would be po ten t ia l  f o r  the two groups to coalesce and confront 
senior management on issues o f  mutual i n t e re s t .  While from a management 
po in t  o f  view, th is  does have disadvantages, a combined scheme is  neverthe­
less an a t t r a c t i v e  p ropos i t ion .
The in t ro du c t io n  o f  a combined scheme could probably be achieved with 
a minimum o f  cost somewhere in the region o f  an add i t iona l  £V2 m i l l i o n  
a t  Rosyth. As has already been suggested, the group element could be carr ied  
out by l in k in g  the Non In d u s t r ia l s  to the DES and basing the ind iv idua l  
element on the curren t  s t a f f  repo r t .
Of the three models reviewed, the combined bonus scheme probably o f fe rs  
the best so lu t ion  as a method o f  s t im u la t ing  Non- Industr ia l  mot iva t ion .  
However, the precise design and shape o f  such a scheme would be g re a t ly  
in f luenced by p re va i l in g  circumstances.
Pay Determination
Ir respec t ive  o f  whether or not an incent ive  scheme is  introduced in to  
the dockyards there is  a need to set basic pay le v e ls .  How th is  should be 
done in  the C iv i l  Service has been given considerable a t te n t io n  by the 
Government and has been the subject o f  cont inuing debate. The problem is  
very r e a l ;  i f  f o r  example, the pay o f  dockyard s t a f f  does not come w i th in  
some range o f  sa la r ies  paid to s t a f f  w ith  s im i la r  s k i l l s  in  other 
organisat ions then the dockyard may not,  over the medium term, be able to 
r e c r u i t  and re ta in  the s t a f f  i t  needs.
Megaw (1982) advocated th a t  comparison with  outs ide indus t r ies  should 
play a less dominant ro le  than i t  did under the system abol ished in  1980 
fo r  es tab l ish ing  leve ls  o f  pay in the C iv i l  Service. Despite the IPGS
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National Executive Counc i l 's  reservat ions about the fa i rness  o f  pay 
comparab i l i ty ,  the survey revealed th a t  the P & T group a t  Rosyth were 
favourably  disposed to comparab i l i ty  as a method f o r  determining t h e i r  
pay.
R e a l i s t i c a l l y  there is  l i t t l e  a l t e rn a t i v e  to a system based on some 
measure o f  comparab i l i ty  f o r  determining pay leve ls  o f  dockyard s t a f f .  
Although i t  is  te c h n ic a l l y  fe a s ib le  to s t ruc tu re  a system fo r  e s tab l ish ing  
pay leve ls  which is  mainly se n s i t ive  to the o rg an isa t ion 's  a b i l i t y  to 
r e c r u i t  and re ta in  labour, i t  would probably be a recipe fo r  disenchantment 
in p rac t ice .  The response, by the Rosyth P & T group to the quest ion o f  
pay comparab i l i ty  does suggest t h a t  the technique enjoys conf idence. This 
is  despite the fa c t  th a t  the way the system operated between 1976 and 
1980 resulted in hor izon ta l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  emerging between ce r ta in  equ iva len t  
P & T and execut ive grades. The existence o f  these hor izon ta l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  
provides strong j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  advocating th a t  c i v i l  servants working in 
dockyards should be treated d i f f e r e n t l y  f o r  pay purposes.
Promot ion
Turning to the promotion dimension i t  was obvious th a t  t h i s  issue did 
not generate the same leve l o f  emotion as pay. Non- Indus tr ia ls  were 
prepared to discuss the sub jec t  in  a detached manner. The most s i g n i f i c a n t  
po in t  to emerge from the study, r e la t in g  to  the promotion issue, was the 
strong desire by Rosyth P & T grades f o r  local management to have a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  say in determining who should be promoted. Devolving 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  the se lec t ion  o f  s t a f f  f o r  promotion to ind iv idua l  
dockyards would strengthen the perceived, reward-performance l i n k  f o r  Non- 
In d u s t r ia l s  who value the promotion reward. Indeed e x t r i n s i c  outcomes 
can serve as a reward f o r  super ior performance only i f  the organ isat ion 
success fu l ly  measures and recognises the performance. I t  is  our b e l i e f  
th a t  the remoteness which Non- Indus tr ia ls  associate with  the present 
system m i l i t a t e s  against Non- Industr ia ls  c le a r l y  perceiv ing the performance
reward l i n k .  Support f o r  t h i s  view is  i l l u s t r a t e d  by the importance 
Non- Industr ia ls  attach to the automatic r i g h t  they enjoy to appear 
before a se lec t ion  board. Thus there are persuasive arguments f o r  the 
promotion o f  N on- Indus t r ia ls ,  c e r t a i n l y  up to PTO I I  l e v e l ,  to be 
con t ro l led  by each dockyard. Indeed i t  is  understood th a t  Rosyth 
Dockyard has taken act ion so tha t  i t  can inf luence which o f  i t s  Non- 
In d u s t r ia ls  gets selected fo r  promotion. Senior dockyard managers conduct a 
p re l im inary  screening o f  promotion candidates and only the most promising 
are recommended to appear before the Headquarter 's se lec t ion  boards.
The importance of promotion as a reward, is  re la ted  to promotion 
prospects w i th in  the o rgan isa t ion .  The survey showed th a t  approximately 
45% o f  Non- Industr ia ls  had expectat ions concerning promotion, but i t  
should be remembered th a t  the survey was conducted p r io r  to the announcement 
o f the decision to close Chatham and Portsmouth dockyards. I t  is  surmised 
tha t  in  1983 promotion prospects would be assessed as less favourable .
The r e s u l t  o f  our evaluat ion o f  the promotion system and the response 
to quest ions r e la t in g  to promotion ind icates th a t  the promotion dimension 
could mer i t  only minor considerat ion in any system of rewards fo r  
dockyards. I t  i s ,  the re fo re ,  u n l i k e ly  tha t  the promotion reward could be 
deployed to o f f s e t  or compensate fo r  low pay except in the case where 
promotion was ava i lab le  to almost everyone and promotion was accompanied by 
a substan t ia l  pay r i s e ,  c l e a r l y  not a p rac t ica l  opt ion .
Organisational St r u c t u r e
The s t ruc tu re  of the dockyard is  re la ted to the context w i th in  which 
i t  funct ions.  K'e have already mentioned tha t  s ize ,  technology and i n t e r ­
dependence with  the mainstream C iv i l  Service have been of pr imary 
importance in in f luenc ing  the s t ruc tu re  and func t ion ing  of the dockyards.
Current ly  (February 1983) there is  l i t t l e  i n d ic a t io n  of the type of 
dockyard organ isat iona l  s t ruc tu re  which is l i k e l y  to emerge a f t e r  the 
planned contrac t ion  o f  the dockyard serv ice has been completed. The
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recommendation in . th e  Dockyard Study Report (1980), th a t  greater f i n a n c ia l  
a c c o u n ta b i l i t y  should be delegated to ind iv idua l  dockyards has not 
occurred, although i t  i s  believed th a t  there may be some movement in th a t  
d i r e c t io n .  Some idea o f  Government th ink ing  on the way they would wish 
Naval Dockyards to be managed may be in fe r re d  from t h e i r  preference f o r  
p r i v a t i s a t i o n  of some pub l ic  sector in d u s t r ie s .
Although the in t ro d u c t io n  of the Trading Fund idea woulddevolve a large 
measure o f  f in a n c ia l  a c c o u n ta b i l i t y  to each dockyard and provide a ya rd ­
s t i c k  to compare performance i t  would be u n l i k e ly  to solve many o f  the 
dockyards' underlying problems unless accompanied by s t ru c tu ra l  change to 
i t s  o rgan isa t ion .  For example, the curren t  enforced dependence o f  each 
dockyard on the CED's department deprives loca l management o f  the 
f l e x i b i l i t y  to manage trade union power e f f e c t i v e l y .  This dependence 
re in forced by the h ig h ly  bureaucra t ic  s ty le  o f  management, pract ised in 
the C iv i l  Service,causes a concentra t ion o f  power in  the CED's department. 
The s t ra te g ic  importance o f  the r e f i t  work undertaken a t  Rosyth moreover, 
i n v i t e s  vigorous monitor ing of loca l management decisions in the f i e l d  of 
i n d u s t r i a l  re la t io n sh ip s  by the CED department. This behaviour by head­
quarters s t a f f  is  occas iona l ly  j u s t i f i e d  on the p re tex t  o f  ensuring 
commonality o f  standards across the fou r  home dockyards. Nevertheless 
local management tend to perceive th i s  behaviour as unwarranted in te r fe rence  
This coupled with  the h igh ly  bureaucra t ic  s ty le  o f  management pract iced in 
the C iv i l  Service puts a heavy brake on any innovat ion l i k e l y  to improve 
the poor performance o f  Naval Dockyards.
To co r rec t  the d e f ic ie n c ie s  we have i d e n t i f i e d  two th ings th a t  need 
to be done. F i r s t l y ,  each dockyard must be given greater  autonomy to 
manage i t s  own a f f a i r s .  Secondly there needs to  be a s h i f t  to a less 
s t ruc tu red  and mechanist ic s ty le  of management. One way tha t  th i s  might 
be achieved is  by separat ing the dockyards from the C iv i l  Service. Indeed 
the survey showed c l e a r l y  th a t  there was support f o r  such a move amongst the 
P & T group at Rosyth.
A s ta r t i n g  po in t  f o r  th is  process would be the in t ro du c t io n  o f  a 
Trading Fund which would provide a veh ic le  to prepare the ground fo r  
eventual disengagement from the C iv i l  Service.
Potent ia l  f o r  Change
One in te rp re ta t io n  o f  responses to quest ions r e la t in g  to management 
s t ruc tu re  and job s a t i s fa c t i o n  suggest tha t  Non In d u s t r i a l s  may be more 
favourably disposed to change than I t  genera l ly  bel ieved to be the case 
by senior management.
Ampli fy ing comments appended to completed quest ionnaires demonstrated 
tha t  there was concern about the fu tu re  o f  Naval dockyards. This l a t e n t  
po ten t ia l  f o r  change should be exp lo i ted  to enable the two remaining dock­
yards to face the challenge o f  the fu tu re .  There is  an ove r r id ing  re q u i re ­
ment f o r  dockyards to shed decades o f  bad habits and to tack le  lax  working 
arrangements which have been encouraged by management acquiescing to 
unreasonable demands by shop stewards. The react ion  o f  management to 
unremitt ing  Trade Union pressure has to  some extent been inf luenced by 
the enforced dependence o f  dockyards on the CED department. There is  
a need to create a cl imate where local management are accountable f o r  
the dockyard's performance. An essent ia l  p re - re q u is i te  f o r  achieving th i s  
goal is the creat ion  o f  a motivated and proper ly  rewarded lower management
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APPENDIX 1
QUESTIONNAIRE ON SYSTEMS OF REWARD
1. I am carry ing out a study in to  Systems o f  Reward as par t  o f  a p r iva te  
course tha t  I am undertaking at Glasgow U n ive rs i ty .  Would you be prepared 
to a ss is t  me in t h i s  study by completing the enclosed quest ionnaire?
While i t  looks ra the r  d e ta i le d ,  I have t r i e d  to design i t  to be 
answered as simply and as qu ick ly  as is  poss ib le , and i t  should need 
about 20 mi nutes.
2. I have received the General Manager's approval and the concurrence of 
the S ta f f  Associat ion Chairman to administer the quest ionnaire to Dockyard 
s t a f f .
3. This quest ionnaire  is  s t r i c t l y  c o n f id e n t ia l ;  i t s  re su l ts  w i l l  on ly  bt 
used in such a way as to ensure the anonymity o f y o u rs e l f ,
4. I w i l l  be pleased to discuss any aspects o f  the quest ionnaire  or the 
study with  you.
5. Ins t ruc t ions
a. DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE.
b. Please t i c k  the appropria te  l in e  ( i t  is  suggested th a t  you
read through the whole quest ionnaire  before placing any t i c k s ) .
c. Please re tu rn  the quest ionnaire  w i th in  a week to :
A C SCOUGALL 
Room 324
Dockside Test Bui ld ing
NOTE : Questions on DES have been worded assuming acceptance o f  the
scheme.
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1 How do you th ink  th a t  the Dockyard E f f ic ie n cy  Scheme w i l l  a f f e c t  
the e f f i c ie n cy /p ro d u c t ive  output o f  the Dockyard?
Great ly  increase 
Some increase 
No change 
Some decrease 
Great ly  decrease
2. What so r t  o f  deal to the In d u s t r ia ls  do you th in k  th a t  the Dockyard 
E f f ic ie n cy  Scheme represents?
Very good 
Good
Don't  know 
Poor
Very poor
3. How do you th ink  the Dockyard E f f ic ie n cy  Scheme w i l l  a f f e c t  Industrie, 
re la t ions?
Great ly decrease number o f  disputes 
Decrease number of disputes 
No change
Increase number o f  disputes 
Great ly increase number o f  disputes
4. Do you consider th a t  under the Dockyard E f f ic ie n cy  Scheme, to earn 
a p ro d u c t i v i t y  bonus, In d u s t r ia ls  have to work:
Very hard
F a i r l y  hard
About the same
Less than now
Very much less than now
5. How wel l  do you th ink  the management w i l l  be able to measure 
performance?
Very wel l 
F a i r l y  well 
Adequately 
Badly
Very badly
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6. How much importance do you th ink  was attached to the quest ion of 
d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  between Non- Indus tr ia ls  and In d u s t r ia l s  in  the fo rmula t ion 
o f  the Dockyard E f f ic ie n c y  Scheme?
Great importance 
Some importance 
Very l i t t l e  importance 
None
Don't  know
7. How important do you regard the commitment o f  Non- Inuds tr ia ls  in 
determining the success of the Dockyard E f f ic ie n cy  Scheme?
C r i t i c a l l y  important 
Very important 
F a i r l y  impor tant 
Very l i t t l e  importance 
Don't  know
8. How would you describe the react ion of each o f  the fo l lo w ing  to the 
Dockyard E f f ic ie n c y  Scheme? Please t i c k  each l i n e .
1. Senior Management ^îT^Managers
2. Middle Management PPTO
PTO I 
PTO I I
3. Lower Management PTO I I I
PTO IV
4. In d u s t r ia ls  C ra f t
ïïôTFlTFâfT
5. Yourself
Favourable Neutral Unfavourable Don't
know
6. S ta f f  Associat ion
9. What do you th ink  were CED's main ob jec t ives in in t roduc ing  the Dockyard 
E f f ic ie n c y  Scheme? Please t i c k  a maximum of  f i v e .
To increase earnings f o r  employees
To increase output
To improve q u a l i t y  o f  r e f i t s
To improve labour f l e x i b i l i t y  ( loosening o f  trade demarcation)
To reduce stoppage or i n d u s t r i a l  ac t ion .
To reduce absenteeism
To reduce labour turnover  (reduce f low  o f  labour to and from the 
Dockyard)
To reduce overtime working 
To reduce manpower
To reduce the length o f  r e f i t ' s  times 
To improve recru i tment
To motivate and provide more employee commitment 
To reduce d is p a r i t y  o f  earnings among workers
10. How do you th in k  th a t  your pay compares with rates in  outs ide indus t ry  
f o r  comparable work?
a. Basic Pay Very favourably
Favourably 
About the same 
Unfavourably 
Very unfavourably
b. Basic pay + overtime Very favourably
and other  enhancements f-avourab iy 
About the same 
Unfavourably 
Very unfavourably
11. Assuming a f ixed  sum is  ava i lab le  f o r  f in a n c ia l  remunerat ion, which 
o f  the systems set out below would you prefer? Please t i c k  one, or 
s p e c i f i c  other combination.
Basic Pay Set aside fo r  
Pension Enhancement
Bonus Payment 
Annual
100% — -
90% 10
90% - 10
90% 5 5
80% 20
80% 20
80% 10 10
12. Are you able to fo recas t  the amount o f  overtime th a t  you are l i k e l y  to 
work?
Very accurate ly  
Accurate ly  
F a i r l y  accurate ly  
Very l i t t l e  accuracy 
None
13. Do you consider th a t  the amount of overtime you work is
Far too much 
Too much 
About r i g h t  
Too l i t t l e  
Far too l i t t l e
14. Do you th ink  th a t  the award o f  extra pay fo r  special  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  
is  a (eg On Call Al lowance, T r ia ls  Pay)
Very good th ing
Good th ing
Don't  know
Bad th ing  .
Very bad th ing
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15. What do you th ink  of pay comparab i l i ty  as a method of pay determinat ion 
f o r  P & T grades in the Dockyard?
Very des irab le
Desi rable
Don' t  know
Undesirable
Very undesirable
16. How much importance do you attach to your pension?
Great importance 
Some importance 
Very l i t t l e  importance 
None
Haven't thought about i t
17. Do you th ink  tha t  the number o f  candidates ca l led  f o r  promotion board
in te rv iew  in r e la t io n  to the number o f vacancies
Far too many
Too many
About r i g h t
Too few
Far too few
18. How would you assess the way each o f  the fo l lo w ing  mark Annual s t a f f  
reports? Please t i c k  each l in e  as appropr iate to your grade, ie 'Yo u rse l f '
and subordinate'  not app l icab le  to PTO ÎV.
Generously About r i g h t  Too s t r i c t l y
Superiors
Yourself
Subordi nates
186
19. How important do you consider i t  th a t  a l l  s t a f f  a f t e r  5 years in  the 
grade have an automatic r i g h t  to appear before a se lec t ion  board?
Very important
Important
Don't  know
Unimportant
Very unimportant
20. A repor t  on the C iv i l  Service in 1968 was c r i t i c a l  o f  the f a c t  th a t  
se lec t ion  boards f o r  promotion attached too much importance to the 
candidate 's  s e n io r i t y .  How would you assess the present s i tu a t io n ?
Great ly  improve 
Improved 
Don't  know 
S l i g h t l y  worse 
Much worse
21. How much importance do you th in  promotion boards attach to experience 
when se lec t ing  candidates f o r  promotion?
Great importance 
Some importance 
Very l i t t l e  importance 
None
Don't  know
22. How much contro l  do you th in k  th a t  each dockyard should have over the 
se lec t ion  o f  s t a f f  f o r  promotion?
Complete
A s i g n i f i c a n t  amount
A l i t t l e
None
Don't  know
23. Do you th ink  th a t  there should be s p e c i f i c  zones f o r  promotion, eg 
an ind iv idua l  is  only e l i g i b l e  fo r  promotion between 3 to 13 years in a 
grade?
Strongly  agree 
Agree
Don't  know 
Disagree
•Strongly  disagree
24. Hov; do you assess your promotion prospect f o r  promotion in  the 
fu tu re?
Good 
Fai r
Don't  know 
Poor
Very poor
25. Do you consider the a b o l i t i o n  o f  the old type Inspec to r 's  and Foreman 
examination to have been?
Very good decision 
Good decis ion 
Don' t  know 
Bad decis ion 
Very bad decis ion
26. Do you th ink  th a t  the re - in t ro d u c t io n  o f  the post o f  Chargeman, as 
an in d u s t r i a l  grade, in  the Dockyard would be a -
Very good decision 
Good decis ion 
Don't  know 
Bad decision 
Very bad decision
27. Do you th ink  th a t  Dockyard management should be separated from the 
C iv i l  Service?
Most d e f i n i t e l y  
A good idea 
Don't  know 
A bad idea 
D e f in i t e l y  not
28. In your view should p r iva te  ship repa i re rs  be allowed to compete with  
the Royal Dockyards f o r  warship r e f i t s ?  Tick as appropr ia te .
Yes - complete r e f i t
Yes “ selected work package items
Yes - S p e c ia l is t  work only
No
Don't  know
29. How do you th ink  the performance o f  the Dockyards would be a f fec ted 
i f  they had to compete on a commercial basis f o r  warship r e f i t ?
S ig n i f i c a n t  improvement 
Marginal improvement 
No change
Marginal d e te r io ra t io n  
S ig n i f i c a n t  d e te r io ra t io n
30. Have you heard o f  the Dockyard Study?
Yes
No
30. a. I f  yes, what do you th ink  was the purpose o f  the study?
Please t i c k  a maximum of three
(a) To es ta b l ish  why ships come out o f  r e f i t  l a te .
(b) To inves t iga te  ways to reducing the cost o f  warship r e f i t s .
(c) To reduce the Dockyard labour fo rce .
(d) To determine i f  more e f fe c t i v e  use can be made o f  Dockyard
resources.
(e) To examine other methods o f  managing the Dockyards.
( f )  Don't  know
31. Which o f  the fo l low ing  fac to rs  do you consider important f o r  the long 
term v i a b i l i t y  o f  the Dockyards. Please t i c k  a maximum of  th re e .
Dockyard management should be given more freedom to manage in re tu rn  
f o r  greater  a c c o u n ta b i l i t y .
Senior managers should spend longer in  a p a r t i c u la r  post (PPTO and above).
Senior managers should have experience in  in d u s t r i a l  management outs ide
the C iv i l  Service.
In d u s t r ia l  and Non- Industr ia l  earnings should be kept broadly 
compet i t ive with loca in d u s t r y .
Local agreed p ro d u c t i v i t y  schemes suited to the needs o f  each 
Dockyard should be introduced.
Royal Dockyards should compete w i th  p r iva te  ship repa i re rs  f o r  warship
r e f i t s .
A Trading Fund should be introduced.
32. Which o f  the fo l lo w in g  fac to rs  are most important to your job 
s a t is fa c t io n ?
Please t i c k  a maximum o f  th re e
Regular increase in sa la ry
Guaranteed job s e cu r i t y
Opportun ity  f o r  promotion
Fringe benef i ts  eg discount buying
Social f a c i l i t i e s
Generous hol idays with  pay
Shorter hours o f  work
Opportunit ies f o r  overtime
Good S ta f f  Associat ion representa t ion
Healthy and safe working environment
Extra payment f o r  e f f o r t
Job s ta tu s /p re s t ig e
Opportunity f o r  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y
. Opportunity to learn and develop s k i l l s
P a r t i c ip a t io n  in  dec is ion making
Recognition and praise f o r  a job wel l done
Good working re la t io n s h ip
Fa i r  a l l o c a t io n  o f  work load
Equitable in d u s t r i a l  r e la t io n  cl imate
33. How would you describe the degree o f  a u th o r i t y  you have as a 
manager?
A great deal 
Quite a b i t  
Very l i t t l e  
Occasional 
None
34. a. There are e igh t  t i e r s  of management in the Dockyard's management 
s t ru c tu re .  Do you regard th i s  as
Far too many 
Too many 
About r i g h t  
Too few 
Far too few
b. I f  ' too  many' which grade/grades would you abol ish - please s ta te
35. What do you th ink  greater  Trade Union p a r t i c ip a t i o n  in the day to day 
business of the Dockyard w i l l  mean to you as a manager?
More a u th o r i t y .
S l i g h t l y  more a u th o r i t y  
No change 
Less a u th o r i t y  
Much less a u th o r i t y
36. a. Do you th ink  tha t  there has been a decl ine in management 
a u th o r i t y  over the past 10 years in  the Dockyards?
Very considerable 
Considerable 
A l i t t l e  
None
Don't  know
b. I f  yes - what t i e r  o f  management do you th ink  has l o s t  most 
au thor! ty?
Senior Management 
Middle Management 
Lower Management
37. How many immediate subordinates do you d i r e c t l y  supervise?
Nil 
0- 2  
3-4 
5-6 
7-8
9-10 
Over 11
38. What age are you?
Under 21
21-29
30-39
40-49 
50-59 
Over 60
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39. a. Are you married? Yes
No
39. b. I f  yes, how many ch i ld ren  do you have
40. How long have you worked in the Sea System area ( inc lude apprent ice time 
i f  appl icab le)?
(Note Sea System area includes 0-4 years
Dockyards, DGC Faslane e tc )  5-9
10-14 
15-19 
20-24 
Over 25
41. a. How long have you been in your present post?
Under 1 year 
1-2 years 
3-4 years 
Over 5 years
b. How long have you been in your present Grade?
Under 3 years 
3-6 years 
7-9 years
10-12 years 
Over 12 years
Have you any f u r th e r  comments:
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APPENDIX 2
INTRODUCTION
In th i s  appendix væ analyse two quest ions from the survey not 
p rev ious ly  analysed. As reference has been made to the responses to 
'separat ing dockyard management from the C iv i l  Service '  and ' fa c to rs  
important to job s a t i s f a c t i o n ' ,  in  the study i t  was deemed necessary to 
analyse them. Although somewhat peripheral to the main theme o f  the study, 
the responses to both quest ions ra ise  a number o f  in te re s t in g  points 
re levant  to the way dockyards are s t ruc tu red  and operated. These responses 
also provide an in te re s t in g  i n s ig h t  to the a t t i t u d e  o f  P & T grades at 
Rosyth to the d e l i ca te  quest ion o f  o rgan isat iona l  change.
Separating Dockyards from the Ci v i l  Service
Do you th ink  tha t  Dockyard management should be separated from the 
C iv i l  Service.
Most d e f i n i t e l y  
A good idea 
Don't  know 
A bad idea 
D e f in i t e l y  not
The survey shows th a t  72% of PTO I l s  against 55% o f  PTO I l l s  and IVs 
th ink  th a t  dockyards should be separated from the C iv i l  Service. There 
are a number o f  possible explanat ions f o r  th i s  d i f fe rence  o f  perspect ive 
between the two groups. F i r s t l y ,  there is  a view amongst PTO I l s  th a t  
the C iv i l  Service is  ra the r  i n d i f f e r e n t  to t h e i r  s p e c ia l i s t  managerial and 
technical s k i l l s .  Secondly, PTO I l s  may be more aware than t h e i r  
subordinates tha t  ship re p a i r  work and bureaucrat ic  organ isat ions are 
not p a r t i c u l a r l y  compatible. T h i r d l y ,  PTO I l s  are probably less 
complacent and consequently more c r i t i c a l  o f  the cu r ren t  o rgan isat ion than 
t h e i r  subordinates because they are more l i k e l y  to th in k  in  managerial
34 23 23
38 29 34
6 17 14
15 22 13
6 9 16
te rms.
An important considerat ion which undoubtedly inf luenced some 
respondents’ a t t i tu d e s  to the quest ion o f  separat ing dockyards from the 
C iv i l  Servants is  the job se cu r i t y  dimension. P r i v a t i s a t io n  o f  the 
dockyards is  obviously perceived as creat ing uncer ta in ty  in the area o f  
job secu r i t y .  This viewpoint has been incu lcated by the current crop of 
redundancies in  indus t ry  in  general and the sh ipbu i ld ing  sector in 
p a r t i  cu la r .
The response to th i s  question o f  separat ing the dockyards from the 
C iv i l  Service ind icates th a t  there might be less opposit ion than is  
c u r re n t ly  supposed f o r  removing dockyards from the C iv i l  Service.
However, the a t t i t u d e  o f  the Non-Industr ia l  Trade Union would be most 
important as t h e i r  opin ion forming po ten t ia l  is  considerable and a 
c a r e fu l l y  orchestrated campaign by them could s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a l t e r  curren t  
views.
Job Sati sf a c t 1 on
Which of the fo l lo w ing  fac to rs  are most important to your job 
sa t i  s fact ion?
Please t i c k  a maximum of three
No %
Extra payment f o r  e f f o r t 30 12
Job S ta tus /p res t ige 20 8
Opportunity f o r  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y 96 38
Opportunity to learn and develop s k i l l s 76 30
P a r t i c ip a t io n  in decision making 90 36
Recognit ion and praise fo r  a job wel l done 37 15
Good working re la t io n s h ip 86 34
Fa i r  a l l o c a t io n  of work load 19 8
Equitable i n d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n  cl imate ■ 14 6
Regular increase in sa la ry 70 28
Guaranteed job secu r i ty 71 28
Opportunity f o r  promotion 65 26
Fringe benef i ts  eg discount buying 1
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No %
Generous holidays w ith  pay 13 5
Shorter hours o f  work 6 2
Opportunit ies fo r  overtime 10 4
Good S ta f f  Associat ion representat ion 4 2
Healthy and safe working environment 28 11
n = 254
The way. respondents have ranked the array o f  fac to rs  considered 
important in producing job s a t i s fa c t io n  provides a useful guide f o r  the 
d i re c t io n  th a t  any organ isat iona l  change should take. For example, 
there is  good c o r re la t io n  between the fa c to r  heading the l i s t ,  'Oppor tun ity  
f o r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' ,  and the desire to see fewer t i e r s  o f  management in 
the dockyard's h ie ra rch ica l  s t ruc tu re  (Chapter 7 question No 7 . x i i ) .
The second most popular f a c to r ,  ' p a r t i c ip a t i n g  in decision making' ,  
is  u n l i k e ly  to be s a t i s f i e d  by or reconc i led with  the bureaucrat ic  s ty le  of 
management cu r re n t ly  pract ised in dockyards. There is  a need to develop 
a type of communication which consis ts  of in format ion and advice ra the r  
than in s t ru c t io n s  and decis ions. To achieve any meaningful degree of 
p a r t i c ip a t i o n  would necessi ta te  a fundamental change in the way dockyards 
are s t ruc tu red .
The t h i r d  most popular f a c to r ,  'Good working r e l a t i o n s h ip ' ,  
suggests tha t  P & T grades would welcome any move to strengthen the sense 
o f  i d e n t i t y  between themselves and the 'shop f loo r '  workers.
Perhaps the most impor tant po in t  to emerge, is  the pos i t ion  in  the 
pecking order o f ,  ' regu la r  increase in sal any This r e s u l t  may seem 
somewhat ambiguous in view o f  the controversy surrounding the pay issue 
in recent years. However, what th is  r e s u l t  does tend to suggest is  th a t  
job s a t i s fa c t io n  is  u n l i k e ly  to be produced by the simple expediency o f  
increasing the frequence o f  sa la ry  increases, f o r  example.
Overal l  the response to th i s  m u l t ip le  se lec t ion  quest ion suggests 
tha t  enhancement of job s a t i s fa c t io n  is  u n l i k e ly  to be achieved w ithout  
rad ica l  changes to the dockyard's s t ruc tu re  and s ty le  o f  management.
APPENDIX 3 
MEASURING DOCKYARD OUTPUT
In troduc t ion
There are two points fundamental to any i n d u s t r ia l  incen t ive  scheme. 
F i r s t l y ,  the a b i l i t y  to measure performance, although i t  is  not the 
absolute value o f  performance which is  so important as the change in 
performance from some reference po in t .  Secondly, es tab l ish ing  a r e l a t i o n ­
ship between performance and pay which w i l l  reward employees fo r  increased 
performance.
There are a number o f  methods tha t  could be used to measure changes 
in dockyard performance, ranging from the simple to the complex w ith  
concomitant degrees of accuracy. For example, a simple method could be 
based on the present method f o r  measuring the cost o f  resources a l located 
to a warship r e f i t .  Cur ren t ly ,  the 'Man-week' is  the u n i t  used f o r  
budgetary purposes fo r  r e f i t s .  A simple scheme to measure performance could 
be based on comparing the budgeted Man-week a l lo c a t io n  with the actual Man- 
week expenditure fo r  the r e f i t .  I f  the actual expenditure was less than 
the planned inpu t ,  th is  would represent a saving prov id ing the work 
content had remained the same. However, such a system would be r e l a t i v e l y  
crude and i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to measure the co n t r ib u t io n  made by 
In d u s t r ia ls  employed on mainta in ing dockyard services f o r  example.
We w i l l  describe the system o f  performance measurement c u r re n t ly  used 
f o r  the Dockyard E f f ic ie n cy  Scheme (DES). This scheme which is  based on 
work measurement to BS 3138 establ ishes Standard times fo r  jobs ,  although 
a d e r iva t i ve  o f  the Standard time technique (comparative est imat ing)  is  
mainly used fo r  work measurement purposes in the dockyards.
Standard Time
The Standard time f o r  a job is  establ ished by the fo l low ing  process:
a. The job is  broken down in to  a number of separate elements and a
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descr ip t ion  o f  each element is  recorded on the time study sheet.
b. The time taken fo r  each element is  recorded on a time sheet.
c. As each element time is  noted, a ra t ing  fa c to r  f o r  th a t  time 
is  recorded also alongside. This is  the time study engineer 's  
assessment o f  the speed and e f fec t iveness o f  the operator in carry ing 
out th a t  p a r t i c u la r  element, r e l a t i v e  to 100, which is  'standard 
performance' on the B r i t i s h  Standard scale.
d. Having obtained a ser ies o f  element times and ra t ings  in  th is  
way the next stage is  to determine what would have been those times 
at standard performance. This is  known as 'basic  t im e ' ,  which is  
computed as fo l low s :
Basic Time = Observed t i me x Observed r a t i n g 
Standard ra t in g  ( ie  100)
e. When the basic times have been worked out a re laxa t ion  allowance 
is  added to each time. This allowance varies according to the nature 
o f  the work and can range from f i v e  per cent f o r  l i g h t  work to f i f t y  
per cent f o r  heavy work,
f .  F in a l l y ,  the basic t imes, increased by the appropria te  re la xa t io n  
allowances., are added together to give the Standard time fo r  the job. 
Because work associated with  ship re p a i r  consists la rg e ly  o f jobs of
f a i r l y  long durat ion (perhaps several hours or even days) and w ith  d e ta i l  
d i f fe rences  between one another, attempting to apply a Standard time to 
each job would be extremely d i f f i c u l t .  Thus in the dockyards 'Comparative 
es t imat ing '  is  used f o r  work measurement.
Compara t i v e  Est imating
The core of th is  technique is to bu i ld  up a ser ies of standard 
times f o r  a I'ange of t yp ica l  jobs which are known as bench-mark jobs.
Tasks f o r  which there is  no t ime-value are compared with  the nearest 
bench mark job and. a l l o t t e d  a time on th i s  basis.  In order to a ss is t  
the est imator  the p rac t ice  o f  ' s l o t t i n g '  is  used. Slots are ranges of
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t imes, say 0 -  1 hours, 1 - 1.5 hours etc up to perhaps f i f t y  hours, 
each with  a mean value. I f  a job which is  to be ca r r ied  out is  s im i la r  
to a bench-mark job with  a time value of 1.2 hours, i t  i s  placed in 
the 1 -  1.5 s l o t  and a l loca ted  a time o f  1.5 hours.
A s p e c ia l i s t  group ex is ts  in  the dockyard (PTO IV Est imators) to 
ca r ry  out the task of est imating the work content o f  jobs.  They are 
attached to production trade centres and t h e i r  job is  to examine work 
in s t r u c t i o n s ,  which contains a de ta i led  descr ip t ion  o f  the job and a l loca te  
a time f o r  the job.
Performance is  determined by the r a t i o  o f  work done, in Standard 
hours, to the actual time taken to do the work. This r a t i o  is  termed 
the U t i l i s a t i o n  fa c to r  and fa m i l ie s  o f  these may be produced to a ss is t  
in  planning and c o n t ro l l i n g  work. For example, by computing the r a t i o  
o f work done, in Standard hours, to the actual time taken, f o r  a ser ies 
o f  jobs undertaken by a work gang or trade centres, U t i l i s a t i o n  fac to rs  
could be generated to compare performance between d i f f e r e n t  groups. In 
Figure 8.8 th is  idea has been used to enable more o b jec t ive  repor t ing  
standards to be achieved f o r  'L ine '  P & T grades, ie the performance o f  
a superv isor 's  work-gang would in f luence his s t a f f  repor t  assessments.
To cater  f o r  wa i t ing  t ime, which is  a special  feature  o f  warship 
r e f i t t i n g ,  uncontro l led and d iver ted a c t i v i t i e s  special  c re d i t in g  ru les  
have been desired f o r  the DESi They are appl ied to the U t i l i s a t i o n  
Factor to produce the Bonus Performance Factor.
L ink i  ng Per fo  m an ce to Pay
Bonus payments are computed from the r a t i o  o f  Bonus Performance 
Factor to a Datum Productive Bonus Factor ,  the l a t t e r  being computed f o r  
each dockyard at the s t a r t  o f  the DES and based upon performance leve ls  
achieved before implementat ion, These bonus ra t io s  are produced every 
four  weeks in  the case o f  the DES and these values determine the Productive
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onus Level as a.percentage o f  basic pay to be appl ied during the fo l low ing  
fou r  weeks.
Set out below is a graph which re la tes  the Bonus as a percentage o f  
basic pay to Product ive Bonus Performance, The slope o f  the Bonus Line 
and the po in t  which i t  in te rsec ts  the X axis would be a m a t te r - fo r  
n e g o t ia t io n ,
Bonus as 
a % o f
Basic Pay
15
10
5
100 105 110 115 120
Product ive Bonus Performance 
Bonus are normally paid a t  p la in  time rate fo r  e l i g i b l e  hours of 
recorded attendances. This i s  done simply to ensure th a t  employees who 
are absent do not b e n e f i t  from the endeavours o f  t h e i r  colleagues.
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